Love in Henry More's *Enchiridion Ethicum*

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Certification of Approval

I certify that I have read Love in Henry More's *Enchiridion Ethicum* by Evan Turner Prier, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy at San Francisco State University.

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The Cambridge Platonists were a group of English Christian Philosophers of the 17th century, who argue for a view of moral knowledge that allowed both subjective sentiment and objective reason to be sources of knowledge of the Good. Contemporary scholar Michael Gill, in *The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics*, outlines the ways in which this attempt to reconcile the two means of moral knowledge fell short in argumentation, and was not compelling enough to prevent the emergence of secular ethics. However, I will argue that an effective case for the compatibility of reason and sentiment is made by Cambridge Platonist Henry More, in his manual on ethics entitled *Enchiridion Ethicum*, translating to *An Account of Virtue*. He does this by presenting three faculties of the soul, where true moral knowledge comes directly from God via those faculties, innately within each human soul. Right Reason, one faculty, imbues the soul with objective rational moral knowledge. Intellectual Love, another faculty, drives the beneficent feelings within us, which reshapes our will to act in the best possible way towards our fellow man.
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Introduction

The Cambridge Platonists were a group of English Scholars of the 17th century, who sought to maintain a philosophical view of religion in a rapidly changing world. Particularly, they were interested in maintaining a beneficent view of human moral nature. This takes place against a cultural backdrop of Reformation Calvinism, with its doctrine of absolute depravity, and the Hobbesian moral framework of egoism and voluntarism. The Platonists defended a position of free will, and innate goodness of humanity as a basis for morality. These Cambridge scholars drew on a variety of philosophical sources, from Aristotle and the Stoics, to Descartes, their contemporary. However, their centering of Plato’s views, like for example the belief that all knowledge is recollection, has made the label "Platonists" fitting. Among the most well remembered of that group were Ralph Cudworth and Henry More.

Michael Gill, in a contemporary analysis, characterizes the Cambridge Platonists like Cudworth and More as navigating the heart of religion, and engaged in conversation on the origin of morality within a person’s soul. Far from reflecting their times, Gill takes them to be counter-cultural, against the materialist Hobbesians and religious Calvinists alike (Gill, British Moralists, 2006 p. 32). In reviewing two sermons that Ralph Cudworth gave, one at the Society of Lincolnes Inn, the other to the House of Commons, Gill identifies “the heart,” or loving sentiment for one’s fellow man from an experience of God as the central aspect to religion. However, for Cudworth specifically, Gill sees this assertion as a temporary position before
defending the views we conventionally consider part of early modern rationalism. That is, he moved to the position that the exclusive source for moral truths are strict, universally verifiable truth claims. This kind of universality is normally associated with the kind of statements made in mathematics. To Gill, this change is a point of tension or inconsistency between two mutually exclusive sources of knowledge: Reason and sentiment. This change is seen by Gill as Cudworth as abandoning sentiment as an unstable philosophical grounding and marking the failure of that aspect of the Cambridge Platonist project. One could see Henry More's works as doing a similar shift, vacillating between sentiment and reason as sources of moral knowledge, never successfully joining them.

It is in the 1647 sermons where Gill suggests Cudworth identifies the departure from true religion in 1640s England. This was an era of escalation of religious tension during the English Civil War, from 1642-51. In the sermons, Cudworth asserts that the practice of religion needs to shift its focus. He suggests the ritualistic, liturgical, and external aspects of religion were superfluous to its ultimate purpose, the transformation of one’s soul towards God (Gill p. 33-35). This left him in at odds with most other parties in his cultural context. While religious freedom was being fought over, both sides had a particular theological position, and dedication to external rituals that were supposedly the correct method of practicing religion. Cudworth thought these disagreements were missing the point entirely.

As Gill explains, Cudworth’s heart of religion begins with a positive view of human nature: that humanity has the spirit of God already within us, and we access it through feeling,
expressed as a divine light. At Lincolne’s, he explains how this interior heart is both practical and metaphysical,

The First Degree (of Victory over sin) whereof is a Principle of New life, infused into the Soul by the Spirit of Christ through Faith, (which the Apostle calls Semen Dei, the Seed of God) inclining it to love God and Righteousness as a thing correspondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuously in the ways of God, out of a living Law written upon the Heart, and to eschew Sin as contrary to a vital Principle (Cudworth, A Sermon preached to the Honourable Society of Lincolnes-Inne, 1664).

Cudworth hints at what Gill would characterize as one of his early foundational concepts: That human nature has a divine spark within it, and to act in accordance to God, is to act to a set of rules that have already been written on our souls (Cudworth, 1664). The purpose of life is to discover that spark within and cultivate it. Goodness is not something wholly external that can only be brought by a specific church or ritual. Those divine rules already exist as a seed within each human soul. By acting virtuously, a person acts from something that exists within us already (Gill, p. 20).

Another important trait of the Cambridge Platonists’s view is that a foundational trait of the spirit of divinity we possess innately, is that it is fundamentally beyond expression. In his sermon to the British Parliament’s House of Commons. Here Cudworth states, “there is a Soul, and Spirit of divine Truths, that could never yet be congealed into Inke, that could never be blotted upon Paper,” (Cudworth, 1674 Common’s speech). To those who advocate for the heart
of religion as being this divine light, this is a transformative, powerful religious experience and
state of the soul. Our heart, and life is irreversibly changed in a way that we cannot describe. If
the heart of religion is indescribable, and is something that is internal, this would undermine the
centrality of scripture, the description of right and wrong, and theology based off interpretation
of text. The experience itself, and the events that come from that experience must be center.

With the focus on this internal change, and the indescribability of the experience,
coupled with the focus on our ability to perform good actions, our moral acts and moral decision
making take a new shape. Actions flow freely from this heart changed by the divine light within
us, which presents a view different Christianity to the Platonist's contemporaries, like
Calvinism's Voluntarism. Gill sees this emphasis on feeling as central to moral knowledge as
being moral sentimentalism. In general, moral sentimentalism is the notion that the heart of
morality lies in the feelings one has. In this case, it comes from divine light. This conception of
the divine light and the transformative experience it brings to one's moral life, and the
intellectual part of the soul, is not unique to the Cambridge Platonists, and has been referenced
by philosophers and theologians throughout Christian thought. This is the sentimentalist side of

\[\text{[1 Notable examples of the use of the divine light in moral knowledge are in Augustine's}\ On\ the\ Trinity,\ 14.21,\ and\ Aquinas\ in\ the\ Summa\ Theologica\ La\ 84-89.1,\ and\ De\ Veritate\ 10.6c,\ and\ Maximus\ the\ Confessor\ in\ Four\ Hundred}\]
the Cambridge Platonists: That feeling and internal, indescribable transformation are the center of religion.

Gill draws a contrast between focusing on the spirit in Cudworth's early work and the philosophical content of his posthumous work, “Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality” (TEIM).2 In it, Gill suggests that Cudworth is seeking to establish an objective and mathematical model of morality. This would be something that can be demonstrated or proven beyond all doubt, and that originates in the power of the soul (which holds reason) (Gill p. 43). For Cudworth, the standard for proof of knowledge of morality in this case is like mathematics. If it cannot be universally demonstrated, it is not the case that such a thing is moral. This high standard for moral knowledge is described by what Gill calls "the Necessity of Morals Thesis": "if what we think of as morality turns out to be based on merely contingent facts, then we will have to conclude that morality doesn't exist" (Gill, p. 43).

Texts on Love, 2.48 . Contemporary to the Cambridge Platonists, The English Dissenters like Quakers, Ranters, etc. all had a primary religious epistemology of divine light, which was a major social issue of the day.

2 Referred to as TEIM throughout the rest of this text.
As Gill explains, Cudworth’s rationalism as presented in TEIM is as follows. First, objects of reason are fixed and immutable --that is, by their nature do not change regardless of how we consider them. Second, that because they can only be thought of, and they are fixed and immutable, then they only exist in intellect. Third, Cudworth asks what kind of mind can maintain these kinds of ideas, and what kind of mind has those traits? The answer is God. The way we access the mind of God is by exercising our rational faculties. To be rational is to access the mind of God (47-48). This kind of access with God’s mind is participation, which, as Cudworth’s analysis of the spirit of religion holds, is already within each person.

Why such a complex structure of mind, and what is the need for rationalist proofs? According to Gill, this movement from sentiment to reason was due to the pressure put upon moral motivation by his era’s two largest competitors: his Calvinist voluntarist counterparts and the Hobbesians, who, as Gill puts it, both “maintain that our moral duties originate in the commands of a being with great power. In the case of Hobbes it is the sovereign, in the case of the voluntarists it is God,” (Gill p. 44). Both of their moral motivations come from fear, while Cudworth of course believed this needed to come from a place of love, and have logical necessity. This was not something entirely unusual for the time, Cudworth was one of many philosophers who put his hopes in a morality equal in demonstrable necessity to that of geometry, logic, and mathematics.
On a rationalist view, like the one Gill maintains Cudworth is defending, in order to have knowledge, we must have innate knowledge of the nature of that thing (Gill p 45). This innateness comes from the view that there are foundational truths of the universe that we have access to from birth and are provable, like those of mathematics. Of course, that model would preclude true moral knowledge to come from what one sees or takes in via sense perception in any way, except as demonstration of those truths (Gill p 46). Religious knowledge without sense perception as a source of knowledge would seem to include divine revelation, or any kind of religious experience. This creates a problem, as Gill sees it: if religious truth is the true metaphysical state of affairs in the universe, and the heart of religious truth is indescribable and innate, then the moral laws of the universe being geometric and necessarily demonstrably true seems at least in tension, if not contradictory (Gill p 47). However, Gill sees the Cambridge Platonists as failing to resolve this tension, instead going back and forth between these two foci.

What explains the tension between these two views of Cudworth, or the development from one view to the other? Gill attributes sociopolitical context in which the scholars worked to explain these seemingly disparate accounts.

Gill identifies the start of the shift in 1647, when Cudworth initially gave his sermons at Lincolnes and the House of Commons. Cudworth echoed the history of divine light in Christian thought although his use of divine light was uniquely formulated (Gill p 56). However, many of the other movements embraced inner light as a concept. Ranters and Quakers, among other traditions, were said to have used divine revelation as justification to overturn the societal norms
of the day. A religious experience could justify dissent up to and including law-breaking and revolutionary ideology. Having God tell a person to ignore the laws of man, and that the command was brought by divine revelation, is non-falsifiable and self-justifying, and excludes any external observers from being able to protest. Gill suggests that Cudworth would have wanted to distance himself from such positions.

To properly distance himself, Cudworth would need to change the seat of morality. This would have precipitated the change from the focus on sentiment in the sermons of 1647, to the later rationalist case in TEIM. Thus, the shift over time “from the heart to the head” that Gill identifies in More takes place (Gill p. 57). The rationalism of TEIM offers a firm foundation for goodness that might otherwise be entirely reliant on one’s internal feeling, and still can retain the rational conception of the Good. According to Gill, this would create enough ideological distance from all relevant antagonist groups of Cudworth’s time, while resolving the tension of the rational and sentimental. However, Gill sees that the two faculties were never ultimately joined, and that the combination was never widely adopted. That can be considered a failure of this part of the Cambridge Platonist project.

However, I contend that Cudworth did not need to pick between the rational and sentimental, whether due to philosophical reasons, or social ones. Those reasons may have played a role in the shifts of individual Cambridge Platonists, or may not have, but I argue there is a potential resolution to Gill’s tension. This solution would be a successful joining of the Cambridge Platonist’s moral sources. There is a model that show the rational and sentimental are
synergistic as sources of moral knowledge, rather than mutually exclusive. That unifying system can be found in Henry More’s exploration of the soul in the *Enchiridion Ethicum*, or *Account of Virtue*. His model of the soul as it pertains to morality can offer a model that uses both heart and head to acquire moral knowledge, without excluding the other necessarily. In order to understand the framework for the soul More refers to, I will examine the actions of his model of the soul referred to as the Boniform Faculty of the soul, Right Reason, and Intellectual Love. I will describe how they are referred to in the *Enchiridion Ethicum*. and discuss how they will resolve this tension and provide a framework in which the objective rational and subjective sentimental are ultimately compatible and complementary.
The Faculties of the Soul

A. The Boniform Faculty of the Soul

More's discussion of faculties of the mind comes after he outlines a groundwork for virtue. First, why we may want to be virtuous, and what virtue is. The Boniform faculty is first introduced when discussing how one internalizes these qualities. It is a "Power of the soul" (Gill p. 43), something that the soul can do. The Boniform Faculty is posed as the seat of the quality of supreme happiness in the human soul. It occurs when one is acting in accordance with our divine nature, and is that which has access to the divine (More, Enchiridion Ethicum, 1.2.5). This faculty of the soul has the feeling that allows for more than just conformity with the divine, and more than simple rational intellection. It is the very means of connection to God in the soul (2.3.4). One can be good and moral before it is active, but it is active when we are in our most morally purified state. As part of all souls, it has the capability of distinguishing what is good among good things, and ranks those good things. It also internally actively pulls us towards what is excellent, which is ultimately God. More himself identifies the faculty as adjacent to the concept of the will, in that when our will is perfected, our moral decisions are coming through the Boniform Faculty in an active and motivating role within an individual when they are at their best (1.2.5).

One begins to activate their own Boniform Faculty when one knows the innate nature of things in the world. As it applies to the soul, this means that it activates when we know how to
correctly apply each desire and virtue properly, and are happy to do so (1.2.5). This is the heart of virtue for More. When we are fully virtuous, we must also be happy (1.2.2). More wants to establish not merely the fulfillment of goodness in living morally right, but he claims that the type of life that is truly good should also be a happy life. The one who is truly virtuous, particularly in the fulfillment of the good innate desires of one's own soul, and enacts those good desires, would ideally be happy to do so. This is happiness in the way it comes from God as it pertains to morality, and all takes place in the Boniform Faculty. How does one get to this point of an inward feeling of goodness from God, particularly when we do good? Through the practice of the virtues, as he elucidates in the third book of the *Ethicum* ³(1.3.7).

³ More describes various ways of understanding the Boniform faculty of the soul; "the Divine Life was not a matter of Sapience only, but was principally to consist in Love, Benignity, and in Beneficence or Well-doing. For these are the Fruits of that Celestial Particle of the Soul, which we term the Boniform; and by which, above any other Accessions, we are made most like unto Almighty God." (1.3.10) In this we see that he is tying the feeling with both acts, and general sentiment. These emanating qualities are things we can always do, and are emerging from the Boniform Faculty. When he introduces the Noemas, or moral rules that are "Irresistibly true" 1.4.1-2, he suggests that the Boniform Faculty must be set aside, as these are for those without that inward sense of Goodness. It appears that the Boniform faculty is not going from simply congruence with the acts to Virtue, but when someone is
How to conceptualize the Boniform Faculty has not been met with a scholarly consensus. Gill sees it as a continuation of the sentimental movement as a whole (Gill p. 89). Aharon Lichtenstein calls More’s description of the Boniform Faculty itself inconsistent, arguing that More at times is prioritizing its rational capacity in moral decision making, and at others is conceiving it as a moral sense (Lichtensten, p. 66-7). Dolson describes it as a “blind intellectual impulse,” lacking clarity, as it includes aspects of both the rational and sentimental, not meeting either in a satisfactory way (Dolson, *The Ethical System of Henry More*, p. 599). Dolson also points out that it is the source of one’s innate sense of the good, which More points out as rendering external senses of the good unnecessary. Although the Boniform Faculty is ambiguously categorized, as we will see with the rest of the faculties, it is clear More regards this as both innate and divine.

**B. Right Reason**

Right Reason, another power of the soul, is more distinctly aligned with a geometric understanding of truth and goodness as it relates rationalism and the intellect. That is, it is a provable, immutable, innate set of rules written within us. More describes Right Reason as “a delighted in the goodness of those acts and ability to see them according to their object, that is when they are stirring in the Boniform faculty. It serves to fulfill the other half of More's goodness and happiness requirement.
sort of Copy or Transcript of that Reason or Law eternal which is registered in the Mind Divine,”
and is a power to do with intellect within the soul (1.3.5). Everything Right Reason judges to be
the best is the best. The pursuit of those things that Right Reason determines is best is the height
of virtue (1.3.6). More describes Right Reason as a power or force that operates as the judgement
(or act of judgement) within a prudent person (2.2.6). However, given More’s reference to its
existence in the “mind divine,” it is also from God, and within God’s mind, the place of all
objective truth. As Right Reason takes place in the Boniform Faculty, that which senses the
divine, it is also divine in nature, though interacts between God's laws and our understanding,
acting as an interpreter of the law (1.3.4). The law that interprets is that which is "registered in
the mind Divine,” but specifically accesses divine Reason. Virtue, as it pertains to this faculty, is
that to do the acts which Right Reason considers the best (1.3.5). More does refer to it more
often in terms of a type of law to be followed, though it too is innate.

This relation of the rationalist to the sentimentalist is immediately vexing to the scholarly
commentary. Lichtenstein asserts it as "the correspondence of the human soul with a set of
fundamental absolute truths” innately within us, in line with a conventional understanding of
rationalist morality: that objective and verifiable moral truths are imprinted upon us innately,
accessible through the intellect. (Lichtenstein, p. 56). However, Lichtenstein also asserts that
when coupled with the Boniform Faculty, they seem confused and contradictory. In doing so, He
is explicitly echoing Grace Dolson, who says that More’s structure of Right Reason and the
Boniform Faculty are inconsistent (Dolson, p. 600-602). They seem to be aligning the reason and
sentiment in ways that are fundamentally unacceptable. The discussion around this tension are close to the root of Gill's initial criticism: That the Cambridge Platonists are trying to juggle two opposing moral foundations, the sentimental and rational, or the Will and Intellect, as Lichtenstein refers to it, and that they are fundamentally incompatible.

c. Intellectual Love

Intellectual Love is the third power of the soul that More presents. When he initially defines it, he poses the problem that Right Reason (that exists within the Boniform Faculty) must have a guiding standard or reason itself, and that the reformed or perfected person could not have Right Reason alone, but some further inward sense that is the foundation for human good (2.9.13). He identifies this ultimate, "primitive" good as Love. This love has qualities that make it worth noting, and can help explain how More understands sentiment and the divine as interconnected.

...[T]his inward Life and Sense points singly at that Idea, which is framed not from exterior things, but from the Relish and intrinsic Feeling of the Boniform Faculty within. And although this Idea be but single and alone, yet from thence arise all the Shapes and Modes of Virtue and of Welldoing. (2.9.16)
This is love that that is taking place in the intellectual part of the soul, but it is from God, and also exists within all of us innately. It acts to evaluate the best acts, but also is what turns one's conscience towards God, which is the source of the Good, and the ultimate Good itself (2.9.15). This Love is one of the key tools for us More says, “this Love from the Body; but either from the Soul itself, or else from God above, who calls and quickens the Soul to such a Divine Effort” (2.9.17). Here he is establishing the true interconnectedness of the divine, our moral impulses and acts towards goodness. However, its power has a more fundamental, transformative power for the soul. It successfully remedies any defect in the soul which separates it from participation in the mind of God. More emphasizes it as a feeling yet is the means by which Reason itself is judged (2.9.16). It is active in its work in the soul, but when the soul experiences Intellectual Love, the soul becomes still, having reached the apex of its development, and is as restored to original state as it can be. It is the culmination of all of our practice of virtue, in a deep connection with God: the feeling of beneficence to our fellow man, the intellectual rules of God, and our connection to God in our experience and feeling.

What does Intellectual Love do with these feelings? More poses it as something that keeps our soul as good as it can be, or the purification of the parts yet to be restored to the state of love to which our souls are intended.

If any of these Parcels appear defective or discompos’d, the Soul compassionates and brings help, strenuously endeavoring, as it is able, to restore everything to that state of Felicity, which God and nature intended for it. In short, it turns all its Faculties to make
good Men happy; and all its Care and Discipline is to make bad Men good. (More, 2.9.15, p. 157).

He identifies that while some parts of the soul can be purified, others may lag behind and still require work. It is Intellectual Love that extends through our whole being and aligns it to that which God intended for it. Not only is the base morality served, but More is arguing that simply doing the right thing is not the ultimate form of morality on its own, but that the truly purified soul is also happy in doing so, and that all moral acts flow from that happiness, and feeling of care and love of humankind.

This is not a passion in the conventional sense, which would suggest that it comes from the appetitive part of the soul⁴. More denies that it comes from the appetitive part of the soul, but prioritizes it over Intellection, as it is a "a firm and unshaken Benignity, or Bounty of the Soul; such as has nothing more perfect, or more approaching to the immortal Gods." (2.9.18). More directly links this feeling or experience to that which makes God and good spirits what they are, as opposed to devils. It would not be the rational part of the soul that is what truly a good soul, but that benignity, with Reason alongside. Either way, in terms of ethics, More is presenting the

⁴ As would be the case in the conventional Platonist account.
emergence of this love to be as close to God as one can possibly be. However, Right Reason is always operating as a judge.

Lichtenstein identifies Intellectual love as "complementing the purified intellect." acknowledging a type of synergy within the soul, but still is identified with the will alone. He suggests More as working to fuse the faculties of reason and faith, or the intellectual and sentimental, by making the source and pinnacle of reason to be something of the sentiment (Lichteinstein p. 68-69). This puts More in the category of sentimentalists. For Liechtenstein, it further points to More grasping at the deiform: a person whose mind is as close to God's as possible, such that their nature takes the form of God. This is derived from More's own writing in various places in the Ethicam, “such as has nothing more perfect, or more approaching to the immortal Gods” (More, 2.9.18). He sees it as a worthy attempt at an expression of fusing the intellectual and will, but that it still subordinates the intellectual aspect to the Will, while identifying that will as the center of the soul in More’s philosophy (Lichtenstein p. 92-93).

Likewise, Dolson also sees it as an attempt at the unification between the two faculties. However, she asserts More's motivation for believing it to be socially driven, given More's social context. She also asserts that More is ignoring concern for the public good, and sociality as moral motivators, rather than philosophical prowess (or lack thereof) (Dolson p. 605).
Analyzing and Extending More’s faculties to resolve Gill’s Challenge

The case that More ultimately prioritizes the sentimental over the rational as the source of morality in the soul seems generally shared by the scholars previously mentioned. It seems that Intellectual Love, as the root or source of all goods, as a feeling, seems to shut the case for compatibility with Rationalist reason. However, can we establish a reading that goes farther than an approach to a model that does not see one as usurping the other, or one existing at the expense of the other? And if so, how? We will look at the strongest textual case for a position that aims to synthesize the rational and sentimental through the harmonious relationship of them in the soul as described in the previous section, and why they may work to answer our initial challenge: solve the rational/sentimental tension as posed by Gill.

The first way we do this is by more closely examining the relationship between the faculties. More sees the soul as being of partially divine composition when he mentions the substance of the Boniform faculty of the soul. In doing so, it relates back to the source of all morality - God and his Goodness. He calls the Boniform Faculty “A faculty of that divine composition, and supernatural texture, as enables us to distinguish not only what is simply and absolutely the best, but to relish it, and to have pleasure in that alone.” (More, 1.2.5). More does not shy away from directly stating that God, or at least divinity, is already in our souls innately and composes at least some of our souls (1.2.7). It is what gives us our ability to determine the
best ethical acts (through Right Reason and Intellectual Love). The operation of Right Reason in discerning the best thing, and the feeling of appreciation of the best thing are closely interrelated.

As we go through moral improvement, our ability to make moral decisions improve, and as we improve, our souls are also improved such that we are more like God. More directly relates our moral development to being like God in relevant ways. He quotes Hierocles, “To obey Right Reason, and to obey God, it is the same thing,” (3.3.6). As one cultivates Right Reason in their mind, they are becoming greater in connection with God himself. To be virtuous is to act like God, as “Virtue was in man the same as in God,” and that when one is operating in the Boniform Faculty, one is acting as God would in the same scenario (3.3.6).

What does this Godliness look like? Intellectual Love. More does see it as a unity of reason and sentiment, as when he introduces Intellectual Love, he says:

This Idea be but single and alone, yet from thence arise all the Shapes and Modes of Virtue and of Well-doing: and ‘tis into this again, that all of them may, by a due and unerring Analysis, be resolv’d. For as all Numbers arise from Unity, and by Unites are all measur’d: so we affirm, that by this Intellectual Love, as from a Principle the most pure and most abstracted of all others, all the Modes and Kinds of Justice, Fortitude, and even or Temperance it self, are to be measur’d...(2.9.16)

Here, he is posing Intellectual Love as a primitive good, that accesses and originates all other goods. This would be participation in the Mind of God and an unassailable experience of the divine light. Without Intellectual Love, those other goods would not be within us. Of course
God, as the fount of all good, is in himself unified by the understanding of classical theism. Just as God is unified, as we grow greater in virtue, so we too grow greater in unity in our resemblance of God. That is what Intellectual Love does for us. From here it is not a stretch to assert that the mind when one is filled with Intellectual Love, whether through the long road of moral cultivation, or a direct experience of the divine, the powers of the soul are unified as much as a thing can be, as one participates with the mind of God. I understand this to be a truly radical change of the mind and soul: either the culmination of a truly transformative deliberate moral development, or divine revelation - both of which are very real possibilities in More’s Christian world.

If Love is taking part in the mind of God, and Right Reason is acting with the rules of God internally in our own minds, where does this leave us? To the notion that they are two parts of the same thing. Though More does assert that the feeling of Intellectual Love is beyond intellection, or that which can be understood by the intellect alone, I suggest that they are still mutually dependent. When in the state of Intellectual Love, Right Reason is still essential, as it is the recognition and application of the geometric truths in our moral acts. That judgement and application is essential to the cognition that goes into moral decision making, even when perfectly refined. Without those objective rational acts, we are acting on our own sentiment, and potentially fall into mere feeling, rather than perfected love. When we act according to reason without the love, our acts are ignoring the source and motivation of those rules, and when perfected, their fulfillment.
To understand this further, we should explore how our soul is changed when accessing these divine faculties of Right Reason and Intellectual Love in the Boniform Faculty. When the soul has changed and had this encounter and reformation via a transformative experience of the divine light, or through our effort to let God reform our souls through prayer and fasting, our moral decision making changes. Though we have reason before this change, Intellectual Love is a new foundation for Reason itself, in its perfected state called “Right Reason”. In this state, Intellectual Love lets us see beyond the ordinary, to the ultimate and original nature of things. Sentiment without Reason fails to allow us the active ability to make decisions or doesn’t allow for access to the geometric morality that More believes in. The perfected Intellectual Love is the foundation and origination for all other Goods, but in reference to morals, has its objective decisions made via Right Reason. This comes from our understanding of Reason before and after this point of perfection (in as much as we can be perfected).

Reason as a tool is not functional in the same way without some starting principle to work from. Reason conceptually is as essential as sentiment, but without Love we aren’t fully partaking in the truth of the matter. The transformative goodness and love of the divine is the key. Both are accessing and interacting with the divine to the maximum of their ability, but Love grants reason the grounding and premises to see things as they should be, and as their nature intends. However, Right Reason is required to operate in the world and bring forth the recognition and action of the right decision. Right Reason is never eliminated or blurred by the
sentiment of Intellectual Love. Both are working in concert. They are participating in the mind of the divine.

Just as Right Reason is the intellect operating with perfect access to the geometric truths found in the divine and ability to apply them, Intellectual Love is the interior aspect of that same thing, the universal love that grounds those laws. When More describes Intellectual love as beyond intellection, or as mentioned above, the font of all other good including Right Reason, we must understand that Intellectual Love still has Right Reason working within and throughout it, and to act with Intellectual Love is always to be acting with Right Reason. Without each, the other is not complete within the mind of the human person.

This embraces the aspects of More and Cudworth’s position that are key for Reason and sentiment to be reconciled: That our soul is at least partially intrinsically divine, and the divine is accessed through both the founding Love of Intellectual Love in our soul, and the deliberative operation of Right Reason. Additionally, we should strive to become as close to that ultimate state as we can possibly be, though we are finite and will likely never perfectly do so as God does. This fits with the reading established throughout More, as he takes great lengths to see how all aspects of the soul in a peak or natural state are harmonious. In his mention of the natural pleasures or appetites of the soul, he seeks to establish innateness and goodness within them (1.6.5).

Both are key to being at the pinnacle of the human moral sentiment. Intellectual Love as More described, is the same innate and ultimate character as Right Reason, which is the
geometric type that establishes reason. In a metaphysical framework that relies on God, who is commonly understand to be the source of both geometric truth and love within the Christian society of the time, this is comprehensible or could have been obvious to a reader of the time, though our conventional understanding of reason and rationalism and sentiment being at odds may chafe at this reframing.
Objections and Considerations

One might reasonably assert that this hasn’t directly answered the changes between the rational and sentimental for Cudworth and other Cambridge Platonists over time. Why would they shift between and not settle on answers that are both accurate and satisfying? One answer can be found in what Gill mentions: The social context. Given the various conflicting groups that would be encountered at the time, one Platonist could see sentimentalist groups like Ranters and Quakers as a greater error, and so focus more effort on defending rational universally accessible morality. Another may find Calvinism, or Hobbesian Voluntarism as the greater error. In this way, different Cambridge Platonists may write their responses to those groups and emphasize reason or sentiment, without abandoning the one they do not mention in that individual work. It would not be unreasonable to address the address sentimentalist attacks by using text that buttresses reason in the moral mind (like TEIM), and another would focus responses to those against sentiment by emphasizing reason. One could write a treatise on the importance and source of reason as moral source and be seen as defending a purely rationalist perspective, while another could dive into the feelings of the internal life and devote one’s own resources and writing solely to that. Both could occur, but if those two are truly the same source, taking part in the same divine nature, there is no conflict. And, as mentioned previously, certain individual
philosophers may have fallen on more of a rationalist-preference or sentimentalist preference, however, that does not indicate that the two are necessarily incompatible.

Another consideration would be the issue of whether the content that comes about by the Intellectual Love is new moral content. If the acts that come from Intellectual Love, and the moral judgements from it are bringing something to the table that is additive to our previous morality, how can we evaluate the old morality against the new? Are non-Christians doomed to an inferior sense of moral judgment? Or perhaps is reason itself deficient? This is a challenge that helps clarify what More is doing when asserting the refining or fulfillment of the moral mind through Intellectual Love.

More's exact answer to this challenge may ultimately be speculative, but reason can be identified that what is new when we have Intellectual Love is within us, which is an unfailing appreciation and knowledge of the ideal state for each thing. As children, we may act morally because we know what we are supposed to do, but not have the deeper understanding as to why or what purpose it serves. However, when we have Intellectual Love, our soul clearly sees that situation as God does, which appears to be only achievable by a deeply direct experience of God and the ability to see from his perspective. Reason acts for both the child and the moral person, but it is developed such that the qualitative experience is different, in an experience of the divine light.

Mystics sometimes report to have such experiences after living strenuously virtuous lives, devoutly praying, and fasting. More's regard for the virtues and their practice certainly presents
that as an option for getting Intellectual Love up and running. many of the virtues he outlines are similar to the mystics' rules. He spends much of the latter part of the book discussing how one attains those virtues.

He describes that one must acquire piety, in that one must be both outwardly and inwardly concerned with God: Outwardly, one serves their fellow man. Inwardly, one endeavours to bring them one's mind as close to God as possible through the acquisition of wisdom, and the offering up of one's self to God (3.5.1-2). Both are attempting to imitate and emulate God, and to offer himself up as a "divine monument"(3.5.3). Only the one who has reformed himself in such a way in thought and deed, is whom God deems worthy to receive divine knowledge, "He, I say, that offers himself for a Sacrifice; that converts his Soul into a Divine Monument; and whose Mind is prepar'd as a Temple, for the reception of Heavenly Light." (3.5.3). The person who does this has practiced the virtues: Concerned with the public good and the good of others, which he identifies with Justice (3.5.5). Fortitude and Temperance are two others, that we may not allow evil to go uncorrected, and that we may not fall to our lust and passions, nor allow for the animal part of the soul to rule, which then would subject the body to bodily evil and can taint our immortal bodies (3.5.6-10).

This is whom More identifies as the recipients or activators of Intellectual Love: those who have become excellent in virtue in mind and body, and who understands and withstands the temptations of the body. More paints the picture, familiar to students of Plato, of A soul as the Chariot Driver, in control of the body and its passions (3.5.14). However, all are subject to God's
will, and thus any might grant a beatific vision towards a sinner should God bestow his grace in such a way.

As to how this answers the initial challenge: Is the moral knowledge brought forth by Intellectual Love is new moral content. It appears that it is a special and new type of knowledge, new metaphysical knowledge: knowing the object of things as intended and their appreciation; and ethical knowledge: What one should do as God would in any circumstance. However, it comes in degrees as one follows the path of virtue. As one grows in the virtuous wisdom, one will get closer to Intellectual Love. the final step will not just see good for good and ill for ill, but to see things as God does.
Conclusion

Though More can be accused of calling on certain sides of this conflict at various times through his writing, the mental faculties in the *Enchiridion Ethicum* offers what may a satisfying answer to that early modern tension of reason and mystic, or divine and felt versus that which is known and provable. This structure of the Boniform Faculty, Right Reason, and Intellectual Love backing the position of his and Cudworth’s belief that the heart of religion is neither self-justifying and rootless feeling, nor mechanistic and heartless phenomena, but the holistic combination of heart and head. The Cambridge Platonists are a remarkable, and lesser-remembered group of philosophers that, despite their popularity in their own time, have waned to obscurity. As a result, their role and contribution to the history of philosophy may be overlooked. At very least, they provide, as Gill shows, a fascinating lens into philosophy interacting with the emergent rationalism in the very beginning of secular ethics, while living in a context of religious enthusiasm and sentimentalism. This would be rich for more study. Other areas to explore would be examining the faculties’ ontological status: Are these discrete entities within the mind of humans, or a catalog of powers of a unified soul. Perhaps More thinks the soul could be unified at this point of Intellectual Love. Digging more into More’s other works, or the works of the other Platonists may reveal fruitful answers to the original question on the reconciliation
of heart and head, the heart of religion, the nature of virtue, and other worthy questions. More himself deals with metaphysics more explicitly in other works, however, this is worth capturing as it explicitly captures a moment of defending a moral foundation of the mind, and one that provides an answer to whether true moral knowledge is founded on the seemingly incompatible reason and sentiment: His answer is that is both and they work together, as they both are accessing the same thing - the mind of God.
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