ATTITUDES TOWARD THIRD PARTY CASUAL SEX PREDICT
RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE:
A TEST OF THE REPRODUCTIVE MORALITY MODEL

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ABSTRACT

Humans are a highly moralizing species showing intense interest in the activities of others regardless of the consequence of a conspecific’s behavior to ourselves. Traditional models of morality propose that moral attitudes are an output of political orientation and religiosity; however, the Reproductive Morality Model (RMM) understands moral judgements toward social hot-button issues, religiosity, and political ideology through individual differences in mating strategies as a self-interested model of morality. Just as the RMM predicts individual differences in moral judgements toward social hot-button issues, I propose that individual differences in rape myth acceptance are driven by attitudes toward others’ casual sex—associating rape victims with promiscuity to keep the “price of sex” high. I examined the relationship between political orientation, attitudes toward others’ casual sex, and rape myth acceptance. I hypothesized that individuals who condemned others engaging in casual sex would accept more rape myths, and individuals who accept others engaging in casual sex would be more likely to reject rape myths. My hypothesis was supported for men but not women. Men who condemned others’ casual sex were statistically more likely to accept rape myths. Like Kurzban and Weeden (2010), I call for considering morality from the perspective of a self-serving strategy to create an environment supportive of an individual’s interests.

Keywords: Morality, Rape Myths, Condemnation, Reproductive Strategies, Reproductive Morality Model
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Humans show an intense interest in the activities of others regardless of the consequence of a conspecific’s behavior to oneself (Kurzban, Dukes, & Weeden, 2010). Morality has typically been defined as the concept of “right” or “wrong” (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). The system of morality within an individual that motivates them to cooperate with others and “do the right thing” is referred to as the conscience (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). However, if morality were solely driven by an endogenous motivational system (i.e., conscience), it would fail to explain the judgements and moral condemnation of others’ behavior. Moral condemnation is defined as the negative affective judgment of a conspecific’s behavior that facilitates the acceptability of an action (Miller & Cushman, 2013). Because of this, DeScioli and Kurzban (2009) argued that a model of morality should explain two phenomena: the conscience that facilitates the actor’s cooperation with others and the actor’s moral condemnation of others to generate an environment that makes it easier for the actor to achieve their goals. Research over the past 15 years is beginning to suggest that our moral judgments are not as virtuous or saintly as we once expected. Moreover, our moral judgements relating to others’ behavior seem to be strategic and self-serving.

Morality as a Self-Serving Strategy

Several studies support two individual phenomena of morality: the conscious and moral condemnation. The condemnation of harmless acts and some welfare-improving
acts makes it hard to reconcile the claim that moral condemnation evolved to reduce fitness losses among groups of individuals (Kurzban & DeScioli, 2009). Justifications behind acts condemned by organized religions under the pretense of providing benefits to an organized group of individuals break down when analyzed logically. Furthermore, individuals strongly condemn acts that do not inflict harm on others. More importantly, preventing these acts would provide no benefit to one’s self or others (Kurzban & DeScioli, 2009). Examples of these acts include moral judgement about incest between consenting siblings who used contraception (Haidt, 2001), the condemnation of abortion (Weeden, 2003), recreational drug usage (Kurzban et al., 2010; Quintelier et al., 2013), and conflicting religious practices (Kurzban & DeScioli, 2009).

An evolutionarily informed approach to understanding moral condemnation involves coordinated condemnation of behavior by a group to encourage cooperation. If social costs are imposed on an action by the majority of a group; the costs outweigh the benefit of the act, and an individual is less likely to perform the act in question. Often this coordinated condemnation is self-interested.

Bourrat, Baumard, and McKay (2011) explored how cues of observation affected the coordinated condemnation of moral violations. Participants read a description of two moral violations in the presence of an image of eyes (i.e., cue to observation) or flowers. Participants more strongly condemned the descriptions of moral violations when cues of observation were present suggesting that implementation of cooperative behaviors by an actor are subject to moral judgement of another. Bourrat et al. (2011) proposed two alternative explanations which hold consistent with a reputation-maintenance function by activating the participant’s awareness of internalized, cultural norms or by matching the
input condition required to activate an evolved mechanism which detects observation of one’s behavior and suppresses behaving in an antisocial way (Dear, Dutton, & Fox, 2019). Both explanations are compatible with the conscience and condemnation phenomena of morality working together to produce a pro-social reputation of the actor through signaling knowledge and alignment with local moral rules (Kurzban & DeScioli, 2009).

Self-interest is often a major factor of supporting societal policies. The literature on this subject is mixed, but Weeden and Kurzban (2017) argued that the decrease of support is due to the narrowing of the conceptual definition of “self-interest.” The traditional, narrowed definition of “self-interest” in the context of social policies has assumed that self-interest is separated from group-interest and focuses solely on short-term, tangible interests disregarding an individual’s demographics and long-term goals. This definition does not consider that often what is beneficial for the individual is beneficial for the group. An example of individual benefits supporting group benefits includes state-based, school-requirements of immunizations (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019). Since individuals who receive the appropriate immunizations are more likely to avoid infectious diseases, vaccinations through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood serve the individual’s best interest. Vaccinations also benefit the community as they produce a herd-immunity to infectious diseases and individuals who have not been vaccinated are not exposed to the virus or bacteria.

Weeden and Kurzban (2017) argued that the definition of self-interest should be expanded into “inclusive interest.” Individual motives are often long-term rather than short-term; we are motivated to attain certain resources that are relevant to evolutionarily
salient domains (e.g., status, sexual intercourse, social coalitions). The drive to achieve fitness-related goals are not restricted to one’s self, but rather extend to one’s relatives and coalition members. The degree of motivation toward assistance of others’ goals is a function of relatedness and the shared cost-benefit trade-off between one’s self and coalition members (Weeden & Kurzban, 2017). Therefore, expanding the definition of “self-interest” to “inclusive interest” provides a clear evolutionary framework to understand variations toward various social and political issues (e.g., economic redistribution, affirmative action, and teens’ access to contraception without parental knowledge).

**Predicting Morality**

Traditional paradigms of predicting moral attitudes assess political orientation and religiosity as predictor variables with reproductive moral attitudes as criterion variables. This presumes that reproductive moral attitudes (e.g., attitudes toward abortion) are an output of abstract political and religious beliefs. However, contemporary theories of reproductive moral attitudes understand abstract political attitudes and religious beliefs as an output of moral judgements driven by an individual’s reproductive strategy. Understanding moralistic attitudes on hot-button social issues through an individual’s sexual strategy and reproductive morals accurately predict religious group attendance (Moon, Krems, Cohen, & Kenrick, 2019; Weeden et al., 2008) and political orientation (Peterson, 2018) providing evidence that the “causal arrow runs (at least in significant part) from sexual lifestyles and attitudes to religious commitments” (Kurzban et al., 2010).

If moral judgements were an output of political orientation then we should expect a clear, natural divide on political orientation and an individual’s support for policies
within their political party of choice. Weeden and Kurzban (2016) analyzed data from the US General Social Survey sample from 1980 to 2014 which contained 48,947 individuals to assess if people naturally cluster into liberal or conservative political orientation. The US General Social Survey includes 55 items that measure political attitudes toward religious items (e.g., abortion, pornography, and teen birth control), racial items (e.g., racial discrimination, race-based affirmative action, and immigration), and economic items (e.g., government spending, unemployment assistance, and income redistribution). If people naturally align themselves with political ideologies, such as politically liberal versus conservative, their attitudes toward religious items, racial items, and economic items should correlate in a predictive manner. Since there were little-to-no correlational pattern among opinions on the top three social policy domains (i.e., economic policies, racial policies, and religious policies), Weeden and Kurzban (2016) concluded that individuals do not naturally align themselves with liberal or conservative political ideology—rather, it is more likely that these political labels are post-hoc summarizations of combined social opinion. This conclusion is consistent with the assumption that individuals align themselves with group identities that maximize one’s benefits from group rules, and group identification is not fixed as a psychological foundation.

In line with Weeden and Kurzban’s (2016) conclusion, Peterson (2018) provides evidence for a contemporary understanding of political orientation. Rather than assuming liberalism and conservatism as two anchors of an ideological dimension rooted in deep psychological underpinnings, Peterson (2018) demonstrates a contemporary perspective that individual differences in sexual strategies are responsible for a more complex understanding of associations. Individuals who had more permissive views toward sex
identified as more liberal on social policies but more conservative on views toward dominance and hierarchies.

Similarly, as political orientation was traditionally thought of as a basis of moral judgements (Haidt, 2012; Pinker, 2002) but is parsimoniously understood as a coordination tactic, Weeden and Kurzban (2013) proposed that religiosity is supported through individual differences in reproductive morals. Through this framework, political ideology is conceptualized as an output of moral strategies rather than a predictor of moral views. Weeden and Kurzban (2013) analyzed data from 296,959 individuals from 90 countries using both the World Values Survey and European Values Study to predict varying levels of religiosity from differences in cooperative morals (e.g., do not steal or cheat) and reproductive morals. Cooperative morals are motivations that include the avoidance of cheating, lying, and stealing while reproductive morals are attitudes including others engaging in casual sex, endorsement of abortion, and inclusive sexual education in public schools. Overall, cooperative morals did not consistently predict religiosity across the countries. However, reproductive morals were statistical predictors of religiosity—countries with more restrictive views on reproductive morals were more religious (Weeden & Kurzban, 2013).

Weeden, Cohen, and Kenrick (2008) proposed that family values were central to religious attendance. Weeden et al. (2008) analyzed data from the US General Social Survey that contained responses from 21,131 individuals; controlling for sexual strategies statistically reduced the effects of age and gender on religious attendance—suggesting that mating preferences were central to individual differences in attraction to religious groups and attendance. A high fertility, socially monogamous psychology predicted more
religious attendance and adherence to conservative values compared to a more short-term, promiscuous psychology.

**The Reproductive Morality Model**

Contrary to traditional models of morality that rely on religiosity and political orientation to account for variation in moral judgements, an individual’s reproductive strategy may better account for the variation in attitudes toward social hot button issues (e.g., varying attitudes toward abortion). In Weeden, Kurzban, and Kenrick’s (2016) Religious Reproductive Model of Morality, political orientation and religiosity serve as outputs rather than predictors of moralistic judgement (see Figure 1).

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<td>Political Orientation</td>
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<td>Attitudes toward reproductive issues</td>
<td>Perception of others’ behavior interfering with one’s strategies (e.g., reproductive strategies)</td>
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<td>(e.g., abortion, legalization of prostitution)</td>
<td>Hot-button social issues (e.g., abortion)</td>
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*Figure 1. Comparing Models of Reproductive Moral Attitudes. Traditional model of moralistic attitudes toward reproductive items compared to Kurzban et al.’s Reproductive Morality Model.*

Weeden et al. (2016) labeled the current model of interest the Religious Reproductive Model of Morality; however, I propose the name of *Reproductive Morality Model* because reproductive moral judgements are not restricted to predicting religious morals; rather reproductive moral judgements predict moral condemnation of others’ behavior that may conflict with the actor’s reproductive strategy. This moral
condemnation is often independent of an individual’s level of religiosity. Furthermore, reproductive morals more parsimoniously account for variation in religiosity and political orientation than religiosity predicting reproductive morals.

Individuals who pursue a long-term, high-fertility mating strategy are more likely to condemn the legalization of recreational drugs (Kurzban et al., 2010; Quintelier et al., 2013), abortion (Weeden, 2003), contraception (Weeden, 2003), and legalization of prostitution (Weeden & Kurzban, 2016) compared to individuals who pursue a short-term, low-fertility mating strategy. Recreational drug usage, abortion, contraception use, and legalization of prostitution are all associated with the perception of promiscuity and a short-term mating strategy, which cheapens the price of sex and creates an environment in which a long-term mating strategy is more difficult to maintain.

Additionally, the Reproductive Morality Model accounts for the political divide over same-sex marriage (Pinsoff & Haselton, 2016). In Pinsoff and Haselton’s (2016) study on the political divide over same-sex marriage, individuals who were more opposed to the legalization of same-sex marriage had a more restricted sexual orientation and a higher implicit association of same-sex relationships with promiscuity. The behaviors and social issues that individuals implementing a long-term, high-fertility mating strategy condemn are perceived to be associated with promiscuity and “cheapening the price of sex.” Individuals implementing a long-term, high-fertility sexual strategy, condemn behaviors that assist a short-term, promiscuous strategy, ultimately creating an environment in which fulfilment of a long-term strategy is considered as virtuous and moral.
Moral judgements have been demonstrated to fluctuate with changes in short-term self-interest. For instance, when hunger is increased, individuals are more likely to endorse an increase in support for social welfare programs compared to satiated, less hungry individuals (Petersen, Aarøe, Jensen, & Curry, 2014). As Buss and Schmitt (1993) suggest that different mate preferences are calibrated by different mating strategies, it is expected that different moral judgements would be calibrated in an individual as their mating strategy changes.

A woman’s mate-value is expected to decrease more sharply as she ages compared to the average man. While a woman’s mate-value is highly dependent upon her youth and fertility, a man’s mate-value is considerably more variable because access to resources often comes with age (Symons, 1979). Additionally, while women display an early, steep decline in fertility levels, men display a more linear, drawn-out decline in reproductive value (Buss, 1994). Following this logic, mating strategies should change across age from using a more short-term mating-oriented psychology to a long-term mating-oriented psychology.

The Reproductive Morality Model predicts that individuals who employ a more short-term mating-oriented psychology endorse more accepting attitudes toward legalization of abortion, legalization of marijuana, legalization of prostitution, pornography, and access to birth control without parental knowledge (Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). If mating strategies change from short-term oriented to long-term oriented with age, one would expect attitudes toward the issues listed above to become less accepted with age. Attitudes toward the legalization of abortion display this pattern: the older the individual, the more likely he/she are likely to identify as pro-life and the
more likely they are to vote no on legalization of abortion (Legge, 1983; O’Connor, Maher, & Kadianaki, 2019).

Attitudes toward legalization of marijuana and the frequency of illicit drug use vary over age such that younger individuals are more likely to endorse the legalization of marijuana compared to older individuals (Wang & Chen, 2006). Furthermore, illicit drug usage is highest in frequency among people 18 to 20-years of age—with 23.9% using illicit drugs in the past month—compared to people 65-years old and above (1.3%) (NIDA, 2015).

Attitudes toward the legalization of prostitution show the same pattern. Younger individuals are more positive toward the legalization of selling sex (Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2019), younger individuals and males are more tolerant toward prostitution compared to older individuals and females (Stack, Adamczyk, & Cao, 2010), and individuals who view marriage as outdated (i.e., those more likely to employ a short-term mating-oriented strategy) have more favorable attitudes toward selling and buying sex (Chon, 2015). On a related issue, older individuals show less favorable attitudes to pornography and are more willing to impose restrictions and to censor pornography’s content compared to younger individuals (Kurzban & Weeden, 2014; Lambe, 2004).

Limited evidence appears for attitudes toward adolescence obtaining birth control without parental knowledge; however, Cox and Jones (2015) asked millennials if all forms of contraception should be available at public colleges and universities. Younger individuals were more likely to agree than older individuals were.

The above evidence addresses the flexibility of moral judgements in one domain. As people age, their mate value often decreases at different rates (Symons, 1979) and
long-term mate-ships become harder to maintain as mate-value discrepancies increase (Buss, 1994), thus it would be in beneficial to adopt a more condemning strategy toward casual sex. Without flexibility in moral judgement and aligning oneself with a coalition of individuals condemning certain actions, it would become more difficult to fulfil ones’ mate-ship strategy. That is, individuals employing a short-term, low-fertility strategy would benefit if the cost of sex was low, and individuals employing a long-term, high-fertility strategy would benefit if the cost of sex was high.

The Price of Sex and Mating Market Dynamics

Parental investment theory states the sex with the higher minimum obligatory investment for viable offspring will be the choosier sex (Trivers, 1972). Women have a higher obligatory investment compared to men because of their limited eggs, nine-month gestation period, and one to three years of breastfeeding. Men’s minimum investment is the amount of time it takes to release a couple of cheap sperm. This sets an uneven stage for the value of sexuality, as the cost to benefit ratio for is lower for men than women (Symons, 1979).

The unequal value of sexual activity for men and women create a sexual marketplace. Within a heterosexual community with a relatively stable and equal ratio of men to women, a female’s sexuality holds more value than a male’s sexuality (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). Like many physical marketplaces, the sexual marketplace works on similar economic principles. Women’s sexuality is deemed valuable when it is in scarce supply, and those women who have the resources sought by highly investing men (i.e., virginity, fidelity, and chastity) will be perceived as more attractive as a long-term partner (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Buss, 1994) and perceived as keeping the price of sex high. Ultimately, parental investment theory and, proximately, sexual economic
theory explain a large portion of the variability in intra- and intersexual competition, suppression of female sexuality, sexual violence, and gender asymmetries.

**Present Study**

The current study was a theoretical extension of Kurzban et al.’s Reproductive Morality Model. The study applied the logic of the Reproductive Morality Model to understand the variation underlying endorsement of rape myths and rape’s association with promiscuity. Since promiscuity among men and women is perceived to cheapen the price of sex (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). Endorsement of rape myths (i.e., believing false statements about victims) may be a coordinated condemnation tactic to censure individuals who are perceived as promiscuous.

**Rape Myth Acceptance**

*Rape myths* are “prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rape [perpetrators]” that shift the responsibility of the rape from the perpetrator to the victim (Burt, 1980). While some of these statements are opinions that stereotype rape victims and perpetrators, other rape myths are demonstrably untrue statements. Examples of rape myths include: (1) “if a girl goes to parties wearing slutty clothes, they are asking for trouble,” (2) “rape almost never happens in a woman’s own home,” and (3) “if a woman doesn’t physically fight back, she can’t claim it was rape” (McMahon & Farmer, 2011; Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999). Therefore, rape myth acceptance is the endorsement of these false statements, stereotypes, and prejudices and treating them as if they are facts.

To speak to the prevalence of rape myth acceptance in society, O’Hara (2012) analyzed 124 news articles covering three separate rapes to assess how the media represents rape cases. The content analysis included three separate rape cases involving...
an attempted stranger sexual assault, a serial date-rapist, and a gang rape of an 11-year-old girl. Of the 124 articles analyzed, the majority perpetuated rape myths primarily involving victim blaming and dehumanization of the perpetrator. The endorsement of rape myths in the media restricts the public’s ability to understand sexual assault accurately.

Suarez and Gadalla (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 37 studies evaluating the characteristics of individuals who are more likely to endorse rape myths. Overall, men endorsed statistically more rape myths compared to women, $d = 0.58$. Rape myth acceptance was also closely associated with discriminatory attitudes (e.g., sexism, heterosexism, and ageism). Importantly, rape myth acceptance was closely related a woman’s decision latency in dismissing sexual advances, male sexuality, hostile attitudes toward women, and demographics such as the individual’s level of sociosexuality and age (Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). Rape myth acceptance was also statistically positively related to sexual coercion perpetration such that individuals who are more likely to sexually coerce were more likely to endorse false statements about rape (Trottier, Benbouriche, & Bonneville, 2019).

**Variability in Rape Myth Acceptance**

There are large amounts of variability in rape myth acceptance. For example, Todd Akin--a member of the U.S. House of Representatives until 2013--was asked his opinion about abortion following a hypothetical rape in which a woman was to become pregnant; he responded, “if it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to shut the whole thing down” (Moore, 2012). This statement sent many men and women into moral outrage while others stood behind Todd and agreed with him. Some individuals agreed
with Akin and believed that a woman cannot successfully conceive a child resulting from a successful rape. Others rejected this statement about rape victims because they agree that conception results from any kind of successful intercourse—consensual or not. 

Variation in rape myth acceptance is not well understood. The current study is the first of its kind to assess the relationship between reproductive morals and variation in rape myth acceptance. 

**Predictions**

**The Reproductive Morality Model.** I first predicted that attitudes toward third parties engaging in casual sex would be negatively related to rape myth acceptance. That is, those who condemn others who engage in consensual, casual sex would be more likely to believe false statements about rape, rape victims, and rape perpetrators compared to those who do not condemn others who engage in consensual, casual sex. Additionally, I predicted that attitudes toward third parties engaging in casual sex would be a statistically unique predictor of rape myth acceptance, above and beyond the effects of religiosity and political orientation.

**Sex differences in rape myth acceptance.** Men accept more rape myths than women (Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). I argue that this may be related to men’s over-sexualization perception bias (Haselton & Buss, 2000). Men are more likely to perceive women as sexually interested when placed in ambiguous situations (e.g., at a party where a woman seems to be flirting with a man). It is the least costly error for a man to perceive a woman as sexually interested in him in these ambiguous situations.

**Men with short-term mating-oriented psychologies.** If a man has a short-term mating psychology and is motivated to pursue casual sex, he may be placed in more
ambiguous interactions with women than a man with a long-term mating psychology. Because of this, men with a short-term mating psychology may endorse more rape myths that dampen the distinction between consensual and coercive sex (e.g., “she said no, but she really meant yes”). Endorsing rape myths that provide reasonable doubt about what defines rape protects themselves against making a costly error in judgement of an ambiguous, sexual interaction. If a man is motivated to seek out casual sex, then he may be more likely to accept rape myths which protect him against assuming incorrectly that a sexual interaction was consensual compared to men who are not motivated to seek out casual sex. This functions to decrease the distinction between consensual and coercive casual sex and leads to assuming most, if not all, casual sex is consensual. Specifically, I predicted that men with more unrestricted sociosexual orientations were more likely to endorse items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale that provide the perpetrator reasonable doubt if a woman is raped compared to men with restricted sociosexual orientations (Figure 2).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 2.** Men with Short-Term Mating Psychology Prediction Visualized. Men with a short-term mating psychology are motivated to acquire more short-term sex thus leading them to endorse more rape myths that protect him against his mistake in perceiving consent in possible sexual interactions; this results in blurring the lines between consensual sex and coercive sex.

**Men with long-term mating-oriented psychologies.** Comparably, men with long-term mating psychologies are motivated to reduce the accessibility of casual sex—
keeping the price of sex high. By obscuring the distinction between consensual and coercive sex, long-term mating men condemn casual sex. Endorsing rape myths that negate this distinction (e.g., “A rape probably doesn’t happen if a girl doesn’t have any bruises or marks.”), provides a basis of coordinated condemnation among men with long-term mating psychologies and functions to condemn promiscuous acts, thus creating an environment that upholds a monogamous, long-term mating strategy. Specifically, I predicted that men who condemn casual sex were more likely to endorse items on the Illinois Rape Myth Scale that focuses the blame away from the perpetrator of the rape and bolsters women’s sexual availability compared to men who do not condemn casual sex (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Rape Myth Acceptance for Men with Long-Term Mating Psychologies Men with a long-term mating psychology are motivated to reduce the amount of casual sex around them, thus I predicted that they would endorse more rape myths that bolster a woman’s sexual availability. This functions to rid the distinction between consensual and coercive sex.

Women with short-term mating-oriented psychologies. Rape is particularly costly to women’s reproductive fitness due to the possible circumvention of a woman’s mate-choice (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000), possible physical injury to her body and reproductive organs (Lalumière, Harris, Quinsey, & Rice, 2005), and a possible decrease in her mate-value (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). To protect themselves against these costs, women pursuing a short-term mating strategy should be highly motivated to create
distinctive boundaries between coercive and casual sex (Figure 4). Therefore, I predicted that women with unrestricted sociosexual orientations would reject more rape myths compared to women who have a restricted sociosexual orientation.

Figure 4. Rape Myth Acceptance for Women with Short-Term Mating Psychologies. Women with short-term mating psychologies are motivated to pursue higher levels of safe, casual sex; therefore, they should reject high amounts of rape myths. This functions to provide a clear boundary between consensual sex and coercive sex.

Women with long-term mating-oriented psychologies. Like men with long-term mating psychologies, women are motivated to reduce access of casual sex. Women pursuing a long-term mating strategy are motivated to condemn casual sex because access to casual sex interferes with their long-term mating strategy. Condemning casual sex and accepting higher rates of rape myths that focuses the blame away from the perpetrator of the rape (e.g., “If a girl doesn’t physically resist sex—even if protesting verbally—it can’t be considered rape.”) negates the distinction between consensual and coercive sex. I predicted that women who condemn others engaging in casual sex will accept higher rates of rape myths compared to women who do not condemn casual sex (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Rape Myth Acceptance for Women with Long-Term Mating Psychologies. Women with long-term mating psychologies are motivated to condemn others engaging in casual sex to prevent interference in their long-term mating strategy. Women who condemn others engaging in casual sex are predicted to accept more rape myths that blur the distinction between consensual and coercive sex.

An alternative hypothesis for women. Selection is expected to produce the most fitness-beneficial outcome (Darwin, 1859; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). Because rape is always costly for women, a clear distinction between consensual and coercive sex may be more beneficial to avoiding the costs of rape than the benefits that condemnation of rape victims provides (i.e., blurring the lines between consensual and coercive sex) for most women. Therefore, I tested the alternative hypothesis that women’s attitudes toward casual sex would not be a significant predictor of endorsement of rape myths.
CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Participants

Before data collection, I ran an a priori power analyses using G*Power. G*Power is a free program used frequently by behavioral and social sciences to conduct a priori power analyses for common statistical tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009). I ran two a priori power analyses: correlational and linear multiple regression. For the bivariate correlation with two tails, alpha set to .05, and a medium expected relationship, the necessary sample size was 138. For a linear multiple regression with a medium expected effect size, alpha of .05, and three predictors, the total required sample size stated by G*Power was reportedly 119 individuals.

A total of 418 participants were surveyed through convenient, snowball sampling of the survey by posting a hyperlink on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) and internet forums (e.g., Reddit). The sample contained 48% males (n = 160), 37% females (n = 123), and 3.6% identified as “other” (n = 12). Additionally, 36 individuals did not report their gender (10.9%). The mean age of the sample was 30.2 years (SD = 12.4, Range = 18 - 73). Twenty-four percent of the sample were married, 20% reported being in a long-term relationship, 35% reported being single (i.e., widowed, divorced, or single). One hundred and fifty-four individuals (46.5%) identified as “liberal,” 28.7% (n
“middle-ground,” and 26.9% (n = 89) identified as “conservative.” See Table 1 for further demographic information of individuals included in final analyses.

Ninety participants were removed from analyses due to taking less than five minutes on the 86-question survey—serving as an attention check. A total of 328 participants were included in final analyses. Two influential univariate outliers on the composite variable for the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale were brought to the fence by replacing their values with three standard deviations above the mean. Participants were entered into an opportunity drawing for an Amazon.com gift card as an incentive for participating in the study.

**Materials and Procedure**

The survey was posted on social media outlets and internet forums (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Reddit). Participants were redirected to the survey hosted through Qualtrics, an online survey platform. Participants first saw an informed consent message which posed the study as a survey on “opinions on sexual experiences.” If participants did not consent to take part in the study, they were redirected and thanked for their time. Participants who consented were instructed to respond to the following questions according to their own opinions and experiences. The survey consisted of seven separate sections presented as follows (see Appendix A for full scales):

**Demographics**

Participants completed a demographics section that contained a total of 23 questions. Attribute variables were obtained such as gender, age, and marital status; this section also included a political orientation scale with two subscales.
Table 1. Demographic Information of Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>4.1 (2.03)</td>
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*Note:* Parentheses indicate standard deviations. \( N = 328 \) for final analyses.
**Political orientation reproductive morals subscale.** The first subscale assessed the participant’s support or opposition toward certain political issues concerning reproductive morals (e.g., abortion, comprehensive sex education), \( \alpha = .81 \).

**Political orientation cooperative morals subscale.** The second subscale assessed the participant’s support or opposition toward certain political issues concerning cooperative morals (e.g., gun control, universal healthcare), \( \alpha = .81 \).

**Sociosexual Orientation Inventory—Revised**

The Sociosexual Orientation Inventory-r (SOI-r) (Penke, 2011) contained a total of 10 questions. Questions were presented with either a Likert-type response scale or asked about their frequency of experience. Eight questions from the SOI-r were original to Penke’s (2011) revised scale which includes three separate subscales: behavior \( \alpha = .80 \), attitude \( \alpha = .82 \), and desire \( \alpha = .83 \); the total SOI-r’s reliability coefficient was \( \alpha = .85 \).

Two additional questions which are not original to Penke’s (2001) revised scale were added to assess attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex \( \alpha = .86 \). These two questions were: “It is okay for two consenting adults to have casual sex.” (1- Extremely disagree to 9-Extremely agree) and “If two consenting adults have casual sex, they are violating morals.” (reverse-coded); 1-Extremely disagree to 9-Extremely agree. The SOI-r with the two added questions had a reliability coefficient of \( \alpha = .85 \).

**Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale**

The Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale included 21 questions which were presented in a 5-point Likert-type scale \( \alpha = .92 \). The scale contained four subscales that
assessed the degree to which individuals accepted several rape myths (i.e., “she asked for it,” “he didn’t mean to,” “it wasn’t really rape,” and “she lied”).

Originally, McMahon and Farmer (2001) coded the Likert-type scale as 0-8 with “0” meaning “strongly agree” and 8 meaning “strongly disagree.” This coding scheme indicated that lower values on the scale indicated more rape myth acceptance. To minimize confusion during data interpretation, I reverse-coded every question. This allowed for interpretation of large numbers as greater amounts of rape myth acceptance while keeping the same scale of the original authors.

Religiosity Scale

A religiosity scale assessed how religious each participant was. Five questions were presented in a Likert-type scale or frequency of behavior related to their religion, spirituality, or frequency in attending religious events; these questions were obtained from Kurzban et al. (2010). The reliability coefficient of the religiosity scale was $\alpha = .89$.

The first two questions: “how religious are you?” and “how spiritual are you?” were supposed to be rated on a 7-point Likert scale (Kurzban et al., 2010); however, during creation of the survey an 8-point Likert-scale was used by accident. This error had no effect on the reliability coefficient.
CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

Composite Variables

Religiosity

The religiosity scale had good internal consistency ($\alpha = .90$). Because Cronbach’s alpha cannot communicate the reliability of a single item on a scale, even with excellent internal consistency, a composite variable was computed (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). I computed a composite variable from averaging the scores on the religiosity scale items: how religious are you, how spiritual are you, how often do you pray while you are alone, how often do you attend church, and how often are you expecting to attend church in the future?

Rape Myth Acceptance

A composite variable was created for the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale by summing participants’ scores on scale items, $\alpha = .92$. See Appendix A for items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale.

Sociosexual Orientation

Penke and Asendorpf’s (2008) revised sociosexual orientation inventory scale contained nine items, but a mistake was made while entering the scale to my survey before data collection that was not caught until all data were collected. One item from the scale was eliminated. The desire facet created from Penke and
Asendorpf’s (2008) validation had a Cronbach’s alpha of .86; the Cronbach’s alpha of my sample was 0.81, so data analysis proceeded as planned.

Item six of the sociosexual orientation inventory-revised was reverse-coded before aggregating the composite variables (Penke & Asendorpf, 2008). Item six of the Penke and Asendorpf (2008), sociosexual orientation inventory-revised states “I do not want to have sex with a person until I am sure that we will have a long-term, serious relationship.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the sociosexual orientation scale revised (Penke & Asendorpf, 2008) including the two added questions assessing attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex was .86. Participants’ responses to all items were averaged to form a composite variable of their overall sociosexual orientation.

**Attitudes Toward Third Party Casual Sex**

Cronbach’s alpha for the items below was acceptable ($\alpha = .87$). Participants’ responses to the items below were averaged to form a composite variable of participants’ attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex: it is OK for two consenting adults to have casual sex, and If two consenting adults have casual sex, they are violating morals.

**Data Screening**

A missing values analysis was computed to identify patterns in missing data. Over all variables, cases of missing data accounted for five percent or less, therefore I deleted missing data-cases pairwise in the following analyses.

Visual assessments of histograms, Q-Q plots, and box-and-whisker plots indicate that “Attitudes Toward Others Having Casual Sex” and “Religiosity Composite” were positively skewed, and “Political Orientation” and “Rape Myth Acceptance Overall” were slightly positively skewed. Visual assessment of bivariate scatterplots indicated the
data are linearly distributed and heteroscedastic. Assessment of bivariate correlations indicate no issues with multicollinearity or singularity. Since correlation and multiple regression are relatively robust to deviations of normality, data analyses proceeded as planned.

Univariate and multivariate outliers were assessed. There was one univariate outlier in the “Age” variable reading .37. I reentered the datapoint as “37” to correct the error in entering data. Inspection of Mahalanobis Distances from the centroid space of variables indicated no multivariate outliers (maximum mahal. distance = 57.50, $\chi^2(296)$ critical value > 249.45.)

**Analyses**

**Were Attitudes Toward Casual Sex Related to Rape Myth Acceptance?**

Yes. A composite variable of the two questions assessing attitudes toward casual sex was created and correlated with a composite variable of average scores of the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale. Attitudes toward third-parties engaging in casual sex were statistically related to rape myth acceptance, $r = -.35$, $n = 307$, $p = 3.0^{10}$, such that the more accepting of others engaging in casual sex an individual was the less accepting of false beliefs about rape myths they were (Figure 6).

**Did Attitudes Toward Third Party Casual Sex Predict Rape Myth Acceptance?**

Yes. A multiple regression analysis was performed to assess rape myth acceptance predicted from attitudes towards third parties engaging in casual sex, self-reported level of religiosity, and self-reported political orientation. Taken together, reported attitudes toward third parties engaging in casual sex, self-reported level of religiosity, and self-reported political orientation statistically predicts an individual’s
level of rape myth acceptance, \( F(3, 301) = 45.25, p = 3.6^{24} \) (see Table 2 for model fit).

Additionally, 31\% of the variance in the level of rape myth acceptance can be accounted for by the combination of attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex, religiosity, and political orientation (Figure 7).

![Figure 6. Correlation Between Attitudes Toward Others Having Casual Sex and Rape Myth Acceptance. Scatterplot of the relationship between attitudes towards third-party casual sex and scores on the Rape Myth Acceptance scale. Individuals who are less condemning of others engaging in casual sex are more likely to reject false statements about rape, rape victims, and rape perpetrators, \( r = -.35, n = 307, p = 3.0^{10} \). X-axis indicates participants’ views toward others engaging in casual sex (i.e., “It is OK for two consenting adults to have casual sex.” 1- Strongly Disagree to 9- Strongly Agree).](image)

**Sex-Differences in Rape Myth Acceptance**

**Do men accept more rape myths than women?**. Yes. I predicted that men would accept more rape myths than women, and this hypothesis was supported.
I tested for the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Levene’s test for equality of variances indicted that men and women had statistically different variances, $F(2, 296) = 8.92, p = .003$; therefore, interpretation of the independent samples $t$-test must be corrected for equal variances not assumed.

An independent samples $t$-test was performed to determine if men endorse more rape myths than women. Men endorsed statistically more rape myths ($M = 45.32; SD = 14.95, n = 165$) than women ($M = 35.17; SD = 11.46, n = 133$), $t(295.30) = 6.64$, $p = 1.56^{-10}, d = 0.76$ (Figure 8).

*Figure 7. Scatterplot of Relationship Between Political Orientation, Attitudes Toward Others’ Casual Sex, and Rape Myth Acceptance. 3D-scatterplot displaying the relationship between attitudes towards others engaging in casual sex, political orientation, and the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale. Individuals who are more conservative and condemning of casual sex accept more false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rape perpetrators. X-axis indicates participants’ views toward others engaging in casual sex (i.e., “It is OK for two consenting adults to have casual sex.” 1- Strongly Disagree to 9-Strongly Agree). Y-axis indicates total rape myth acceptance. Z-axis indicates participants’ political orientation (1-strongly liberal to 7-strongly conservative).*
Table 2. Regression results using Scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale as the criterion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>95% CI [LL, UL]</th>
<th>beta</th>
<th>95% CI [LL, UL]</th>
<th>sr²</th>
<th>95% CI [LL, UL]</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>38.40**</td>
<td>[30.74, 46.06]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes Toward Others’ Casual Sex</td>
<td>-1.22**</td>
<td>[-1.94, -0.50]</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>[-0.33, -0.09]</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>[-.00, .05]</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-1.56**</td>
<td>[-2.52, -0.59]</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>[-0.31, -0.07]</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>[-.00, .05]</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>3.80**</td>
<td>[2.99, 4.60]</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>[0.41, 0.63]</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>[.11, .25]</td>
<td>.54**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model Fit

\[ R^2 = .32\] 95% CI[.24,.39]

*Note.* A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr² represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. Beta-weights predicting rape myth acceptance from attitudes toward others’ casual sex, religiosity level, and political orientation.

* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.

Figure 8. Sex Differences in Rape Myth Acceptance. Sex differences in average scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale where men (\( M = 45.32; SD = 14.95, n = 165 \)) than women (\( M = 35.17; SD = 11.46, n = 133 \)), \( t(295.30) = 6.64, p = 1.56^{-10}, d = 0.76 \). Higher scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale indicates higher endorsement of rape myths. *Note.* Error bars denote the standard error of the mean.
Do more short-term mating-oriented men accept certain rape myths? No. I predicted that men with more unrestricted sociosexual orientations were more likely to endorse items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale that provide the perpetrator reasonable doubt if a woman is raped compared to men with restricted sociosexual orientations (See Appendix B for hypothesized items). This prediction was not supported.

A composite variable of the items hypothesized to provide the perpetrator reasonable doubt was created and correlated with the composite variable of men’s sociosexual orientations. Men’s sociosexual orientation was not to statistically related to items hypothesized to provide the perpetrator reasonable doubt, \( r = -.07, n = 168, p = .343 \). The more open to casual sex a man was did not statistically relate to individual levels of rape myth acceptance on items hypothesized to provide reasonable doubt (Figure 9).

Do long-term mating-oriented men accept certain rape myths? Yes. I predicted that men who condemn casual sex were more likely to endorse items on the Illinois Rape Myth Scale that focuses the blame away from the perpetrator of the rape and bolsters women’s sexual availability compared to men who do not condemn casual sex. See Appendix B for list of items. This prediction was supported.

A composite variable of the items hypothesized to bolster women’s sexual availability was created and correlated with the composite variable of attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex. Men’s attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex was statistically related to items hypothesized to bolster women’s sexual accessibility (Appendix B), \( r = -.32, n = 168, p = 2.6^{-5} \). The less condemning of casual sex a man was
the less likely he was to accept of rape myths hypothesized to blur the distinction between consensual and coercive casual sex (Figure 10).

\[ r = -0.07, \quad n = 168, \quad p = .343. \]

**Figure 9.** Men’s Sociosexual Orientation and Rape Myth Acceptance. There was no statistical relationship between a man’s openness to casual sex (sociosexual orientation) and specific rape myths which provide reasonable doubt about consensual sex, \( r = -0.07, \quad n = 168, \quad p = .343. \) X-axis indicates men’s composite score on the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory-revised (1-restricted sociosexual orientation; 9-unrestricted sociosexual orientation). Y-axis indicates men’s scores on hypothesized rape myths—higher scores indicates more endorsement of rape myths.

**Do short-term mating-oriented women reject rape myths?** Yes. I predicted that women with unrestricted sociosexual orientations would reject more rape myths compared to women who have a restricted sociosexual orientation. This prediction was supported.
Men’s attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex was statistically related to items hypothesized to bolster women’s sexual accessibility, $r = -.32, n = 168, p = 2.6^{-5}$. Men who are more likely to condemn others having casual sex are more likely to accept rape myths that bolster a woman’s sexual accessibility. X-axis indicates participants’ views toward others engaging in casual sex (i.e., “It is OK for two consenting adults to have casual sex.” 1- Strongly Disagree to 9- Strongly Agree). Y-axis indicates scores on certain items in the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale; higher numbers indicate more endorsement of rape myths.

A composite variable of sociosexual orientation was created and correlated with a composite variable of scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale. Women’s sociosexuality was statistically related to rape myth acceptance, $r = -.26, n = 133, p = .003$. Women who were more open to casual sex were statistically more likely to reject rape myths than women who were more restricted (Figure 11).
Figure 11. Women’s Sociosexual Orientation and Rape Myth Acceptance. There is a statistical relationship between women’s openness to casual sex (SOIr) and rape myth acceptance $r = -.26$, $n = 133$, $p = .003$. X-axis indicates women’s scores on the composite variable of the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory-revised; lower numbers indicate a more reserved sociosexual orientation while higher numbers indicate a less reserved sociosexual orientation.

Do long-term mating-oriented women accept certain rape myths? Yes. I predicted that women who condemn others engaging in casual sex would accept higher rates of rape myths compared to women who do not condemn casual sex. This prediction was supported.

The composite variable of the items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale was correlated with the composite variable of attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex. Women’s attitudes toward others engaging in casual sex was statistically related to rape myth acceptance, $r = -.32$, $n = 133$, $p = 1.69^{-4}$. The more condemning of casual sex a woman was the more likely she was to accept rape myths (Figure 12).
Does the reproductive morality model predict rape myth acceptance in women? Not really. I tested the alternative explanation that women’s attitudes toward casual sex would not predict rape myth acceptance scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale. This hypothesis was supported.

I ran a multiple linear regression predicting rape myth acceptance from attitudes toward casual sex, religiosity, and political orientation. The model significantly fit the data, $F(3,129) = 21.53, p = 9.4^{-5}$, but attitudes toward others’ casual sex was not a significant predictor, $t(129) = 0.132, p = .895$ (Table 3). Religiosity was also not a
significant predictor of rape myth acceptance, $t(129) = 0.045, p = .647$, but political orientation was a significant predictor of rape myth acceptance for women, $t(129) = 7.10, p = .75^{-11}$.

Table 3. Predicting Women’s Rape Myth Acceptance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>$beta$</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>$sr^2$</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>$R$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>21.53**</td>
<td>[10.96, 32.09]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>[-.00, .00]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes Toward Casual Sex</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>[-0.95, 1.08]</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>[-0.18, 0.20]</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>[-.00, .00]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>[-1.07, 1.72]</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>[-0.15, 0.24]</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>[-.01, .01]</td>
<td>.35**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>3.84**</td>
<td>[2.77, 4.91]</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>[0.43, 0.76]</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>[.12, .36]</td>
<td>.61**</td>
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</table>

Fit $R^2 = .378^{**}$ 95% CI [.24, .48]

Note. A significant $b$-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. $b$ represents unstandardized regression weights. $beta$ indicates the standardized regression weights. $sr^2$ represents the semi-partial correlation squared. $r$ represents the zero-order correlation. $LL$ and $UL$ indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. ** indicates $p < .01$. Beta-weights predicting rape myth acceptance from attitudes toward others’ casual sex, religiosity level, and political orientation for women.
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

My first prediction was supported. I predicted that attitudes toward third-party casual sex would have a negative relationship with scores on the rape myth acceptance scale. Individuals who were more accepting of rape myths (i.e., believing false statements about rape, rape victims, and rape perpetrators) tended to be more condemning of other people engaging in casual sex. Conversely, individuals who did not believe rape myths tended to be more accepting of other people engaging in casual sex. This relationship was stronger than the relationship between an individual’s sociosexual orientation and rape myth acceptance.

My second prediction was also supported. I predicted that attitudes towards third-party casual sex would be a unique predictor of scores on the rape myth acceptance scale. My second prediction assessed attitudes toward other people engaging in casual sex along with political orientation and religiosity against rape-myth acceptance. Although political orientation and religiosity were unique predictors of rape myth acceptance, attitudes towards third party casual sex still supported my prediction as a unique predictor in the statistical model. People likely surround themselves with coalition members who advance inclusive interests of the same goal, thus I argue that post-hoc labels of political orientation are more easily accessible to people than reasoning behind their mating
strategy. This might be what is driving the strength of political orientation as a predictor of rape myth acceptance.

These findings lend support to past research on the Reproductive Morality Model. Similarly, Weeden et al. (2008) found that religion was associated with conservative reproductive morals (i.e., reproductive morals supporting a long-term mating strategy), and the strategies associated with short-term sexual strategies (e.g., casual sex) went against more conservative views seen in some religions. It is possible that individuals who condemn others for engaging in casual sex view victims of rape as promiscuous and cheapening the price of sex because the value of female sexuality may be related to its limited accessibility.

These data surprisingly indicated that the more religious an individual was, the less accepting of rape myths they tended to be. While data from the current study contradicted the logic of Weeden et al. (2008), I argue that the data still support the Reproductive Morality Model. Within the current sample, political orientation and religiosity were strongly correlated; however, I did not specifically ask participants to identify their religion, so results may be skewed by individuals’ religious beliefs that do not align with more traditional conservative views. Analysis of the U.S. General Social Survey indicates that non-Catholic Christians and other minor religious denominations (e.g., Buddhism) attract individuals who are more liberal on lifestyle and reproductive morals (Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). I argue that accounting for equal distributions of conservative and liberal reproductive morals will illuminate the expected pattern in religiosity and rape myth acceptance (i.e., a positive correlation between religiosity and rape myth acceptance).
My third prediction was supported. I predicted that men would accept more rape myths than women. As reviewed above, men are statistically more likely to be the less-choosy sex due to the differential minimum obligatory investment (Trivers, 1972). The differential cost of obligatory investment between the sexes created conflict between the sexes where the lower-investing sex has, on average, a more variable reproductive success than the higher-investing sex (Trivers, 1972; Symons, 1979). When placed in ambiguous interactions, men are biased toward perceiving sexual interest from a woman—even if that perception is false (Haselton & Buss, 2000).

The content of certain rape myths may provide a perpetrator reasonable doubt in ambiguous sexual interactions, thus I predicted that men with more unrestricted sociosexual orientations were more likely to endorse items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale that provide the perpetrator reasonable doubt (e.g., “the way she said no was unclear”) if a woman is raped compared to men with restricted sociosexual orientations. Acceptance of these rape myths would provide reasonable doubt against the perpetrator committing a punishable crime. Lönnqvist, Rilke, and Walkowitz (2015), for example, demonstrated that providing reasonable doubt can function to deter punishment in a series of economic games. Although my prediction that men with less restrictive sociosexual orientations would accept more rape myths which provide them reasonable doubt compared to men with more restrictive sociosexual orientation was not supported, future research should address if men, in general, accept more rape myths that provide reasonable doubt than rape myths that do not.

My fifth prediction stated that men who condemn casual sex were more likely to endorse items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale that focus the blame away
from the perpetrator of the rape and bolsters women’s sexual availability (e.g., “If a girl goes to a room alone with a guy at a party, it is her own fault if she is raped”) compared to men who do not condemn casual sex. Men who condemn casual sex are motivated to reduce the ease of obtaining casual sex because an abundance of casual sex creates an environment which monogamy is difficult to maintain (Symons, 1979). If casual sex was abundant in the environment, the ease of a committed woman obtaining an extra-pair copulatory partner may increase and the likelihood of her main partner experiencing cuckoldry also increases (Gangestad & Simpson, 1990; Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Thus, imposing a social cost on casual sex and behaviors associated with casual sex (e.g., abortion, drug use, and prostitution) would make casual sex less common and long-term, high-commitment strategies easier to maintain (Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). Accepting rape myths that bolster a woman’s sexual availability seems to function to blur the lines between consensual and coercive sex—enabling men who condemn casual sex to maintain a moral cost on low-commitment, short-term mating women.

My sixth prediction that women with unrestricted sociosexual orientations (i.e., short-term mating oriented) would reject more rape myths compared to women who have a restricted sociosexual orientation (i.e., long-term mating oriented) was supported, $r = -.26, p = .003$. Women with a less restricted sociosexual orientation were less likely to believe false statements and stereotypes about rape, rape perpetrators, and rape victims.

My seventh prediction was supported. To address if long-term mating oriented women accept certain rape myths (e.g., “A lot of times, girls who say they were raped often agreed to have sex and then had regrets”), I predicted that women who condemn others engaging in casual sex would accept higher rates of rape myths compared to
women who do not condemn casual sex. Creating an environment where there is no
distinction between coercive and consensual casual sex adds a social cost to men and
women whose strategies are tuned to low-commitment, low-fertility lifestyles.
Suppressing the ease of casual sex provides an environment suitable for maintaining a
high-commitment, high-fertility lifestyle (Symons, 1979; Buss & Schmitt, 1993).

Finally, I tested an alternative explanation that investigated whether the
Reproductive Morality Model would predict women’s moral judgements on rape myth
acceptance. Specifically, the alternative explanation stated that women’s attitudes toward
casual sex would not predict rape myth acceptance scores on the Illinois Rape Myth
Acceptance scale due to the costs associated with blurring the lines between consensual
and coercive sex. This explanation was also supported, and I was unable to reject this
alternative explanation.

Further research is needed to understand the relationship between women’s
sociosexual orientation, attitudes toward others’ casual sex, and rape myth acceptance
because long-term mating oriented women are more condemning of casual sex and accept
more rape myths, but the Reproductive Morality Model did not predict all women’s rape
myth acceptance (i.e., attitudes toward casual sex was not a significant predictor of rape
myth acceptance beyond religiosity and political orientation). Moral judgements toward
rape victims may be a smaller effect than expected for women than men due to the costs
associated with rape. The average woman may not gain much from morally judging rape
and sexual assaults—unless they’re in the bottom 20 percent of intelligence and are
weekly churchgoers (Weeden et al., 2008). These women are more likely to be lower in
mate value and use religion as reproductive support (Weeden et al., 2008); additionally,
they are more likely to vehemently condemn casual sex compared to the rest of the population (Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). Most women may not gain benefits from accepting rape myths due to the cost associated with rape; however, the women who attend church weekly and who are within the bottom 20 percent of intelligence may have more to gain from blurring the line between consensual and coercive sex—thus accepting more rape myths to uphold an environment where their mating strategy is upheld. Since these women are a small proportion of the population, future work should focus on measures to differentiate these women from the population [e.g., intelligence screening like the International Cognitive Ability Resource verbal reasoning scale (Condon & Revelle, 2016)]. Again, I argue here that post-hoc labels of political orientation are more easily accessible to people than reasoning behind their mating strategy, so more covert measures should be employed to disseminate between the hypotheses about women’s moral judgements on rape myth acceptance. It is possible that a social desirability bias is captured by women reporting conservatism in political ideology and avoiding an accurate report on their attitudes toward casual sex.

Future research should also address the rape myth scale used in the current study. The Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale (Payne et al., 1999; McMahon & Farmer, 2011) contains items that are arguably demonstrable statements (e.g., “Guys don’t usually intend to force sex on a girl, but sometimes they get too sexually carried away.”). Endorsing these statements contributes to a higher total score on the rape myth acceptance scale indicating that an individual believes more false statements and stereotypes about rape victims, but it is possible these individuals are knowledgeable about statistics behind these statements. Individuals who report higher agreement to these
items on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale are falsely captured as endorsing rape myths by the current method. An updated rape myth acceptance scale should focus on rape-excusing attitudes and language rather than demonstrably true statements; for example, “when a girl resists sex, they actually want it,” compared to “a lot of times, girls who say they were raped agreed to have sex and then regret it” (Payne et al., 1999; McMahon & Farmer, 2011).

Due to the nature of online posting forums, many of the sampled individuals identified as liberal. Possible future directions would be to collect data that encompass a balanced sample, specifically with a more conservative population—especially more conservative women. A larger and more representative sample will provide the opportunity to control for demographics that affect moral judgements (e.g., education level) while maintaining enough variance to accurately capture the effects of reproductive morals on rape myth acceptance.

Nonetheless, initial findings helped establish and provide a greater understanding of how the mind works, but more specifically how the mind works about morality, sexual strategies, and rape myth acceptance. Using Weeden, Kurzban, and Kenrick’s (2016) Reproductive Morality Model as an a priori framework, I used past models and theories and applied them to current issues of concern, such as victim shaming and rape myth acceptance. This research provided more evidence for morality as a self-serving strategy. By using the Reproductive Morality Model, sexual assaults may be viewed through this lens of research and by predicting attitudes toward rape myth acceptance through the condemnation of casual sex, psychologists may create interventions to assist victims of rape and sexual assault in processing their trauma. Understanding and gauging the
attitudes toward societal views and opinions toward rape and acceptance of rape myths will help establish a more concrete understanding behind the variation in condemnation of rape victims, ultimately helping victims of rape and sexual assault.
APPENDIX A

SURVEY GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS

We designed this survey because it’s important to understand how personal morals influence how you see the world. Basically, we’re interested in how your traits and circumstances affect your values system. Your responses will remain completely anonymous. Once you’ve completed this survey, there is no way for anyone to determine which survey was yours.

This research could have important applications, but the ultimate value it brings depends on how open and honest you are in answering the questions. Please read the questions and answer them at your own pace. It took the members of our research team between 10 and 20 minutes to complete the entire survey, but there is no rush if you wish to take more time.

Please enter your age: ___

What is your gender?
- Female
- Male
- Other: ___
- Prefer not to say

What is your relationship status?
- Married
- Widowed
- Divorced
- Separated
- Partnered and living together
- Partnered and not living together
- Single
- Casually dating
- Other: ___

What is your sexual orientation?
- Heterosexual (sexually attracted to the opposite sex)
- Homosexual (sexually attracted to the same sex)
- Bisexual (sexually attracted to both sexes)
- Other
What is your ethnicity?
  o White
  o Black or African American
  o American Indian or Alaskan Native
  o Asian
  o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
  o Other

How would you describe your socioeconomic status (SES)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower SES</th>
<th>Lower-Middle SES</th>
<th>Middle SES</th>
<th>Upper-Middle SES</th>
<th>Upper SES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
  o Less than high school
  o High school graduate
  o Some college
  o 2-year degree
  o 4-year degree
  o Professional degree
  o Doctorate

Please identify you overall political identification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Liberal</th>
<th>Moderately Liberal</th>
<th>Slightly Liberal</th>
<th>Middle-Ground</th>
<th>Slightly Conservative</th>
<th>Moderately Liberal</th>
<th>Strongly Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the following questions, please select how opposed to or supportive of you are to the following issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-Completely oppose</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3-neither oppose nor support</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5-completely support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions against internet pornography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive sex education in public schools</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banning abortion</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Legalized gay marriage</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the following questions, please select opposed to or supportive of you are to the following issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-COMpletely oppose</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3-neither oppose nor support</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5-completely support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher taxes for the wealthy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strict gun control laws</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggressive military response to dangerous</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>foreign groups</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Universal healthcare</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please answer the following questions honestly. As a reminder, your answers are completely anonymous; nothing you disclose here can be traced back to you.

It is OK for two consenting adults to have casual sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree-</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With how many different partners have you had sex with within the past 12 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10-19</th>
<th>20 or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With how many different partners have you had sex with within the past 12 months?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With how many different partners have you had sexual intercourse without having an interest in a long-term committed relationship with this person?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10-19</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sex without love is OK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree-</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex without love is OK.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I can imagine myself being comfortable and enjoying “casual” sex with different partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree-</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How often do you experience sexual arousal when you are in contact with someone you are not in a committed romantic relationship with?

- Never
- Very seldom
- About once every two or three months
- About once a month
- About once every two weeks
- About once a week
- Several times per week
- Nearly everyday
- At least once a day

I do not want to have sex with a person until I am sure that we will have a long-term, serious relationship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In everyday life, how often do you have spontaneous fantasies about having sex with someone you just met?

- Never
- Very seldom
- About once every two or three months
- About once a month
- About once every two weeks
- About once a week
- Several times per week
- Nearly everyday
- At least once a day

If two consenting adults have casual sex, they are violating morals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the following questions, please answer as honestly as you can. These questions are designed to assess your opinions on sexual violence. All responses cannot be traced back to you. Answer how strongly you agree or disagree with the statements.

If a girl is raped while drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting things get out of hand.
When girls got to parties wearing slutty clothes, they are asking for trouble.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a girl goes to a room alone with a guy at a party, it is her own fault if she is raped.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a girl acts like a slut, eventually she is going to get in trouble.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

When girls get raped, it’s often because the way they said “no” was unclear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a girl initiates kissing or hooking up, she should not be surprised if a guy assumes she wants to have sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

When guys rape, it is usually because of their desire for sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Guys don’t usually intend to force sex on a girl, but sometimes they get too sexually carried away.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Rape happens when a guy’s sex drive goes out of control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a guy is drunk, he might rape someone unintentionally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
It shouldn’t be considered rape is a guy is drunk and didn’t realize what he was doing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If both people are drunk, it can’t be rape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a girl doesn’t physically resist sex—even if protesting verbally—it can’t be considered rape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a girl doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say it was rape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A rape probably doesn’t happen if a girl doesn’t have any bruises or marks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If the accused “rapist” doesn’t have a weapon, you really can’t call it rape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If a girl doesn’t say “no,” she can’t claim rape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A lot of times, girls who say they were raped agreed to have sex and then regret it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at guys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A lot of times, girls who claim they were raped have emotional problems.

| Strongly Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Somewhat Agree | Strongly Agree |
Girls who are caught cheating on their boyfriends sometimes claim it was rape.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Please answer the following questions.

How religious are you?

0-Not religious at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-Extremely religious

How spiritual are you?

0-Not spiritual at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-Extremely spiritual

How often do you pray while you are alone?

Never Very rarely Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very frequently Daily

How often do you currently attend church?

- Never
- 1-2 times a month
- 3-4 times a month
- 5-6 times a month
- 7-8 times a month
- 9-10 times a month
- More than 10 times a month

How often are you expecting to attend church in the future?

- Never
- 1-2 times a month
- 3-4 times a month
- 5-6 times a month
- 7-8 times a month
- 9-10 times a month
- More than 10 times a month
APPENDIX B

HYPOTHESES FOR SEX DIFFERENCES ANALYSES

*Do Men with Short-Term Mating Psychologies Accept Rape Myths?*

When guys rape, it is usually because of their strong desire for sex.
If a guy is drunk, he might rape someone unintentionally
It shouldn’t be considered rape if a guy is drunk and didn’t realized what he was doing.
If both people are drunk, it can’t be rape.
If the accused “rapist” doesn’t have a weapon, you can’t call it rape.
When girls go to parties wearing slutty clothes, they are asking for trouble.
If a girl goes to a room alone with a guy at a party, it is her own fault if she is raped.
If a girl initiates kissing or hooking up, she should not be surprised if a guy assumes she wants to have sex
If a girl doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say it was rape.
If a girl doesn’t physically resist, even if protesting verbally, it can’t be considered rape.
If a girl doesn’t say “no,” she can’t claim rape.
A lot of times, girls who say they were raped agreed to have sex and then regret it.
Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at guys.
A lot of times, girls who claim they were raped have emotional problems.
When girls get raped, it’s often because the way they said “no” was unclear.

*Do Men with Long-Term Mating Psychologies Accept Rape Myths?*

If the accused “rapist” doesn’t have a weapon, you can’t call it rape.
When girls go to parties wearing slutty clothes, they are asking for trouble.
If a girl is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting things get out of hand.
If a girl goes to a room alone with a guy at a party, it is her own fault if she is raped.
If a girl acts like a slut, eventually she is going to get in trouble.
If a girl initiates kissing or hooking up, she should not be surprised if a guy assumes she wants to have sex.

If a girl doesn’t physically resist sex—even if protesting verbally—it can’t be considered rape.

If a girl doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say it was rape.

A rape probably doesn’t happen if a girl doesn’t have any bruises or marks.

If a girl doesn’t say “no,” she can’t claim rape.

A lot of times, girls who say they were raped agreed to have sex and then regret it.

Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at guys.

A lot of times, girls who claim they were raped have emotional problems.

Girls who are caught cheating on their boyfriends sometimes claim it was rape.

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**Do Women with Long-Term Mating Psychologies Accept Rape Myths?**

If a girl is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting things get out of hand.

When girls go to parties wearing slutty clothes, they are asking for trouble.

If a girl goes to a room alone with a guy at a party, it is her own fault if she is raped.

If a girl acts like a slut, eventually she is going to get in trouble.

If a girl initiates kissing or hooking up, she should not be surprised if a guy assumes she wants to have sex.

If a girl doesn’t physically resist sex—even if protesting verbally—it can’t be considered rape.

If a girl doesn’t physically fight back, you can’t really say it was rape.

A rape probably doesn’t happen if a girl doesn’t have any bruises or marks.

If a girl doesn’t say “no,” she can’t claim rape.

A lot of times, girls who say they were raped agreed to have sex and then regret it.

Rape accusations are often used as a way of getting back at guys.

A lot of times, girls who say they were raped often agreed to have sex and then had regrets.

A lot of times, girls who claim they were raped have emotional problems.

Girls who are caught cheating on their boyfriends sometimes claim it was rape.

When girls get raped, it’s often because the way they said “no” was unclear.

When guys rape, it is usually because of their strong desire for sex.

Rape happens when a guy’s sex drive goes out of control.

If a guy is drunk, he might rape someone unintentionally.

It shouldn’t be considered rape if a guy is drunk and didn’t realized what he was doing.

If both people are drunk, it can’t be rape.

If the accused “rapist” doesn’t have a weapon, you can’t call it rape.
REFERENCES


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