

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION: A PROCESS EVALUATION OF A BAKERSFIELD
GANG VIOLENCE PREVENTION MODEL

By

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


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**This thesis has been accepted on behalf of the Department of Public Policy and
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Executive Summary

The street gang problem in Kern County most certainly affects all residents; making criminal street gang activity a public problem. In Bakersfield, the statistics show that gang related gun violence is burdening society with devastating social and financial costs. Law enforcement agencies are ill equipped to handle the problem of gang related gun violence by themselves.

A review of relevant literature on strategies to reduce gang related gun violence has revealed that interagency collaborations can be a valuable alternative to traditional law enforcement tactics. These collaborations can be particularly successful when law enforcement agencies collaborate with social services, public health officials, clergy members, and community outreach organizations. One of the most successful of these collaborations was Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts. This program served as a model to several other agencies wanting to address gang related gun violence with a modern approach.

In 2010 the Bakersfield Police Department spearheaded an effort to create the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership (BSSP), which was modeled from Operation Ceasefire. The BSSP included law enforcement agencies from local, state, and federal agencies, as well as representatives from the Kern County Superintendent of Schools, nonprofit community outreach workers, religious organizations, social service agencies, and other volunteers. Part of the model of the BSSP was to institute “call-in” meetings where carefully selected gang members found to be at-risk for gun violence were invited to attend. Part of the meeting was a confrontation from criminal justice representatives who informed these gang members of consequences of participating in gang-related gun violence. The other part of the meeting was more interactive and allowed the “call-in” participant gang members to meet with social service providers and non-profit groups for an assessment of their personal needs (e.g. job skills training, obtaining a driver’s license, tattoo removal).

In 2013, several students from California State University, Bakersfield conducted a program evaluation of the BSSP. Their focus was on the “call-in” processes and their function as a major component for the BSSP. The results of the evaluation revealed several inefficiencies with the process and inconsistencies with the model as it was originally planned. Because the BSSP grant funded period is now over, the collaborative program has become volunteer-based. The evaluation of the BSSP has resulted in the development of several proposals which included dissolving the BSSP completely; modifying the BSSP into a nonprofit entity; modifying the BSSP model to mobilize the collaborative organizations; include Juvenile Facilities into the BSSP “call-in” model, and to further modify the BSSP follow-up procedures. Two detailed recommendations were presented which were directed at the Bakersfield Police Department. Those recommendations were to address inefficiencies in BSSP “call-in” processes at Bakersfield Police Department levels, and secondly, to make major changes to the entire BSSP model and mobilize / expand the accessibility of the program.

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Chapter 1

Defining the Criminal Street Gang Problem

Introduction

Criminal street gangs are expanding, they are evolving, and they are continuing to be a posing threat to cities nationwide (NGIC, 2011). Gangs are becoming more adaptable, more organized, more opportunistic, and are ever raising their sophistication. Including prison street gangs and outlaw motorcycle street gangs, there are more than 1.4 million active gang members in more than 33,000 gangs in the United States. Gang members are responsible for an average of 48% of violent crimes in most jurisdictions, and have accounted for 90% of the violent crimes in some jurisdictions. These were all among the key findings of the 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment released by the National Gang Intelligence Center and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Alarmed by the growing threat of violent street gangs, the federal government has taken a broader role in reducing gang related violent crime. The efforts included legislation like the Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of 2007 and Fighting Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of 2007 (Muhlhausen & Little, 2007). Other efforts include specialized grants made available for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. These grants include funding through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) (National Gang Center, 2014).

Street gang violence is nothing new to California and certainly not new to Kern County. What is alarming is that despite all the community outrage, the creation of specialized units in law enforcement to suppress street gangs, the creation of specialized gang prosecutors, and all of the preventative measures Kern County and the City of Bakersfield has committed to; our local

street gangs continue to prosper. A local news agency in Kern County published information in 2009 showing that Kern County had a total of 7,477 documented gang members, which was an increase from the approximate 4,500 documented gang members three years prior (KGET,2009). While these statistics were not cited, the numbers were consistent with the 2010 California Department of Justice Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence's Annual Report to the Legislature where Kern County was reported to have approximately 6,740 gang members. Neighboring counties like Fresno County reported having approximately 12,650 gang members and Los Angeles County exceeded 94,000 gang members. Law enforcement tracks these gang populations in part because these gang members show a high propensity for violence and contribute to a high ratio of violent crimes when compared to non-gang offenders. For example, previous research into general homicide statistics for the city of Bakersfield, California revealed a disturbing trend. This trend is best outlined in Table-1:

Table-1.1 Bakersfield Police Department Homicide Statistics

YEAR	TOTAL HOMICIDES (H)	FIREARM (F) RELATED HOMICIDES (% of H)	GANG W/FIREARM HOMICIDES (% of F)	SUSPECTED GANG RELATED
2000	25	19 (76%)	6 (31%)	
2001	25	18 (72%)	6 (30%)	
2002	23	13 (56%)	4 (31%)	
2003	20	11 (55%)	2 (18%)	
2004	24	12 (50%)	4 (30%)	2
2005	30	21 (70%)	12 (57%)	1
2006	25	19 (76%)	14 (74%)	
2007	18	11 (61%)	6 (54%)	
2008	27	12 (44%)	7 (58%)	1
2009	39	26 (67%)	17 (65%)	
2010	39	23 (58%)	12 (52%)	
2011	23	12 (52%)	6 (50%)	
2012	37	30 (81%)	12 (40%)	
	Total: 355	Total: 227	Total: 108	

Note: Information provided by Bakersfield Police Department (Holcombe et al., 2013)

In the last thirteen years, the homicides reported in Bakersfield have steadily increased from twenty-five homicides in 2000 to thirty-seven homicides in 2012. What is even more staggering is the statistical comparison with homicides by firearm. The information from Table-1 revealed a peak in 2012 where thirty out of thirty-seven, or 81%, of the homicides were committed by suspects who used firearms to kill their victims. Over the span of the thirteen year compilation, there were a total of 355 homicides with 227 of them, or 63%, attributed to suspects with firearms. Each year the Bakersfield Police Department not only tracks the means by which each homicide victim is killed, the agency also determines if there is documentation to support the homicide being “gang related” or even “possibly gang related”. This strategy allows for the department to track three very important variables: *Homicides committed by gang members with firearms*. As the data shows, of the 227 homicides where firearms were determined to be used in the offense, gang members were identified as suspects in 108 offenses. In other words, when homicides were committed in Bakersfield by suspects with firearms from 2000-2013, it was reported that, on the average, 48% of the time it was attributed to gang members as suspects. The correlations and comparisons could be endless, but the information is clear: Gang members account for a significantly large percentage of the homicides in Bakersfield, and they are committing these offenses with firearms.

The street gang problem in Kern County most certainly affects all residents, which makes criminal street gang activity a public problem. Gang violence does not occur in small areas or specific parts of this community; hence the need for public safety to be innovative, open to change, and dedicated to alternative strategies that have been successful elsewhere in the world. Crime and public safety are concerns for all residents of the community and gang violence is public safety issue. Every member of the community has a stake in the prosecution of criminals,

and therefore street gang violence and street gang intimidation are classic examples of a public problem.

Because gang members are seen as violent and aggressive, the impact they have on communities can be devastating. Residents in areas where criminal street gangs are prevalent are fearful of the gang members and have to alter their way of life to avoid incidental contact with any of these gang members (Lane & Meeker, 2000). This creates a whole new type of victimization of the community; one that is not quantifiable but present nonetheless. These people who are sharing neighborhoods with gang members will likely lose their sense of security as they continue to be victimized either directly or indirectly. Carlie (2012) asserts that indirect victimization of the community and its members are visible in a “decrease in neighborhood property values, a decline of city services, and losses to the neighborhood’s business community.” Carlie (2012) further states there are numerous other social costs to communities with gang problems which include the harm that gangs do the children, the contribution to a culture of violence, and the burden on social services. Simply put, gangs can destabilize entire communities and adversely affect youth as gang culture spreads.

Gang prevention and enforcement efforts also incur a tremendous amount of financial cost. San Mateo County reported that gang violence costs their taxpayers over \$50 million each year (Cooney, 2011). The study in San Mateo County researched the costs associated with criminal proceedings, lost productivity, medical care, and decreased quality of life experienced by victims. The result was that each non-fatal gun injury was found to cost taxpayers around \$46,000 and fatal injuries were estimated at \$6.4 million. Within the parameters of those estimations, the cost of the 36 fatal and 133 non-fatal firearm injuries to youth in San Mateo County from 2005 to 2009 will total \$234 million over time.

Addressing Gang Violence

With the tremendous social and financial costs associated with gangs and the damage they incur, the question facing law enforcement and public health professionals remains debated: What is the best way to combat criminal street gang violence? The answer is completely dependent on which perspective is represented. Law enforcement is tasked with enforcing laws, using suppression tactics as a means of public safety, and participates in crime prevention mostly as a peripheral role. Social services and agencies focused on corrections and rehabilitations that would combat gang violence by looking at individual causal factors to gang violence in the attempt to explain the behavior, understand the behavior, and later correct it. These roles are sometimes adversarial as each respective discipline contributes with their proposed solutions (Fritsch et al., 1999).

In the early 1980's Los Angeles, California was at the forefront of strategic efforts to subdue criminal street gang violence. One of those strategies was in the form of civil gang injunctions against the Play Boy Gangster Crips in 1987 which received national attention due to its success (Werdegar, 1999). According to Werdegar (1999) law enforcement agencies and district attorneys compile the names of numerous gang members from certain gangs and catalogue numerous anti-social acts they commit in the neighborhoods. Essentially the gang members are served with a temporary, and sometimes permanent, civil order which makes it a misdemeanor contempt of court violation if they commit specified acts such as trespassing on private property, blocking traffic, littering, spray-painting graffiti, and dealing in illegal drugs (p.417). All of these acts are illegal by state and local law; however the injunctions provide additional penalties for crimes commonly associated with non-violent gang activity.

In yet another attempt to control gang violence, California legislators authored a section into the California Penal Code which recognized the need for enhanced penalties for gang activity and violent crime. California Governor George Deukmejian signed the Street Terrorism and Prevention Act (STEP Act) on September 24, 1988 (Von Hofwegen, 2009). The STEP Act was the first of its kind to provide a legal definition for a documented criminal street gang member. Furthermore, the law provided for sentencing enhancements for gang members that were prosecuted for gang specific crimes (Truman, 1995). The STEP Act eventually became law under California Penal Code Sections 186.22-186.33 defining a gang as “any organization, association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, which (1) has continuity of purpose, (2) seeks a group identity, and (3) has members who individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity” (Reference section 186.22(f), California Penal Code, 2009). The operational definition of a gang and the hefty sentencing enhancements the statute allowed law enforcement agencies to have additional tools for suppression and deterrence efforts.

Regardless of how many laws are drafted or how many gang members are served with injunctions, there are a number of critics who claim other strategies are needed. Social services, public health, and legal advocacy groups tend to define the gang problem as a social one and claim the current anti-gang legislation is flawed. One critic of the STEP Act, and other anti-gang legislations like gang injunctions, opined that gang suppression strategies are unfair, ineffective, unconstitutional, and foster racial profiling (Van Hofwegen ,2009). The American Civil Liberties Union recently sued Orange County for unconstitutional gang suppression legislation that resulted in a judicial victory for the organization (ACLU,2011). The ACLU stands behind a

dedication to gang prevention and community programs to deter young men and women from joining street gangs, claiming the root cause of gang crime is a lack of gang prevention efforts.

Regardless of their mandate, law enforcement, public health, and social services all work well when orchestrated properly. Their goals are the same; it is their strategies that differ. Interagency collaborations, or inter-organizational collaborations, are not new concepts to the gang violence vernacular; but when these pooled resources effectively merge, there are increased chances of success in lowering levels of violence among criminal street gangs (Peaslee, 2009).

Overview

In the following chapters, this paper will identify several situations where interagency collaborations were utilized to address criminal street gang violence. Starting in Chapter 2, this paper will first discuss the relevancy of utilizing interagency collaborations as a legitimate means to influence decreases in gang violence. In the chapter, the discussion will identify best practices with regards to the operational successes of an interagency collaboration and the successful management of an interagency collaboration. The discussion follows with a literature review of a widely recognized interagency collaboration in Boston, Massachusetts, *Operation Ceasefire*, and how the best practices applied to its success. In Chapter 3, this paper will outline the history of how the Bakersfield Police Department developed a need for its own interagency collaboration: Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership (BSSP). The chapter will discuss the modifications that the Bakersfield Police Department intended for the collaboration as it was modeled after the Ceasefire premise. Chapter 4 will present results from a program process evaluation conducted on the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership at the end of its grant funded period. The study detailed the process by which gang members in Bakersfield were selected and later obligated to attend special meetings hosted by the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership. Those results will be

thoroughly discussed as part of the numerous proposals presented for the consideration of key stakeholders in the partnership. Finally, Chapter 5 will serve as a proposal for final recommendations and conclusions for the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership and the Bakersfield Police Department's role in it.

Chapter 2

Literature Review on Interagency Collaborations

Integrating Roles

In the wake of the creation of gang legislation in several states nationwide, law enforcement began to turn to academics to broaden strategies in the fields of gang suppression and gang intervention. In 1996, Fritsch et al. (1999) reviewed tactics of gang suppression by the Dallas Police Department in Dallas, Texas. In this study, law enforcement personnel in Dallas were being evaluated on the success of strategies to combat gang violence in small areas. The techniques that were being used by police included saturation patrol in gang areas, aggressive truancy sweeps, and curfew enforcement. What Fritsch et al. (1999) found was that traditional patrol saturation was largely unsuccessful in reducing gang violence. Contrarily, the authors found that suppression and enforcement efforts in concert with aggressive curfew and truancy sweeps had greatly impacted the gang violence. Fritsch et al. (1999) illuminated a fundamental flaw in law enforcement in their critique of truancy and curfew violations being low priority on a grand scale. Where truancy and curfew enforcement notably benefit the community is in reducing gang violence, although those substantive crimes themselves were low priority and deemed less important to address.

But aside from enforcement and saturation, Fritsch et al. (1999) addresses the question of what roles police play, or should be playing, in creating and executing strategies that stray from traditional policing. Efforts to expand into social services cause concern for police departments whose mandate is to reduce crime and enforce the laws of their jurisdiction. Spergel (1995), quoted in Fritsch et al. (1999) asserts:

The police cannot be held responsible for the basic failures of youth socialization; lack of social and economic achievement by families, deficiencies of schools, decreased employment opportunities for African-American youth, the extensive street presence and accessibility of sophisticated weaponry, and the extensive racism and social isolation that appear to be highly correlated with the gang problem in some low income minority communities. (p. 135)

The narrow focus should then be on the crimes and crime problems that these gangs create. Fritsch et al. (1999) conclude that while “police are designed, organized, staffed and trained to deal with crime, not social services”, there should be coordination “with other agencies in their efforts to deal with gangs, and these efforts should be focused on the criminal problems that gangs create” (p.135). What Fritsch is alluding to is the concept of interagency collaboration defined by Kaiser (2011), in reference to the federal government, as “any joint activity by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more public value that could be produced when the organizations act alone” (p.2). Kaiser (2011) further explains that collaborative efforts are often done through partnerships, defined as:

An arrangement which features public-private partnerships, with the public sector entities extending from the federal government to state, local, or tribal governments as well as, in some cases, foreign governments; and with the private sector involving different kinds of entities: non-governmental organizations, not-for-profit organizations, for-profit companies and firms, government-sponsored enterprises and government-chartered corporations. (p.4)

Law enforcement collaborations with social service agencies are nothing new, however “even within the trend of community policing, partnerships with social service

agencies, particularly those that involve the allocation of agency resources, are not widespread” (Peaslee, 2009, p.121). Peaslee (2009) agrees with Fritsch et al.(1999) in the assertion that crime is influenced by factors that are outside of law enforcement; factors including family, community, and economic characteristics that, under traditional law enforcement, are beyond their control. Plotkin and Narr (cited in Peaslee, 2009) further point out, “Police are expected to be problem solvers, social workers, employment counselors, order maintenance workers, fear-reduction experts, and mediators... Yet they lack the community resources and direction to adequately assume these roles.” From these perspectives, it makes sense that law enforcement would seek out a change, and not necessarily in their fundamental roles as police, but in the delivery of a broader customer service. This adaptive view of customer service can work positively from a public relations angle as well. Peaslee (2009) argues that collaborative efforts with agencies outside of law enforcement can assist with police legitimacy among poor and minority neighborhoods. By allowing prevention and intervention strategies to accompany crime suppression, particularly within the criminal street gang context, the result is often the humanization of police and a sense that the police care about the future of these neighborhoods. There are numerous examples of these collaborations being hailed as the public policy solutions, and the evidence is reviewed and discussed extensively in the academic forum.

Successful Interagency Collaborations

One such example of a successful interagency collaboration was seen with Operation Smokescreen in North Carolina (Fromme, 2007). In this collaborative, 16 governmental agencies from local, state, federal, and international governments acted on information developed from

sources that linked terrorist funding to local crime rings. Over several years these agencies were able to develop federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) cases on 26 suspected terrorists and ultimately led to a permanent collaborative union: The North Carolina Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Another example of a successful interagency collaboration occurred with Operation REACT in Chicago in 1994 (Rodriguez & Branon, 1996). This collaborative effort consisted of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to combat gang violence. What was unique about this collaborative effort was the finite time period set at the start of the operation: 4 months. In this short period of time there were numerous efforts to suppress gang violence, disrupt gang organized narcotic activity, and target those gang members who possessed, used, or sold firearms. The effort was ultimately successful in lowering homicide rates and lowering violent crimes in the small targeted area in South Chicago. Among the strategies was to gather community support in the disposition of the criminal cases these targeted gang members were facing. The police department wanted “buy-in” from the community and it resulted in large numbers of residents turning out to follow the cases through the court processes. While there were several factors contributing to the success of the operation, the effectiveness was also attributed to the finite lifespan of the operation which did not allow for dissipation over time. Additionally, the operation called for focused strategies and clear goals from the very start; which appear to be additional factors in the success of the operation.

Developing Successful Collaborations

From these examples of interagency collaborations there seem to be a number of definable factors that contribute to the success, and sometimes failure, of collaborative efforts involving multiple agencies. In Okamoto’s 2011 study on interagency collaborations addressing

high-risk gang youth, there were two main elements he attributed to successful collaborations: Communication and Cooperation. In another study about collaborative efforts, Johnson et al. (2003) looked at interagency collaborations assisting disabled children in Ohio. Johnson et al. (2003) provided seven factors deemed as the most important for a successful interagency collaboration. The factors were “(a) commitment, (b) communication, (c) strong leadership from key decision makers, (d) understanding the culture of collaborating agencies, (e) engaging in serious preplanning, (f) providing adequate resources for collaboration, and (g) minimizing turf issues” (p.201). At the conclusion, Johnson et al. (2003) believed that commitment, communication, and strong leadership were the main factors for successful interagency collaborations. But not every collaborative effort ends favorably, and there are identifiable factors that can endanger collaborative arrangements. Kaiser (2011) identifies numerous factors that proved to be major obstacles for interagency collaborative efforts. Those factors include, but were not limited to:

- Transformations in governmental responsibilities and broad scale, wide ranging public policies
- Expectations of what is to be accomplished and determining how extensive and demanding these expectations are, for the project and the participants
- The urgency, scope, scale, and complexity of the problem being addressed
- Selection of lead agency or officer in coordinative arrangements
- Bureaucratic and administrative cultures within the agencies
- Competition of a collaborative enterprise with other missions mandates, responsibilities, strategic plans, and policy priorities among the participating agencies (p.25)

In a workbook developed by Rosenthal & Mizrahi (2004), the authors compile their thoughts on components necessary for making inter-organizational collaborations successful. The workbook contained a comprehensive assessment of factors causing concern for interagency or inter-organizational collaborations in a detailed discussion of nine aspects of the collaboration process in need of special consideration to avoid failure. The first component necessary for

avoiding failure involves the setting of clear goals (Rosenthal & Mizrahi, 2004). The authors warn of collaborative efforts without clear vision, inadequate planning, and a lack of commitment to those goals. Second, Rosenthal and Mizrahi (2004) assert that collaborative arrangements are in need of proper resources like funding, proper staffing, leadership, and strong memberships. Inadequate funding or a lack of stable funding can be obvious obstacles to any successful collaborative. In addition to funding resources there must be strong leadership with experience in cooperative ventures and ability to hold partners accountable. Next, the collaborative needs a defined structure; some level of organization of roles for members, representatives, and leaders. The fourth consideration is to clearly establish participation benefits. Outcomes need to be realistic, but the organization needs to foster innovative work and opportunities for creativity. Next, the collaboration processes need to be consistent. Conflict must be addressed instead of ignored, members in the group need to feel comfortable to get involved in decision making, and there must be sensitivity to the input by those involved in the collaborative. The sixth consideration is to have the proper division of labor. It is important to list realistic expectations regarding the time and energy required to keep the collaborative cohesive. Without the proper division of labor there could be a loss of direction or focus, certain tasks could simply get neglected, and the members may become more at risk for feeling resentment towards those who are not viewed as pulling their weight. Next, there must be collaboration credibility with all the participating members of the collaboration. If all members are to be held accountable for their assigned responsibilities, there must be mutual trust and respect from other members and leaders. Each member should have an equal voice in decision making or agenda setting, and the lead agency needs to be conscious that control and authority must not appear to be over-dominating. The number eight component addresses the topic of adaptability to external changes. Any organized collaboration has to have a plan in place to react

to negative publicity, to avoid negative exchanges with those groups or organizations that are competing with the collaborative, and to recognize when the political or economic climates change or become unfavorable. Lastly, a healthy collaborative has to maintain positive organizational and interpersonal relationships. Open communications with constructive intentions are keys to maintaining organizational and interpersonal relationships. Problems occur when destructive relationships are not kept in check. This is very common when there are members with “conflicting loyalties, vested interests, or fear of domination by another agency” (Ch.15, p.5).

From a unique perspective, Rosenthal and Mizrahi (2004) conclude that while some interagency collaborations may fail, the processes that lead to failure can be useful. The authors suggest that when problem-solving is needed, failing organizations can get assistance from consultants, other established interagency collaborations, or utilize temporary focus groups to evaluate options. But a failing interagency collaboration is ultimately an ineffective collaboration. In any event, if any part of the interagency collaboration was fundamentally rooted in healthy inter-organizational relationships, new collaborative efforts may be a by-product of any combination of those established relationships. In other words, failure does not need to be permanent, nor does it need to be devastating. New successful interagency collaborations may form and ultimately flourish due to the lessons learned from failing efforts in the past.

Managing Interagency Collaborations

Much of the responsibility for the success or failure of any collaboration is dependent on how the collaboration is managed. Managing a successful interagency collaboration is a delicate endeavor as traditional roles of leadership are arranged to include power-sharing with other agencies. There is an inherent amount of risk of partners lacking congruent organizational

cultures, not sharing the same focus, and ultimately there is always a risk of partners exiting the collaboration (Page, 2003). In a study conducted by Page (2003), six basic strategies were established for any public manager to consider for successful management of an interagency collaboration. Because most agency collaborations are given ambiguous mandates, the first strategy is to clarify missions and goals. Next, the manager must be willing to embrace and even seek out accountability from overseers. The willingness to be held accountable in the public arena will allow the manager to call attention to their efforts and define some of the terms that will be used to assess their initiatives. Third, a leader must be able to redesign production processes which enhance flexibility and responsiveness to their customers or clientele. This process involves surveying customers, streamlining service delivery processes, and other operational management techniques which are important in not only launching new programs, but improving existing ones. Fourth, the administrative systems supporting the new processes should not be solely controlled by management. This strategy calls for the allowance of control and discretion to be shifted downward within the collaboration with a focus of serving the frontline staff. The fifth strategy is to establish consequences to motivate performance at all levels. These consequences are linked to performance and could be as simple as incentives for successes and sanctions for failure. One way management is involved in this strategy is through performance contracts which hold management accountable for reaching specific goals. Finally, the manager must be the catalyst for organizational culture to change to support the first five strategies. The mission, accountability arrangements, process changes, administrative restructuring, and performance benchmarks are only going to be effective if all levels of the collaboration believe in and implement them.

Some scholars have even clarified collaborative management skills as “unique” to the collaborative context (McGuire,2006). According to McGuire (2006) distinguishing collaborative management behaviors in terms of their operational differences can be organized into four categories: “Activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing” (p.37). Activation refers to the ability to identify and incorporate the right people and resources that would be needed to achieve the established goals. These people are simply those “who possess the policy-making resources- finances, knowledge, information, expertise, experience, legal authority, and labor, on which the collaborative effort depends in order to attain its goals” (p. 37). Framing is described as the facilitation of agreement on leadership and administrative roles. In this category, the leadership establishes an identity and culture for the collaborative. Regarding mobilization, the public manager builds support from those directly involved in the collaborative as well as key players outside of the collaboration. Synthesizing includes the facilitation of productive and purposeful relationships and interactions among all of those involved.

In summary, the keys to successful collaborations appear to be centered on good management practices and well developed skills with interpersonal communication. Successful collaborations are often attributed to concepts like clear goal setting, appropriately defined missions, proper planning for finances and resources, and accountability from its members. Other lessons gained from successful interagency collaborations include considerations of defining time periods for the life of the collaboration, as well as constant assessment of achievements to determine relevancy of the collaboration.

Operation Ceasefire & Project Safe Neighborhoods.

In response to social pressures to combat gang violence and in the aftermath of reported failing strategies (Fritsch, 1999) to impact street gang violence, The Boston Police Department

set out in 1995 and 1996 to implement a problem-oriented policing intervention model to deter firearm violence at the local street gang level. That program was titled Operation Ceasefire, and it has been extensively studied by scholars attempting to prove or disprove its claimed success. Braga et al. (2001) states that the model included several aspects: bringing together interagency criminal justice professionals, applying both qualitative and quantitative research techniques to assess youth gun violence in Boston, develop an intervention strategy to have short term impacts on youth homicide, implement and adapt the intervention, and then evaluate the impact of the intervention (p.198). The participants in the intervention included several officers of the Boston Police Department, probation and parole departments, district attorneys, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, representatives from the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, local juvenile corrections personnel, school district police, and gang outreach community workers (Braga et al., 2001). Braga et al. (2001) states the selection of small groups of well documented gang members met with the aforementioned participants which was termed a “working group.” Braga summarized his understanding of the message provided to the gang members: “...violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, the normal workings of police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters” (Braga et al., 2001, p.200). The overall message included the threat of federal prosecution for gun possession or gun trafficking, which incidentally carries a more severe punishment. In fact, one of the other main elements of the Ceasefire program focused on strategies to combat illicit firearms trafficking (Braga et al., 1999). Those strategies called for focused law enforcement efforts to trace seized firearms to their origins and focused attention on those who supplied firearms to gang youth.

One of the most unique attributes of starting a program similar to a model like the Boston Ceasefire is the scientific process used to target the specific gang violence problem. A city or county wide gang intervention of this magnitude raises the question of who the intended targets of the intervention program would be due to the impossibility of personal interaction with every gang offender in a given area. Hughes (2005) asserts that when studying youth gangs there is often a lack of quantitative data as it refers to gangs. Hughes explains that most of the quantified data regarding crimes and arrests is gathered by the review of the Uniform Crime Reports, a nationwide database which includes crime information provided by all law enforcement agencies. Using traditional methods to isolate gang related crimes has been difficult due to the lack of designation to the area of gangs in these reports. Hughes posits that there is a need to use qualitative studies of gang members, i.e. in depth interviews with gang members, collective behavior studies, criminal background, and socio-economic factors of gang members (2005, pp.103-104). Braga (2008a) comments on what he refers to as a problem analysis phase to the Boston Ceasefire model. Braga (2008a) states, "The analysis phase challenges police officers to analyze the causes of problems behind a string of crime incidents or substantive community concern" (Braga, 2008a, p.335). McGloin (2005) comments on the problem analysis phase of the Ceasefire model as being "invaluable" in that the knowledge gained by the law enforcement officials during initial stages of the project provided "unique leverage" when the interventions started (2005, p.613). The importance of police conducting the analysis themselves brings an automatic qualitative research component to the analysis phase as it is the police officers who are in contact with the gang members on a regular basis. Adherence to a scientific problem analysis founded in terms provided by both qualitative and quantitative data brings this model additional credibility as scholars.

To carry out the problem analysis phase, Braga et. al (1999) explains that researchers assembled gang officers from the Boston Police Department, probation officers, and “streetworkers”. The researchers were interested in finding the scope of the gang youth violence problem, and it was clear early on that the data was simply not available by examining official police records. In the summer of 1995, this group met during several sessions to discuss details regarding homicides from 1990 to 1994. Researchers structured questions surrounding each homicide to ascertain key details about the victimization. For example the following questions were indicative of what was asked for each incident:

- Do you know what happened in this homicide?
- Was the victim a gang member?
- Was the perpetrator (or perpetrators) a gang member (or gang members)?
- What was the killing about, and was it gang related?

All of the answers were recorded into a database where the qualitative data was combined with official data taken from the reports. Though it sounds subjective, the researchers were finding the input, specifically with regards to defining “gang related”, to be consistently applied. From the data, researchers could start to frame the gang violence problem in Boston and lay the foundation for a need for action.

Because this type of gang intervention model has been in place in some cities for several years, data has been studied by scholars attempting to evaluate the successes and failures. The reviewed literature provided information into the findings where this model was previously implemented: Boston, Massachusetts, and Stockton, California. Braga (2008a) evaluated the use of the program in Stockton, California and Boston, Massachusetts. What is interesting in the

presentation of data is that Braga et al. (2001) mainly presented the statistical data of the before and after homicide rates and shootings for the city of Boston itself. In this regard Braga et al. was able to observe several successes which were ultimately attributed to the Ceasefire model or problem oriented policing. Braga then addresses the city of Stockton, California with a small but noticeable approach (2008a). In Braga's review of the data for Stockton, California he finds positive results favoring the program, however then provides additional results as the city of Stockton is compared to comparable sized cities within the state of California under the same time period. This approach was more complete and appeared less subject to academic criticism. Rosenfeld (2005) reviewed data from Boston, Massachusetts, specifically research conducted by Braga et al. (2001), and found the claims of success following the implementation of the Boston Ceasefire model to be exaggerated. Rosenfeld (2005) explains that alternative factors may have played a role in homicide and gun violence reduction immediately following the implementation of the Ceasefire program. Rosenfeld (2005) explains that a series of other calculations still allow for the claims of a reduction in homicides in Boston, but not to any statistical significance. To dispute Rosenfeld, his findings were focused on gun homicides and offered no insight as to the reduction in overall gun violence; which is a significant exclusion of a core point of the project.

In 2001, US President George W. Bush announced plans to fund a federal program to combat gun violence. In a speech delivered by the president on May 14, 2001, he outlined a need for communities to create programs like Ceasefire where success in lowering homicide rates was well documented. President Bush proposed dedicating \$550 million for Project Safe Neighborhoods which would "be used to hire new Federal and State prosecutors, to support investigators, to provide training, and develop and promote community outreach efforts" (Bush, 2011, p.2). In 2002 Lowell, Massachusetts was one of eleven targeted cities in the state for

Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) intervention (Braga et al., 2008b). What followed was a multi-agency collaborative effort to mimic Boston's Operation Ceasefire program and the "pulling levers" strategy. Braga et al. (2008b) found there was a significant decrease in gun violence and homicide rates among young gang members which was attributed to the PSN program. In the aftermath, Braga et al. (2008b) concluded that "coordinated strategies that integrate suppression, social intervention, opportunity provision, and community organization are most likely to be effective in dealing with chronic youth gang problems."

Operation Ceasefire- Successful Principles

The successes of interagency collaborations like Boston's Operation Ceasefire are not solely assessed with respect to their quantifiable reductions of homicides and gang violence with firearms. When the aforementioned strategies provided by Braga (2001, 2008a, 2008b), Rosenthal & Mizrahi (2004), Johnson et al. (2003), Okamoto (2011), and others in the academic literature are applied to what we know about the Ceasefire program, the framework for success at early stages of the program becomes clearer. The Ceasefire program was ultimately successful for a variety of reasons, but much can be attributed to the extensive forethought by those involved. First and foremost, Operation Ceasefire was developed in response to a very high profile, widely discussed gang violence problem in Boston, Massachusetts. Timing appeared to be a large part of the creation of the program as the discussion of some sort of solution appeared in a variety of agencies' agendas; an idea supported by Kingdon (2011). It was Kingdon (2011) who was interested in the processes of what influences agenda setting. Kingdon (2011) found that there are several ways agenda items are formed, based on participants and key actors and the processes preceding the time of agenda setting. The processes preceding any agenda setting were separated into what Kingdon (2011) referred to as "streams", which include the problem

stream, the politics stream, and policies stream. Using the metaphor of streams, Kingdon (2011) illustrates how the “coupling” of certain participants and issues in the streams come together for what is referred to as a window of opportunity for agenda setting; presumably in this case being a coupling of Boston’s gang shootings, media coverage of the violence, mounting pressures for law enforcement solutions, community frustration, and available funding (Braga et al., 2001). All of these “streams” coupled during a time where it made the interagency collaboration an optimal solution. Next, according to Okomoto (2011) one of the components for a successful interagency collaboration was “engaging in serious preplanning”. In agreement with Okomoto (2011), Braga (2001) commented on a need for a clearly defined problem. The problem analysis phase of Operation Ceasefire was part of the pre-planning for the interagency collaboration and it was focused and surgical. Kaiser (2011) also stressed the importance of finding the urgency, scope, scale, and complexity of the problem being addressed. It was clear to researchers involved in Ceasefire that gang violence involving firearms was a broad and encompassing problem that affects cities nationwide. With help from the Boston Police Department, the problem analysis phase focused on a specific area of Boston and aimed to reveal identifiable gang violence trends (Braga 2001). In their problem analysis phase, Braga et al. (2001) reported finding that a very small percentage of gang youth were responsible for 60% of the homicides with firearms. The findings also showed that a small amount of seized firearms from these gang members in prior years were being purchased from legitimate firearm dealers in Massachusetts with a larger portion of firearms being transported to Boston from out of state. The overwhelming benefit of a clearly defined problem is that the Ceasefire program could set tangible goals and have quantifiable results.

While we know very little about the interagency dynamics of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, based on the positive results there is cause to speculate that the cooperation among agencies was satisfactory at the very least. With a focused goal, proper planning, and interagency support, the Ceasefire project was successful in combining two very different disciplines: public health and law enforcement. As noted earlier, recognizing a need for punitive efforts *and* prevention efforts, especially in attempting to impact criminal street gang gun violence, is not revolutionary. Prothrow-Stith (2004) asserts "Boston, Massachusetts, with its dramatic and sustained decline in youth violence, serves as a model of multilevel programmatic activity with exemplary integration between public health and policing strategies." The two disciplines in Boston were complementary and allowed for both to function independently but simultaneously. Not all interagency collaborations need to be as innovative as Boston's Operation Ceasefire, but the underlying moral is that success can be found by forging relationships with those from opposing disciplines.

Conclusion

Law enforcement, public health, and social service professionals are tasked with improving our communities. Their goals are similar; however the service deliveries are based in very different schools of thought. Interagency collaborations between the disciplines are a potential solution when specific goals are agreed upon and all actors are willing to use their respective expertise and experience to complement efforts. Even with the right assembly of agencies, the right financial planning, thoughtful and attainable goals, and motivated staff, some collaborative simply need the right timing. Successful collaborative efforts are often thwarted by outside influences which are unseen and unforgiving. What we also know is that managers of interagency collaborations have pivotal roles in the success or failure of any collaborative effort.

One study of interagency collaborations targeting crime reduction concluded: “When collaboration succeeds in improving performance, it does so because managers have used general management tools in circumstances favorable to collaboration success” (Kelman, Sounman, and Turbitt, 2013). Boston’s Operation Ceasefire was hailed as a successful interagency collaboration aimed at reducing gun violence among youth gangs. It was successful for several reasons, but part of its success was likely attributed to proper planning, effective management, good communication, and overall good timing. The success of Ceasefire has drawn scholars to study its effect on homicides and gun violence in Boston. It serves as one of the most popular models of an interagency collaboration effort for any law enforcement agency or governmental organization wanting to reduce gang-related gun violence in their respective areas.

Chapter 3

Origins of Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership

Historical Overview

In 1999 the Bakersfield Police Department formally created a Gang Unit, which was exclusively tasked with identifying criminal street gang members and criminal street gang suppression. Despite years of relentless suppression, enforcement efforts, and high profile prosecutions, gang related shootings and homicides were not significantly reduced. To the contrary, in years that followed the creation of the Gang Unit, the violent trend of gang shootings and homicides dramatically increased. Some evidence of this was seen by a 63% increase in gang related shootings from 2004 to 2005 and a 200% increase in homicides in the same year (BPD 2005 Year End Report). The following year's data shows that gang shootings further increased by 7% from 2006 to 2007 (BPD 2007 Year End Report). With extensive media coverage and public outrage over these statistics, the residents of Kern County looked to local law enforcement agencies for innovative solutions to curb gang violence. The Bakersfield Police Department was at risk of becoming a one dimensional entity with focus on gang suppression and enforcement, and there seemed to be little attention paid to long term strategies.

In 2010 the Bakersfield Police Department sought out innovative ways to combat criminal street gang violence. In several personal communications (2010) with a former lieutenant of the BPD Gang Unit, he explained an interest in the Boston Ceasefire program. That program had been well documented by two scholars: Anthony Braga Ph.D. and David Kennedy Ph.D. In the Boston Ceasefire programs, there was scientific evidence documenting the success of a unique interagency collaboration focused on reducing gun violence among gang members (Braga, 2008). The success was mostly attributed to a strategy of "pulling levers", an idea

coined by Kennedy (1997) several years prior. Essentially the law enforcement side of the Ceasefire program utilized a message of deterrence and promised intense enforcement for those gangs who continued violent behavior with firearms. But there was a unique human services component with the deterrence message that contributed to the success of the program: “Street workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups offered gang members’ services and other kinds of help” (Braga et al, 2001). It was this dual message that was repeated to the gang members and the community saw positive results. The Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit wanted to duplicate that same kind of success for the local community in Bakersfield, California.

The Bakersfield Police Department, in collaboration with the Kern County Superintendent of Schools, authored a grant proposal in 2010 to the California Gang Reduction, Intervention, and Prevention Program for Cities (CAL-GRIP). The listed proposal clearly established a need for enhanced criminal street gang enforcement and the narrative outlined an innovative strategy that would lay the foundation for a unique interagency collaboration; later named the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership. After researching years of Bakersfield Police Department crime reports, the grant proposal contributors provided information on a variety of statistics involving criminal street gangs and correlating gun violence. Along with other data, the statistics identified the most violent gangs in Bakersfield and identified the areas most affected by gang violence.

The next step in the CAL-GRIP (2010) proposal was to outline strategies and components of the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership. The first of five components was to **“Organize a working group that will design and implement the local strategy.”** The working group would be comprised of criminal justice agencies, community leaders, interdenominational

religious leaders, social service agencies, youth outreach groups, victims of gang violence, and former gang members. A small group of gang members would be targeted as “referrals” for their at-risk status and/or their status in the gang. These referrals would be invited (or mandated to respond by virtue of their probation/parole status) to participate in working group meetings referred to as “call-ins”. The working group would be utilized in specific ways. First, they would directly communicate a message of violence prevention to gang members and at-risk youth most likely to commit gun violence. Secondly, these working groups would serve as the setting where gang members and at-risk youth get connected with job training and employment opportunities. Lastly, the working groups would also serve to assist in coordinating law enforcement efforts.

The second approach was that the working group would “**Communicate directly with the gang members and youth most likely to commit gun violence.**” In order to communicate directly with gang members and at-risk youth, there would be a series of group meetings, or “call ins.” The purpose of these meetings would be to inform gang members of a two-pronged message. First, the message must be clear that gun violence stop immediately or police will intervene quickly and forcefully. Secondly, the message needs to convey the availability of services and employment opportunities for the gang members and at-risk youth as a means to avoid the gun violence. It would be the responsibility of the gang outreach workers, community members, and victims of gang violence to present a moral argument to participants that supporting the gang in any way would show support of the violence committed by the gang. The subsequent “message” received during these “call-in” meetings are theoretically amplified as the gang members communicate with each other about the meeting. Couple the personal communications with public service announcements on local television about gang related gun

violence with the law enforcement officers themselves bringing the message to the streets, and the message then essentially becomes reinforced full circle. It is on these levels that communication becomes paramount for the success of the model.

Next, the strategy calls for the working group to “**Connect gang members and young people to employment opportunities.**” The working group must lend credence to the second strategy and provide quality services and sustainable employment to the gang members and young people likely to commit gun violence in quality employment. This should include social services and job training.

The fourth component was to “**Build a strategic law enforcement partnership.**” The Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit was to partner with the Kern County Sheriff’s Department, the Kern County Probation Department, The Kern County District Attorney’s Office, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Parole Division, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. According to the former CAL-GRIP Project Director, these criminal justice agencies had already forged partnerships on previous occasions, just not at this magnitude.

Finally, there had to be a plan for “**Rapid and effective response to gang violence.**” The Bakersfield Police Department would plan, coordinate, and lead quick and effective law enforcement suppression efforts in response to all incidents of gang violence within the target area. These efforts will be selectively focused on previously-identified active members of the gang responsible for the violence. This strategy was meant to reinforce the message that violence would not be tolerated.

The CAL-GRIP proposal outlined plans to have at least one gang “call-in” each month during the grant period; which was later determined to be October 2011 to December 2012. To supplement the efforts of all gang “call-ins”, there were a number of other objectives that the CAL-GRIP grant would also fund. There were plans to track the gang member participants in the criminal justice system during the grant period. Project 180, a gang prevention program with the Kern County Superintendent of Schools, in collaboration with local employment development agencies, was to coordinate at least four job and education fairs during the grant period. In addition, 50 at-risk youth from the Target Population were to participate in Aggression Replacement Training; a program aimed at lower at-risk behaviors in those youth. A number of other strategies were planned to focus on at-risk youth and their families, with services being provided by the Kern County Superintendent of Schools.


Salinas, California

In the summer of 2010, two Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit Officers and I were sent to Salinas, California to observe the Salinas Police Department’s “call-in” model: Safe Streets. According to Salinas Police Department Chief of Police, the Salinas P.D. had created Safe Streets in 2004 which resulted in significant violent crime reduction over short periods of time (Personal Communication, 2010). The Salinas Police Department had used the Safe Streets program intermittently over the years as it was difficult to keep it sustained as a full time program. Safe Streets had been modeled from the Ceasefire type programs, and consisted of law enforcement, social service workers, religious leaders, victims of violent gang crimes, and ex-gang members. They utilized a strategy of identifying gang members at-risk for gun violence or at-risk to perpetuate gun violence, and they required them to attend a mandatory “call-in” to convey the anti-violence message. It was from the observations of the Salinas Safe Streets

program that the Bakersfield Police Department modeled the physical set up of the “call-ins”. It was explained by the Salinas Police Department Chief of Police that the location of the “call-in” is as important as the event itself. The Salinas Safe Streets utilized a large meeting room at a local church for the “call-in” we observed. The Salinas Police Department selected a group of about 20 gang members to attend the meeting at the church, which was in a part of the city considered “gang neutral.” Security in the “call-in” was paramount, not only for the numerous volunteers and service providers, but for the gang members themselves who had traditionally been uneasy about possibly being targeted by rival gang members.

The physical seating arrangement of the Salinas Police Department’s Safe Streets “call-in” was configured to maximize safety as well as provide a dynamic conducive to the anti-violence message.

Figure 3.1 - Seating Arrangements



Note: This configuration reflects the basic seating arrangements for the Safe Streets / BSSP Model. (Source: Author)

The Safe Streets representatives were seated at the front of the room, directly in front of the gang members. Directly behind the gang members were a number of service providers and tables that would be utilized at the conclusion of the presentation. The Chief of Police called in the gang members while the working group speakers were already seated in the front of the room. The police chief then provided a two minute speech directed toward the gang members who were seated in the center of the room. The focus of the speech was that law enforcement had enlisted the help of the community and that everyone was ready for the gun violence to stop. The police chief told the gang members that he would be authorizing any and all enforcement options if the gang they represented was found to be part of a violent crime with a firearm. He told them they would be held accountable for passing the message along. In contrast, the Chief also explained that the program would conclude with opportunities to get employment and other social services, which would serve as their way out of the violent lifestyle if they chose to seek the services. Then from right to left, each representative would stand and deliver a two to three minute speech to the gang members. It was not interactive, just each speaker delivering a detailed message pertinent to their role in the Safe Streets Program. For example, the second speaker was a Salinas District Attorney who delivered a message of cooperation with law enforcement agencies to seek maximum sentences against those who were found with firearms or utilized firearms in gang offenses. A representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation delivered a speech emphasizing his commitment to seek federal gun charges and long federal prison sentences against those gang members who would be eligible for them.

At the conclusion of about four or five criminal justice representatives providing their speeches, all of the law enforcement and criminal justice representatives in the room were asked to exit and re-group in the parking lot. The strategy was to leave the gang members a hard line message that consequences would be dealt out if their gang participates in gun related violence.

That stern message was then countered by another message delivered by the remaining representatives to the front of the room. The strategy was to deliver the supplemental message that help was available in the way of social services if they wanted to pursue an avenue of distancing themselves from the gang lifestyle.

The second part of the “call-in” consisted of representatives from faith groups, non-profit organizations, and other social service providers offering the gang members hope. The speakers generally shared success stories about themselves or those they had assisted and offered an overall message of inspiration. One of the last speakers was strategically slotted for an emotional appeal to the attendees. The speaker was the mother of a gang member who was killed by rival gang members during a drive-by shooting. Her short message highlighted the emotional loss that families go through as a result of the senseless gun violence.

The third and final part of the “call-in” involves individual attention from service providers, and it is completely voluntary. The participants are told they are able to leave after the speakers have all finished their short presentations, but after that particular “call-in” every single one of the attendees agreed to meet with a Safe Streets representative to assess their individual needs. The gang member participants met individually with representatives to fill out a services assessment form developed by Safe Streets organizers. It was during this process that the participants could request a variety of services which included tattoo removal, job training, transportation, child care, education funding, obtaining a driver’s license, and counseling. The basis for the Call-in Participant Information and Service Referral Form (Appendix B) was developed with assistance from the Salinas Police Department.

In October of 2010 the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership had already received the CAL-GRIP funding and plans were underway to initiate the first gang “call-ins”. The

Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit, in collaboration with the Kern County Probation Department and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Parole Division, had identified 24 local gang members who met the criteria for a “call-in” (Holcombe et al., 2013). The gang members were identified as being at-risk for being victims of gun violence, or were at-risk for perpetrating gun violence. Every one of the gang members received two letters demanding their presence to the upcoming “call-in”: One was sent U.S Mail and the other was hand delivered by BPD Gang Unit Officers. The content of the letters explained that by condition of their probation or parole they were required to attend the upcoming “call-in” or face a formal violation that could result in incarceration. According to the BSSP Secretary’s records, 24 local gang members were called in and only 17 came (Holcombe et al., 2013). Two gang members had been arrested in the week prior to the “call-in”, two were given permission to be absent due to employment reasons, and three were classified as “no show”. The working group speakers, led by the Lieutenant of the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit, carried out the “call-in” in an identical fashion as Salinas Police Department’s Safe Streets. A strong message was delivered to the participants that violence would be met with consequences, but that help was available for those who wanted out of the violent gang lifestyle.

The Bakersfield Safe Streets continued to have a total of three “call-in” meetings in October 2010. By May 2011 the BSSP hosted a total of 11 “call-ins” which had now included every major identified criminal street gang in Bakersfield. After each of the “call-ins” the participants were asked to stay and complete a “Call-in Participant Information and Service Referral Form” to assess their individual needs. But the form was not used solely for identifying the participant’s needs. Among other descriptors, the assessors recorded data about race, gender, age, number of children, marital status, education background, housing situations, and overall

health. The assessors also asked the participants about their reaction to the “call-in” and what they gained by listening to the speakers on the panel. After the 11 “call-ins” it was recorded that 87% of the participants stayed to complete the assessment. By the end of the first year of BSSP, 214 gang member participants had attended a “call-in” and 92% had stayed to fill out assessment data. By the end of the CAL-GRIP grant period in December 2012, the BSSP had hosted a total of 25 “call-ins” with 510 gang members as attendees (Holcombe et al., 2013).

At the end of the grant period, the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership started in a new direction. Without funding, the partnership became a volunteer collaborative, supported by a core group of representatives who were interested in keeping the program going. The collaboration now includes a formal board, with leadership roles and support roles. Two additional “call-ins” were held in March 2013; however the program has since grown stagnant as the collaborative partners outline new strategies to keep the program going. The BSSP may be in need of a few changes; a direction that may involve new strategies and potentially new partners.

Summary

During the planning process of the BSSP it was determined by key stakeholders in Bakersfield that gang violence levels were unacceptable (Holcombe et al, 2013). It was also determined that the tensions between police and minority communities were unacceptable. The need for strategy change in the Bakersfield Police Department was evident; suppression efforts have been solely relied upon as a method to reduce gang violence for entirely too long. In fact, per the mission statement of the Bakersfield Police Department, the agency is obligated to seek out innovative crime prevention and create partnerships to assist with crime prevention. An interagency collaboration that involved not only several law enforcement agencies, but included social services, public health organizations, faith based organizations, and nonprofit

organizations, was a new concept to the Bakersfield Police Department and to its Gang Unit.

Looking to other successful collaborative efforts like Ceasefire and Project Safe Neighborhoods, the Bakersfield Police planned out and implemented the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership to mimic successful elements in those programs. To date, the BSSP is has completed its grant funded period and is now operating as a volunteer collaborative with significantly less support.

There are potential ways to keep the collaborative from dissipating; however there have been no comprehensive evaluations done on the program to identify areas for improvement. In an effort to assist with future considerations for the stakeholders, a small group of students set out to evaluate one of the key components of the BSSP: The gang member “call-ins”. The next section will present details and highlights from that evaluation and conclude with proposed directions for the BSSP.

Chapter 4 **Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership –Program Evaluation**

Introduction

In April and May of 2013 a team of students from California State University, Bakersfield conducted a program evaluation as part of the required final assignments for the Public Policy Administration 492 class. As part of that team, I had already taken interest in the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership which had essentially been developed as an inter-organizational collaborative effort to impact gun violence among the criminal street gang population in Bakersfield. The Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership had become operational in October 2010 with funding from the Bakersfield Police Department, the Kern County Superintendent of Schools, and the California Gang Reduction, Intervention and Prevention Grant. Prior to the evaluation, the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership program had proceeded with 25 “call-ins”. It was my intention to focus on the “call-in” processes which the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership had been using, as well as provide detailed proposals for future program improvement. In this “call-in” model, several specially selected gang members determined to be at-risk for gang violence were invited to participate in a meeting. Part of the meeting was a confrontation from criminal justice representatives who informed them of consequences of participating in gang related gun violence. The other part of the meeting was more interactive and allowed the “call-in” participant gang members to meet with social service providers and non-profit groups for an assessment of their personal needs (e.g. job skills training, obtaining a driver’s license, tattoo removal). Much of the BSSP, including the gang “call-ins” model, was developed from successful collaborations like Salinas Police Department’s Safe Streets and Boston Police Department’s Operation Ceasefire; however most of the academic literature had

assessed the outcome and results of these programs with regards to reductions in homicides, reduction in shootings, gun seizures...etc. There seemed to be a lack of literature focused on the “call-in” strategy of the model and the processes that drove it. Who was the driving force behind the “call-ins”? Was the process efficient? Were there any obstacles that were in need of review? These were just some of the questions that this team set out to answer.

A large portion of the information in this chapter, and the data presented therein was obtained as part of a California State University, Bakersfield student research project from Spring 2013 (Holcombe et al.). Unless specified, all of the research was conducted in association with that team project; all of whom I wish to thank for their hard work and dedication. It is that review of the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership that I intend to use as a basis for the proposals that are highlighted in the following chapter.

Methodology

In order to conduct the program evaluation, the evaluation team elected to use the program process as a basis for evaluation. This method allowed the evaluation team to gather knowledge of the BSSP model and subsequently serve as the basis to provide feedback and even suggestions for improvement. The program process evaluation traditionally examines the level of program participation, participant satisfaction with services and staff, and how effectively the program’s personnel work with one another and other agencies (Holzer & Schwester, 2011). However, in this particular program evaluation, the evaluation team was mainly focused on just one component of the BSSP model: The meetings set up between Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership participants and gang members, or “call-ins”. As noted earlier, the “call-in” process served as a major function of the BSSP model, which had been originally developed during a successful interagency collaboration in Boston, Massachusetts: Operation Ceasefire. The Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership had several partners, all of whom

subscribed to a variety of disciplines including law enforcement, corrections, public health, education, and faith-based activism. While the listed partners had representatives attend the “call-ins”, the responsibility of selecting, contacting, and ultimately supervising the gang members, all fell on the Bakersfield Police Department.

During the evaluation, the team was interested in developing insightful information about the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership from the perspective of those involved. Some of the empirical data was collected through open-ended survey questions posed to BSSP program administrators and through a “SWOT analysis” (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) which provides a richer collection of data (Holzer & Schwester, 2011). Field interviews were another tool used by the evaluation team along with field observation and participant observers, which consisted of use of “insiders” with intimate knowledge about the BSSP structure and process.

The 8-person evaluation group included two sworn Bakersfield Police Department personnel with access to both public and confidential records kept by the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit. The beginning phase of this evaluation started with field interviews conducted with six officers of the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit. All six of these officers had been with the gang unit since the inception of the BSSP in 2010 and had intimate knowledge of its formation and implementation. With each of these officers a SWOT analysis was completed in lieu of a focus group due to time constraints. The interviews and subsequent SWOT analysis questions were specifically directed toward the BSSP “call-in” model. The goal was to determine if there was any consistency among the answers provided by the BPD Gang Unit officers, and then later contrast the information with similar information being sought from the BSSP working group.

The initial approach to the evaluation process consisted of two phases: (1) Interview of BPD Gang Unit officers; and (2) Interview of BSSP Board Members. The goal of the two phases was to define common concerns between two groups of entities that rarely interact with each other: the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit, and the BSSP Working Group.

The first phase of the evaluation consisted of an interview process with the BPD Gang Unit officers. During this phase, the evaluation team collectively asked the officers to explain the process by which the gang members were selected as candidates for a “call-in.” The officers were then asked to estimate how many BPD Gang Unit man-hours a typical “call-in” process takes. They were then asked to provide an overall estimate of the number of staff time (in hours) that each portion of the call-in process typically takes.

In the second phase of this evaluation, three members of the evaluation team attended a BSSP working group meeting and advised them of the team’s evaluation efforts. This “working group” operates similar to a board meeting with agendas and recorded minutes. The newly appointed Executive Director provided the team with time to meet with and conduct field interviews with Board members. The working group consists of representatives from the Kern County District Attorney, the Bakersfield Police Department, the Kern County Superintendent of Schools, and three additional members currently involved in non-profit organizations participating in the BSSP. After the meeting, members of the evaluation team conducted field interviews and another modified SWOT analysis with working group members in the same fashion as was done with the BPD Gang Unit officers.

In order to execute the next stage of the evaluation process, the evaluation team needed to obtain attendance numbers for the “call-ins” and other data considerations. This need was met by direct access to the BPD Gang Unit Clerk, who asked not to be identified in this narrative.

The data collected from the BPD Gang Unit was strictly controlled and contained no names or information that could lead to a breach of confidentiality.

Data

As noted above, evaluation team members interviewed BPD Gang Unit officers and attended a BSSP working group meeting to conduct interviews. The goal of the process was to define common concerns of both the BPD Gang Unit and the BSSP Working Group because the entities rarely interact with each other. As a result of the interviews, the evaluation team obtained data and summarized the responses. To assess the consistency of the BSSP working staff and BPD Gang Unit Officers, a SWOT assessment was completed. To assist with this process, the BPD Gang Unit representatives were asked to explain their personal SWOT analyses regarding the call-in style model being utilized by BSSP. The evaluation team then completed a similar process with the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership Working Group. The evaluation team compiled the following summaries for the BSSP interviews:


SWOT Analysis for the BSSP Call-Ins

- Strengths.** The strength of the model is that promotes positive community based outreach by the Bakersfield Police Department. It is valued as a program the community participates in with the Bakersfield Police Department and demonstrates unity among several factions of participants.
- Weakness.** The numbers of participants coming to the call-in meetings are dropping. There is a disproportionate amount of service providers per gang member called-in.
- Opportunities.** There are opportunities to expand the program into the private sector. There are additional non-profits, not associated with BSSP, already serving some of the candidates which could be used to better serve the candidate's needs.
- Threats.** Variables such as budget cuts to law enforcement, smaller court sentences, Assembly Bill 109 Post-Release Supervision issues, and failing support by partnering agencies all threaten the sustainability to the call-in model. Additionally, it is getting harder to find documented gang members who are active in the gangs and who have not attended the call-in forum already .

It was from this initial SWOT analysis that the evaluation team started to recognize the need for the evaluation to get more focused. Due to the complexity of the BSSP and its commitment to a variety of areas (e.g., truancy in schools, youth facilities, parent education) the evaluation team decided to focus on just one component of the BSSP: The “call-ins”. To facilitate a baseline for understanding the process, the team asked the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit representatives to outline the unit’s structure and role in the “call-in” process. The Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit identified themselves as the sole identifier of gang member candidates based on the expertise of the active gang members as well as the proficiency and access to confidential databases. This was consistent with the CAL-GRIP Grant Proposal which outlined the selection process strategy. The Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit representatives stated that the BPD Gang Unit consists of 20 sworn personnel and one non-sworn secretary. The following is a rank structure of the Gang Unit:

Figure 4.1

Rank Structure of the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit (Source: Author)



As a result of the interviews with representatives from the BPD Gang Unit, the evaluation team was provided with the estimates, reached by a consensus of gang unit personnel, of the man-hours spent on a BSSP Call-In forum. The “insiders” of the evaluation

team conducted field interviews with the BPD Gang Unit Officers and collectively asked them to explain the process by which the gang members are selected as candidates for a call-in, the man hours they must invest into constructing a typical call-in, and the actual process of a call-in. They identified themselves as the sole identifier of gang member candidates based on records of active gang members and through the use of confidential databases. The following data was collected from the BPD Gang Unit Officers during the field interview pertaining to orchestrating a call-in.

Steps to Orchestrating a Call-In

1. One team takes about 40 man-hours to complete a candidate list for one call-in meeting. This process is lengthy because of the amount of time it takes to research the appropriateness of each candidate. The form the officers utilize is attached as Appendix-A.
2. Next, the candidate list is sent to the Lieutenant for approval which takes about one hour.
3. The candidate list is then forwarded to the secretary so formal letters can be typed. These letters are printed and hand delivered by one of the gang unit officers to the Chief of Kern County Probation Department, and the supervisor of local parole division (CDCR) . This process takes three hours.
4. The letters, now signed, will be hand delivered by gang unit officers to the candidate at their registered address, (which based on experience is not where they live). This process takes one team 21 man hours.
5. Actual call-in date. At the call-in meeting there is the Chief of Police, the BPD Gang Unit Lieutenant, one gang unit Sergeant with his team of eight or so officers. The meeting takes up 40 man hours.
6. Enforcement action for any call-in candidate who did not attend. Hours spent typically depend on how many candidates fail to attend.

When the call-in meeting is complete, the conservative estimation for total BPD Gang Unit man-hours dedicated to a single “call-in” meeting by the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit is over 100 hours. The BPD Gang Unit representatives explained that these dedicated


hours are not attributed to, or covered by, any grant funded operations. It was explained that the grant funded operations per the CAL-GRIP plans were for enforcement and suppression efforts following any target gang's participation in a violent incident with a firearm.

Based on the results of interviews with the BPD Gang Unit, the evaluation team concluded that the "call-in" process is a very time-consuming activity. Because gang-member attendance at the "call-ins" is the key to reaching the gang members and spreading the message of the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership, the evaluation team was sought out and received detailed information regarding attendance records for all 25 "call-in" sessions. This data was obtained from the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership archives courtesy of the BPD Gang Unit Clerk. Attendance by the invited gang members was previously identified as an obstacle for program sustainability even from the inception of the program; therefore the data on each meeting regarding the attendance has historically been well documented. The following table details the attendance numbers.

Table 4.1

BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
Special Enforcement Unit
Gang call-in results - ALL CALL-INS

CALL-IN MONTH / YEAR	#	GANG	MANDATORY INVITE	ATTENDED	I/C	NO SHOW	PAL	REASON FOR ABSENCE (WORKING ETC)	INVITED (NOT MANDATORY) NO SHOWS	WALK-INS
OCT. 2010	1	EAST SIDE CRIPS	24	17	2	3	0	2	0	1
	2	WEST SIDE CRIPS	18	6	5	3	0	4	0	0
	3	COUNTRY BOY CRIPS	22	14	2	3	0	3	0	0
DEC. 2010	4	VARRIO BAKERS	27	15	6	2	0	4	0	0
	5	COLONIA BAKERS	35	11	7	15	2	0	0	0
FEB. 2011	6	EAST SIDE CRIPS	30	22	4	2	0	2	0	0
	7	OKIE BAKERS	15	12	1	1	1	0	0	0
APRIL 2011	8	BLOODS	24	19	2	1	0	2	0	1
	9	LOMA BAKERS	23	16	2	5	0	0	0	0
MAY 2011	10	COUNTRY BOY CRIPS	20	15	2	3	0	0	0	0
	11	COLONIA BAKERS	22	15	2	2	1	2	2	0
JUNE 2011	12	EAST SIDE CRIPS	30	20	4	4	0	2	0	3
AUG. 2011	13	LOMA BAKERS	19	15	2	1	1	0	0	0
	14	COLONIA BAKERS	14	11	0	1	1	1	1	0
OCT. 2011	15	FEMALE CALL-IN	17	6	0	11	0	1	1	0
DEC. 2011	16	EAST SIDE CRIPS	20	12	0	6	0	0	2	0
	17	COUNTRY BOY CRIPS	21	11	3	4	1	2	0	0
FEB. 2012	18	WEST SIDE CRIPS	24	18	2	1	0	3	0	0
APRIL 2012	19	COLONIA BAKERS	24	12	1	4	1	5	1	0
MAY 2012	20	VARRIO BAKERS	20	8	3	4	1	1	3	0
JUNE 2012	21	COUNTRY and LOMA	18	11	0	4	1	1	1	0
SEPT. 2012	22	EAST SIDE CRIPS	23	14	2	7	0	0	0	0
NOV. 2012	23	OKIE and WEST SIDE BAKERS	20	9	5	6	0	0	0	0
DEC. 2012	24	EAST SIDE CRIPS	5	3	0	2	0	0	0	0
	25	COUNTRY BOY CRIPS	5	3	1	1	0	0	0	0
MAR. 2013	24	EAST SIDE CRIPS	13	2	1	10	0	0	0	0
	25	COUNTRY BOY CRIPS	15	5	1	10	0	0	0	0
TOTALS			548	322	60	116	10	35	11	5



Note. This table was provided by the BPD Gang Unit Secretary in April 2013. There were no other “call-ins” to report from March 2013 to present day.

Conclusions

In the beginning of the program evaluation, the team was interested in developing a broad sense of what views some of the key stakeholders held about the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership program. Through the SWOT interview process, the evaluation team learned that for the most part the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit Officers and the BSSP Working Group leaders were in agreement about the value of the program. Both entities were of the opinion that the program served as an excellent opportunity for community outreach and creating new inter-organizational partnerships. According to the Bakersfield Police Department Mission Statement, there is an emphasis on “improving community safety and the quality of life by developing partnerships that promote efficient and innovative prevention, intervention, and law enforcement service” (BPD Homepage). The BSSP is a prime example of the innovation and partnerships that the BPD is wanting to promote.

There was additional agreement about the weaknesses of the programs. The two entities felt that the attendance levels were of concern, a point that will be revisited later in this chapter. In some cases the number of social service representatives outnumbered the number of invitees in attendance. The Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit representatives highlighted that a major weakness in the program was the selection process of invitees as well as the logistics of getting those that were selected to attend.

Both the BSSP and Gang Unit representatives were encouraged by opportunities for the program to expand in new directions. The discussions with the BSSP representatives revealed opportunities to forge new partnerships with other successful non-profit groups as well as an interest in developing new funding streams. The Gang Unit representatives were encouraged by opportunities to utilize resources that were previously not being considered.

Some of the most fruitful discussion with both groups was regarding the identification of threats to the program. Both groups were concerned about the sustainability of a program

heavily reliant on a message of deterrence; a message not easily conveyed when external factors threatened to undermine key components of the program. California Assembly Bill 109 restructured the entire parole and probation systems, significant budget cuts to California prisons created a reduction in jail and prison sentences, and a very widely used criminal street gang statute in the California Penal Code was no longer being upheld in the courts. Any deterrence based model relies on promises of consequences for specific actions. In the case of BSSP “call-ins” there was concern that the punitive measures were being diminished. For example, candidates once subject to parole violations for not complying with their parole conditions were rapidly finding themselves on the new AB 109 Prison Realignment caseloads, which were managed by overwhelmed county probation officers. The new AB 109 supervised release program had redefined punitive parole violations and had significantly shortened jail and prison sentences for property and narcotics offenses.

One of the biggest concerns identified by the evaluation team was regarding the role of the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit in the “call-in” process. According to the representatives from the BPD Gang Unit the time spent on each “call-in” was in excess of 100 man-hours. There seemed to be no plan in the CAL-GRIP proposal that supported hours of delivering formal invitations to the “call-in” participants, or the subsequent hours it spent to locate the participants if they were not residing at their address of record. The team learned that the process of selecting the at-risk gang members had increased in difficulty over the lifetime of the grant funded program for a number of different reasons. First, at the inception of the BSSP program, the “call-ins” included a number of easily identifiable gang members who were selected by the Gang Unit with very little effort. As the number of “call-ins” increased, the pool of readily identifiable at-risk gang members conversely decreased. Second, there was little evidence that the process of selecting gang members for the BSSP “call-ins” was being supplemented by other agencies. The evaluation team found this to be concerning as the

narrative of the CAL-GRIP proposal assigned responsibility for participant selection to be a collaborative effort. Next, the selection process by the BPD Gang Unit was formalized with the creation of a Gang Verification Form (Appendix A), which required supporting documentation to verify that each participant was a gang member. Finally, the team had learned that the bureaucratic process of identifying, selecting, locating, and contacting the potential “call-in” participants was not necessarily funded by the CAL-GRIP grant. Therefore the team concluded that the Bakersfield Police Department had been unnecessarily funding a large portion of the “call-in” selection process as it had been dedicating its gang officers to the BSSP related matters during their normal work hours. Additionally, the team located language in the CAL-GRIP grant proposal that specifically states that providing funding for assistance would not change the BPD’s operational responsibilities. Based on the reported number of man-hours dedicated to “call-in” selection process, the evaluation team concluded that operational responsibilities for the BPD Gang Unit are being affected; albeit up to the Bakersfield Police Department to decide if the responsibilities are being affected adversely.

The evaluation team next turned to the attendance numbers to assess what type of participation the BSSP was documenting. Utilizing a simple correlation of Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit preparation time for the BSSP “call-in” in relation to attendance percentages for invited candidates, the team examined efficiency of input versus output. The team wanted to know if the Bakersfield Police Department was getting the attendance results it had originally outlined in the CAL-GRIP proposal. The original plan was to conduct a “Gang Forum”, or “call-in”, at least once a month. A minimum of fifty gang members were to be invited with a realistic goal of obtaining 50% attendance. The evaluation team was provided with the attendance data (Table 2) which exhibited attendance numbers all 25 “call-ins”. The overall attendance after all 25 call-ins was 57%. In terms of attendees, 548 gang members were selected to attend and 322 participated. The team noted that there were excused absences

where attendees were at work or incarcerated during the meeting. Even after all the excused absences, the BSSP recorded 116 gang members were “no shows” without cause, with an additional ten gang members who were not in attendance because they were “wanted” for Parolee At Large warrants. Overall, the “call-in” attendance was slightly over the expected 50%.

The real value of the attendance assessment is its correlation to the BPD Gang Unit’s man-hour input. With the Gang Unit exceeding 100 hours of preparation time for each “call-in”, are the attendance numbers at an acceptable level for the Bakersfield Police Department’s approval? Was the Bakersfield Police Department administration or key representatives of the BSSP aware of the human resource and financial costs associated with the “call-ins”? As a reminder, the evaluation team had little exposure to any BSSP impact on local homicides and/or gang related shooting because this evaluation focused on the process of “call-ins”. Obviously, additional work would need to be done to develop quantitative data in that respect, and therefore reveal possibilities to attribute additional “value” to the program. Again, the evaluation team was aware of the subjective value of the BSSP program, but in the name of efficiency for “call-in” processes the evaluation team developed a number of proposals for consideration.

Proposals

With the evaluation process completed, the evaluation team wished to present a number of proposals to the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership as well as the Bakersfield Police Department. The evaluation team was fortunate enough to have reviewed the BSSP “call-in” processes after the CAL-GRIP grant period had ended. This entitled the team to comprehensive data and information from BSSP’s inception to its current state. The proposals will first address options on a broader, program level and assess potential directions and options for the BSSP as a whole. Following the broader proposals, there are a few proposals directly focused at the BSSP “call-in” process. The following proposed ideas will be discussed:

Proposal #1 – Dissolve the BSSP completely.

Proposal #2 – Modify BSSP into nonprofit entity.

Proposal #3 – Modify BSSP model to mobilize the organizations.

Proposal #4 – Include Juvenile Facilities into BSSP Call-in.

Proposal #5 – Modify BSSP model to include follow-up call-ins.

It was during the information gleaned from the Salinas Police Department that the first proposed option was realized. It remains an option that the BSSP disband and conclude its collaboration for the short term. As of the last BSSP meeting in Spring 2013, the program has already lost a few of its original partners and has become volunteer based. The sustainability of volunteer based “call-ins” remains precarious at best. From perspectives highlighted by Rosenthal and Mizrahi (2004) previously discussed in Chapter 2, the finality of any inter-organizational collaboration can serve as the beginning of a new venture. Based on the successes of other inter-organizational collaborations like Salinas Police Department’s Safe Streets, it stands to reason that programs like the BSSP are simply not easily sustained. One such example occurred with Operation REACT in Chicago in 1994, where Rodriguez and Branon (1996) credited strategic success to having the collaboration for a finite amount of time. If the funding source of the BSSP was heavily reliant on the CAL-GRIP grant, and the grant period has ended, it may be a perfect time to cease BSSP operations and explore funding options for the future. In the words of Hansen (2009) quoted in Kelman et al. (2013), “Bad collaboration is worse than no collaboration”(p.625) There are many funding sources available, and two major sources of revenue actively assisting law enforcement agencies in their efforts to impact criminal street gangs include the federally funded Project Safe Neighborhoods, and the Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant.

One of those funding options could come by way of forming the BSSP into a non-profit. All of the necessary research is available to formulate a modified version of the BSSP that still incorporates multi-agency supplementation in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of criminal street gang violence. As of 2014 the BSSP has been restructured under the leadership of a formal Executive Director. While this is still a volunteer position, with the proper grant writer and board of directors, the BSSP could hypothetically transition to a non-profit organization partnering with those whose relationships started with the original BSSP. With the fundamental construct already in place, the next step would be relying on the expertise of the Executive Director and other partners who have the experience in operating successful non-profits. Integrating into a legal nonprofit organization will also assist in bringing legitimacy to the program. The legal status and bylaws associated with a nonprofit may allow for the organization to be viewed by future participants and other organizations as more stable and therefore recognized as more professional.

The next proposal for consideration is more focused on the actual process of the BSSP “call-ins” and the selection of potential participants. One of the findings of the program evaluation was that the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit had a detailed selection process to get at-risk gang members to attend the “call-ins”. The process largely involved identifying those who were on probation or parole, and were not incarcerated at the time. One major obstacle to this process came when the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit identified over 500 potential gang members to attend the program and the pool of potential candidates naturally diminished. The model of the program was intended for each participant to only attend one “call-in”. Referring back to the youth gang research of Braga et al. (2001) during the problem analysis phase of Operation Ceasefire, about 1% of the gang population was committing 60% of the youth homicides. If those statistics are even remotely consistent with the experience of Bakersfield, the problem of identifying “call-in” candidates would be

exponentially compounded over a sustained period of several years. A possible solution to this dilemma would be to make changes to the selection process and commit the BSSP “call-ins” to include a mobile approach. In other words, instead of the working group setting up the forums in a gang neutral area with only members of one gang in attendance, the BSSP could consider taking the working group to the institutions where potential candidates are about to be released from incarceration and include a variety of documented gang members in one meeting. The BSSP would consider going to local youth facilities and camps, both Kern County jail facilities, and local prisons in Wasco, Delano, Tehachapi, and Corcoran. The advantages to a mobile BSSP would be numerous. First, each facility has security measures in place for small meetings. Second, the selection process would be less financially burdensome to the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit as more agencies like parole, probation, and the Kern County Sheriff’s Office take on more of an inclusive role. Each of these agencies maintains lists of incarcerated subjects about to be released from custody, and all have policies in place for documenting gang status. If there were a system in place to identify at-risk gang members about to be released to Bakersfield, and the process included identifying those who fit the criteria for participation in the BSSP program, the working group and social service workers could potentially have a “call-in” at the facility where the two-fold message of deterrence and assistance could be done at a time where the attendees may have a better mindset for commitment to the program. Lastly, with the attendance numbers being another identified inefficiency of the program, allowing for a mobile BSSP working group would provide a situation where attendance could be controlled. This would only work if the agencies overseeing supervised release, like probation and parole, mandated the attendance while in-custody as part of a pre-parole or pre-probation requirement. Some of the disadvantages of mobilizing the BSSP would be in the participation of some of the non-profit partners. Some of the representatives involved in the BSSP are ex-gang members themselves, and incidentally

have to contend with criminal histories of their own. Institutions like jails and prisons do not typically allow ex-felons to enter their facilities and interact with inmates. To overcome this obstacle, some of the representatives without felony convictions could be used during the “call-ins”, or a pre-recorded message could be used.

The next proposed change to the BSSP “call-in” involves not only being mobilized, but also more inclusive of juvenile facilities. None of the BSSP “call-ins” were inclusive of juveniles for legal reasons, but it remains an obvious untapped resource for potential candidates. In Kern County there are a number of lock-up facilities and educational facilities providing opportunities for interaction by the BSSP. An example of a possible institution to start with would be the Blanton Academy; where there is an integration of junior high and high school students either referred to the school by probation or parole, or on probation or parole and are not enrolled in school (KCSOS Alternative Education site, 2014). Ruble and Turner (2000) found that most of the academic studies involving criminal street gangs show that a majority of gang members are between 14 and 24 years old. It is documented that the younger members are often seen as expendable and are used in the commission of crimes because the hierarchical gang culture has indoctrinated them as subservient. The point is that the demographic of juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18 years old are not being addressed as part of the BSSP “call-ins” and their inclusion should be considered by either mobilizing the forums or by implementing ways to hold juvenile only “call-ins” with permission of parents/guardians.

One final possible consideration for the future of BSSP “call-ins” also affects its model design. As it stands currently, the BSSP “call-in” is structured to deliver the messages and services to the participating gang member after one meeting. The “call-ins” were not designed for a participant to come more than one time, which makes dissemination of the BSSP mission as well as the follow-up with the service providers less effective. Considerations could be made in designing a “call-in” for previous participants who were still on active supervised release,

which for legal reasons could be mandated by their probation or parole officers as part of their conditions of supervised release of custody. This forum could be designed to update the participants on local gang violence statistics, re-affirm expectations, re-affirm messages of deterrence by highlighting recent arrests with significant sentences, and then finalize the meeting with a follow-up on the progress of their previous needs assessment. In the event this kind of “call-in” is deemed too time-consuming for multiple representatives of the partnership to attend, consider the option of this proposal to be a supporting factor in advocating a mobile model for BSSP.

Because the future of the BSSP is heavily dependent on future funding resources, some of these considerations could be utilized to offset costs. The proposals outline several ways to show expansion into target groups that were previously omitted, and the proposals all were conceived with concern for fiscal efficiency and responsibility. Per the mission statement the Bakersfield Police Department is dedicated to innovative crime prevention and developing partnerships to assist with that goal. As a major stakeholder in the BSSP program, the Bakersfield Police Department could consider these proposals and use them to restructure current partnerships and develop new ones for an overall enhanced BSSP program specifically modeled to address the issues affecting Bakersfield and its citizenry.

Chapter 5 Recommendations, Summary, and Conclusions

Recommendations

After reviewing the results and proposals from the process evaluation for the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership, there appear to be a number of positive attributes that will assist in keeping the program from dissipating, though previous discussion of a dissipation strategy exists. It appears the fundamental idea of creating a “working group” to conduct “gang forums” based on the model of a Boston Ceasefire approach has been uniquely adapted for Bakersfield and the criminal street gang problem encountered here. The participants in the intervention “gang forums” included several officers of the Bakersfield Police Department, personnel from the Kern County Sheriff’s Office, Kern County Probation Department, Kern County District Attorney’s Office, California State Parole, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, representatives from the United States Department of Justice, Kern County Superintendent of Schools, Kern High School Police Department, multiple faith based organizations, and other outreach community workers. To my understanding, this was the first collaborative effort of its kind to incorporate assistance from such a vast spectrum of the community. Any undertaking which calls for the organization of all of these participants under one roof is a challenge in itself; however the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership invited the collaboration to continue well after the CalGrip funding stopped. It is with the consideration of the present status of the BSSP and its future that I present the following two recommendations; both of which are presented in greater detail than the proposals in Chapter 4. A logic model is presented in Appendix C for additional illustration.

- **Recommendation #1 - Address inefficiencies in BSSP Call-in processes at Bakersfield Police Department level**
- **Recommendation #2 - Mobilize / Expand the accessibility of BSSP model**

My first recommendation is based on the assumption that the Bakersfield Police Department and other stakeholders wish to continue with the volunteer collaborative. Per the Bakersfield Safe Streets Statements and Beliefs (Holcombe et al., 2013), “The tensions between police and minority communities are unacceptable.” The BSSP, even in its current capacity as a volunteer collaborative, is of value to the Bakersfield Police Department as an example where community outreach to minority communities is constant. As of the last meeting of the BSSP leaders in 2013, there were no plans to dissolve the remaining partners and there were discussions to include new partners. With any progression of the BSSP, my recommendation would be to lessen the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit’s role in the “call-in” process, and obtain support for a better division of labor from existing partners. Kaiser (2011), as discussed in Chapter 2, asserted that a successful strategy for improving interagency collaborations includes evaluating “expectations of what is to be accomplished and determining how extensive and demanding these expectations are, for the project and the participants.” This recommendation is based on these unforeseen funding obstacles as well as unforeseen labor costs which exceeded originally planned expectations. The main stay of the 2010/2011 California Gang Reduction and Prevention Program (CalGRIP) grant which funded the BSSP was an effort for cultivating a solid group of law enforcement, faith based, and community service providers to ensure the focus of a message to stop the gun based gang violence in Bakersfield. During the initial stages of this evaluation, the BSSP CalGrip grant amounts were provided along with details as to their intended purpose. Per the 2009/2010 CalGrip Budget Narrative Proposal, the Bakersfield Police Department was to provide the following:

- **Police Response to Encourage Safe Streets Grant Funds \$150,650 / Match \$389,792**
- **Truancy Sweeps: Grant Funds \$47, 517**
- **Crime Analysts Personnel Costs: Grant Funds \$1,675**
- **Personnel Costs for Gang Forums: Match \$10,307**

While the line items of further earmarked funds follow in the three page budget narrative, these were the listed expenditures for the Bakersfield Police Department's contribution. The substance of the "Police Response" marked funds were clarified in the narrative:

"This allows for full shifts of the Bakersfield Police Department Special Enforcement Unit (Gang Unit) to provide immediate and effective enforcement in gang areas in response to violence as well as additional manpower to carry out investigations of shootings. Each shift will consist of eight officers and one sergeant and will run in conjunction with SEU's primary focus on the same gang. PRESS efforts will run for a period of time sufficient to convey the message of a lack of tolerance for gang violence and in proportion to the shooting incident. BPD currently has no other source of funding for this activity."

This explanation of allocated funds for the Gang Unit was initially for gang enforcement response only. In this process evaluation, it was found that the BPD Gang Unit was actually tasked with much more responsibility; mostly in the development of "call in" referrals. The original strategic plan calls for the collaborative efforts of the Bakersfield Police Department, Kern County Sheriff's Office, Kern County Probation Department, Kern County District Attorney's Office, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Parole Division, and the FBI to "identify the most active and violent gang members under each agency's jurisdiction, as well as identifying the most active gang conspiracies" (BPD CalGrip Proposal, 2009, p.13). These identified gang members would serve as the target audience for the "call ins". During the evaluation it was revealed that the process of identifying gang members as referrals evolved into a more of formalized process (Appendix A). The BPD Gang Unit was spending in excess of 100 hours in preparation to any single gang "call in". That is particularly alarming as there were 25 reported "call ins" from October 2011 to March 2013. Sometimes that process would involve an entire shift of gang officers on regular duty to dedicate most of their day to the BSSP agenda. While the value of the CAL-GRIP Grant certainly assisted with costs to the Bakersfield Police Department, the preparation time (process) was not covered as part of the

grant. This cost could be mitigated with delegation to the collaborative law enforcement agencies to develop their own list of “at-risk” gang members who could benefit from the BSSP program. The Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit could serve as more of a consultant role with regards to verifying eligibility and gang status with alternatively developed candidate lists. With the Bakersfield Police Department being a major driving force behind BSSP, it is necessary to outline the basis for a professional cost-benefit analysis involving the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit.

The next recommendation would be to re-evaluate the target population pool for the “call ins” and consider process changes by mobilizing the BSSP. This is based on the reorganization of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations as well as the Kern County Probation Department have been unable to sustain the original level of punitive consequences for gang members not attending mandatory “call-ins”. It is also complementary to the first recommendation involving process design. The evaluation found that the vast majority of the gang members could be nudged into compliance with the BSSP model due to current probation and parole status they obtained from past criminal activities. By using the gang member’s probation and parole status as a type of leverage, law enforcement had the ability to revoke the privilege of freedom from the gang member and have them sent to a custodial setting (state prison) for up to one calendar year on a violation. This was a powerful tool for compliance for law enforcement; however, since the implementation of Assembly Bill 109, law enforcement’s power to enforce a gang members parole or probation conditions is virtually non-existent. This essential tool has hindered the BSSP model position on the selection process for the “call-in” stage and limited the attendance by identified active gang members who are most likely to commit a violent act with a firearm. To offset this once useful strategy, the BSSP partners in charge of the custodial settings should develop and implement a “pre- release” group of all identified gang members who are scheduled for release. It would

allow the BSSP program and message to be universally heard prior to the gang member being released and may institute a positive nudge for those wanting reform from their gang activities. Lastly, a more direct approach by the BSSP should be an at home style contact. This method could be design and focused for the subjects who are labeled as “most at risk” or influential in the gang’s social and rank structure. The idea would be to encourage influential gang leaders to use their status to deliver the BSSP message to his/her community and also seek the benefits offered by the service providers for not only him/her, but also their family members. These in-home consultations would allow for the BSSP to operate in smaller, more focused groups of facilitators.

There is no question that gang-related gun violence is a problem that cannot be ignored. It is a problem that has a hefty social and financial cost associated with it, and the problem is being addressed by law enforcement, social services, public health organizations, faith-based organizations, and non-profit organizations. In each respective profession, these organizations have different approaches to lowering gang violence, but in an interagency collaboration setting, all of these approaches can be applied simultaneously.

Summary and Conclusions

National, state, and local statistics representing criminal street gang violence over the last decade read like a horror story. Gang membership continues to rise and subsequently so do the violent crimes that are committed by them. Supporting this claim, Crawford (2009) found that over the last twenty five years, the number of gang members in the United States increased more than five-fold, leading to increased violence and other criminal activity. Entire communities are held hostage by gangs who prey on the innocent using intimidation tactics and public displays of violence. In every area afflicted with gang violence there are tremendous social and financial costs. Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies have tried a variety

of strategies to lower gang membership and to increase punitive measures for those gang members who choose to participate in gang-related criminal activity. In California, legislators drafted the Street Terrorism and Enforcement and Prevention Act in 1988 which increased penalties for gang activity. The STEP Act, located in California Penal Code 186.22, allowed for enhanced prison sentences for certain crimes which were commonly committed by members of violent street gangs. Also in the 1980's, legislators in Los Angeles, California attempted another tactic to criminalize gang activity in the form of gang injunctions. In both these cases of legislation, the gang members find way to adapt, grow, and prosper.

At the beginning of this paper I posed a question about the best methods to address criminal street gang violence. It is utterly ridiculous to believe that society can legislate its way out of the gang activity. Evidence suggests that interagency collaborations have historically been successful in bringing together professionals from different disciplines for a common goal. This is particularly true in the pursuit of crime reduction. As seen with programs like Operation Ceasefire and others like it, law enforcement, corrections, public health, and social services have been proven effective to combat gang violence in targeted areas. The academic literature on the topic of interagency collaborations clearly highlights potential for success as long as appropriate measures are taken to support the efforts. Managing any inter-organizational collaboration requires unique abilities not only to lead, but to share power. A manager defines the organizational culture, and yet acts a catalyst for change when the culture needs adaptation. Managers need to know when individual organizations may contribute more to the common goal as opposed to hanging on to a failing collaborative for the sake of public perception.

The purpose of this paper was to provide discussion about interagency collaborations and how to apply any peer-reviewed best practices to the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership. What we know is that the BSSP is fundamentally based on a successful strategy that has been

proven to be effective in combating gang violence in other cities like Boston, Chicago, Stockton, and Salinas. We know the history of gang violence in Bakersfield is well documented, and members of the community deserve to have the problem properly addressed. The Bakersfield Police Department, with funding from the CAL-GRIP grant has over three years of time invested in its role with the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership. We know that unforeseen outside influences like prison realignment under California Assembly Bill 109 have altered some of the capabilities the BSSP “call-ins” once had. We know that the role of the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit in the “call-in” process is greater than originally planned. Fiscal concerns aside, the mandate of the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit to operate outside of the collaborative is something the CAL-GRIP proposal addressed directly. Much needed manpower in the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit is spent identifying a progressively decreasing pool of viable candidates to participate in the program. An evaluation of the BSSP “call-in” process resulted in the discussion of several proposals that may mitigate the financial situation of the collaborative. These proposals and recommendations address some of the advantages and disadvantages of going forward with a partnership with no financial base.

At the very least, the BSSP will be in need of revisiting its original proposed model. Some of this reorganization was already addressed at the end of 2012 when CAL-GRIP contributions were spent. It is time for a new chapter for the BSSP, and there is evidence to support the notion that new partnerships and new goals may invigorate those involved in the change. And finally, I know that a very dedicated group of individuals are volunteering their time to keep the BSSP from dissolving. In any capacity it is an admirable effort, and it is an effort that probably goes widely unrecognized by the community it is dedicated to improving. It is with these dedicated volunteers in mind that I conclude with one final thought from the

mind of Albert Einstein: “The world is a dangerous place to live; not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it”.

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Appendix A
BPD Gang Unit Participant Verification Form



SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT UNIT



GANG CALL-IN PARTICIPANT VERIFICATION

Name: _____

DOB: _____

Address: _____

ZIP: _____

Gang: _____

Recommending Officer: _____

Badge: _____

Date of most recent gang contact: _____

Date last contacted with gang member: _____

Probation / Parole: Probation Parole AB109

If on Parole is there a "no contact with gang members" clause? Y N

Self-admits? Y N

If yes what date did the last self-admit occur on? _____

Classification admits? Y N

If yes what date did the last classification admit occur on? _____

Gang Tattoos: Y N

Description: _____

Has subject recently been incarcerated? Y N

If yes, what were the charges? _____

Any further information that would verify calling this subject in? _____

Appendix B
BSSP Referral Forms (3 pages)

**Bakersfield Safe Streets
Attendee Information & Service Referral Form**



Thank you for coming today. The Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership would like to help you learn about services in the community. If you are interested in finding out more about these opportunities, can I please ask you some questions to help me link you to the appropriate services? I realize that the information you share with me today can be personal in nature. I want to assure you that all the information you share with me is confidential and will not be released to the courts or any law enforcement agency.

Participant Information

May I please get some information about you and how to contact you after today?

Name: _____ Gender: Male Female
 Age: ____ Date of Birth: ____ / ____ / ____ Marital Status: Single Married Living With Partner Divorced Separated Widowed
 Phone #: _____ Alternate Phone #: _____ Email: _____
 Address Where You Live Most of the Time: _____

Street City Zipcode
 Race/Ethnicity: African-American/Black Latino/Hispanic Asian/Pac. Islr. Caucasian Native American Other: _____

Employment & Vocational Information

Now, I would like to ask you about your past educational and work experiences. You are not required to answer all the following questions, but the information you provide can help me identify job services and resources for you.

Are you interested in assistance finding employment, job training or a better job? Yes No Not Sure

What is the highest level of education that you have achieved? (check all that apply) Less than high school High school/GED Some college 2-year college 4-year college Technical/Certificate Program Other: _____

What is your current working status? Working Full-time Working Part-time Not Working Now
 Never Worked Working Temporary/Seasonal Not Interested in Working

Do you have any special training, skills or certification? (list) _____

Are you interested in taking college classes or attending a technical school? Yes No

If yes, what would you be interested in learning (e.g. computers, welding, auto repair, business, electronics, etc.): _____

Next, I have a list of barriers people may experience when they are trying to get a job or go back to school. As I read the list, please tell me if you have any of these issues and if you would like assistance.

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Need High School Diploma/GED
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Need a Driver's License
<input type="checkbox"/> Never had a Driver's License | <input type="checkbox"/> Need Social Security Card
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Transportation Problems
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Suspended for DUI | <input type="checkbox"/> Resume/Job Interviewing
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Need Photo Identification
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Suspended for Traffic Fines | <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of Paid Work Experience
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Drug Testing
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Suspended for Owing Child Support
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Anger/Dealing with Emotions
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Finding Child Care
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Tattoos
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Family Obligations (ex. ill family member)
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Help Paying for Child Care
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Not Able to Read/Write
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Personal health issues
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Record
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Physical disability
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Need Work Clothes or Tools
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Finding the Money to Pay for School
<input type="checkbox"/> Would like assistance | |

Do you have any other barriers to employment or school you would like help with? Yes No

If yes, please explain: _____

This is an optional question, and you don't have to answer it. If you could change one thing in your life, what would it be? _____

Support Services Information

The local programs here today would like to provide supportive services to you and your family such as housing, financial assistance and health care. I would now like to ask you some questions about yourself and your current home life to find out which programs and services are available to assist you.

Do you have children or are you expecting a baby? No children Yes, what ages are they: _____

Children live primarily with: Both parents Mother Father Other: _____

Do you have any children in CPS custody? Yes No If yes, do you need help establishing visitation? Yes No

How do you support yourself? (list) _____

Are you or is anyone in the home a migrant agricultural worker? Yes No

What is your current living situation? Permanent house/apartment Living with family/friends Shelter

Subsidized housing None (living on street in vehicle, etc.) Other _____

Have you or a parent ever served in the military? Yes No

Have you ever been in foster care? Yes No

Do you have any special needs or learning disabilities that you need assistance with? Yes No

If yes, what: _____

Is there any physical or medical conditions that you would like services for? Yes No

If yes, please explain: _____

Now I'm going to read to you a list of services offered by community programs. Please let me know if a resource or service meets a need for you and your family.

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Find Affordable Housing | <input type="checkbox"/> Mental Health Services | <input type="checkbox"/> Applying for Food Assistance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Help with Child Support | <input type="checkbox"/> Help Paying Bills/Utilities | <input type="checkbox"/> Dealing with Stress or Depression |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Health Insurance | <input type="checkbox"/> Clothing | <input type="checkbox"/> Money Management/Debt |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Parenting Issues/Support Groups | <input type="checkbox"/> Individual/Family Counseling | <input type="checkbox"/> Dental Services |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Faith Based Counseling/Services | <input type="checkbox"/> Pregnancy & Parenthood Services | <input type="checkbox"/> Household Appliances |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Applying for Cash Assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> Applying for Social Security/Disability | <input type="checkbox"/> Legal Services |

Would you like to meet with an alcohol/drug use counselor? Yes No Not Sure

Are there any specific legal issues you need assistance with? _____

Are there any other needs or concerns you have that you would like assistance with? _____

What message did you hear today from the panel? _____

Are there any young persons that you know that would benefit from the message you heard today?

No Not Sure Yes (Names & phone#s) _____

Can I or another Bakersfield Safe Street staff member contact you after today to help you connect to additional services that you are interested in receiving? Yes No Not Sure

When is the best time to contact you: Morning Afternoon Evening

Is there any other information you feel is important to tell me that wasn't asked?

POST CALL-IN VOLUNTEER ASSESSMENT

Call-In Participant Name: _____

Participant refused services/referrals

Please explain: _____

Describe client's level of motivation for process: High Medium Low

Please explain: _____

Did participant appear to have a clear understanding of process and its goals? Yes No Not Sure

Please explain: _____

Did the participant have any concerns about the call-in process? Yes No Not Sure

Please explain: _____

Did you give the participant any information or referrals for services (please list):

For the intake volunteers, what aspects of the call-in session do you think could be improved or changed at future call-in sessions to benefit call-in participants and volunteers?

Intake Form Completed By:

Name: _____ Organization: _____

Primary Phone #: _____ Alternate Phone #: _____

Email Address: _____

I would be willing to make follow-up phone calls to this individual: Yes No Not Sure

Signature _____ Date: _____

Appendix C Logic Model

Bakersfield Safe Street Partnership “Call-in” Logic Model

SITUATION:

The Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership grant funded period ended in December 2013. Efforts to continue the interagency collaboration have transformed the BSSP into a volunteer collaborative. One way to improve the viability of the BSSP is to address inefficiencies in its “call-in” selection and implementation processes.

GOAL: To continue operating the Bakersfield Safe Streets Partnership as a volunteer collaborative; still providing the social and public health services through alternative means.

Objectives	Outputs / Activities	Output Measures	Outcome Measures
<p>Reduce BPD Gang Unit involvement in the “call-in” selection process</p> <p>Delegate other law enforcement agencies in BSSP to assume larger role in developing contributions to selection process</p> <p>Improve attendance by participants: Develop alternative ways to contact at-risk youth</p> <p>Develop a BSSP call-in component for juveniles under age 18</p>	<p>Restructure or eliminate the “call-in” selection criteria form for the Bakersfield Police Department Gang Unit</p> <p>Kern County Probation, CDC Parole, and KCSO develop their own lists of candidates for BSSP call-ins</p> <p>Invite “at-risk” gang members who are not on probation/parole</p> <p>Mobilize the BSSP to correctional and education facilities where attendance numbers are controlled (Including Juvenile Facilities)</p> <p>Mobilize the BSSP to do in-home contacts with approved candidates</p>	<p>Number of man-hours the individual law enforcement agencies are dedicating to call-in selection</p> <p>Number of candidates other agencies contribute</p> <p>Number of volunteers needed to run the BSSP “call in”</p> <p>Number of facilities utilized in BSSP mobilization efforts</p> <p>Feedback from partners and volunteers</p>	<p>Attendance evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attendees per “call-in” • Attendees per service provider <p>Evaluation of financial contributions to BSSP by contributing agencies (labor cost, equipment cost)</p> <p>Number of arrests for non-compliant candidates who fail to attend “call-in”</p>

Appendix D

Institutional Review Board Approval



CSU Bakersfield

Academic Affairs

Office of the Grants, Research, and Sponsored Programs (GRuSP)

Mail Stop: 24 DDH Room 108
9001 Stockdale Highway
Bakersfield, California 93311-1022
(661) 654-2231
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Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects Research

Anne Duran, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Scientific Concerns

Roseanna McCleary, Ph.D.
Masters of Social Work
Scientific Concerns

Steven Gamboa, Ph.D.
Department of Phil/Rel Studies
Nonscientific/Humanistic Concerns

Lily Alvarez, B.A.
Kern County Mental Health
Community Issues/Concerns

Grant Herndon
Schools Legal Service
Community Issues/Concerns

Mike Butler
Community Issues/Concerns

Kathleen Gilchrist, Ph.D.
Department of Nursing
Scientific Concerns

Paul Newberry, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy/
Religious Studies
Nonscientific/Humanistic Concerns
IRB/HSR Chair

Tony Alteparmakian, Ed.D.
Teacher Education
Nonscientific/Humanistic Concerns

Steve Suter, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Research Ethics Review Coordinator
and IRB/HSR Secretary

Date: 04 February 2014

To: Brian Holcombe, PPA Student

cc: Chandrasekhar Commuri, Public Policy and Administration
Paul Newberry, IRB Chair

From: Steve Suter, Research Ethics Review Coordinator

Subject: Protocol 14-08: Not Human Subjects Research

Thank you for bringing your protocol, "Interagency Collaboration: A Process Evaluation of a Bakersfield Gang Violence Prevention Model", to the attention of the IRB/HSR. On the form, "Is My Project Human Subjects Research?", received on January 31st, 2014, you indicated the following:

I want to interview, survey, systematically observe, or collect other data from human subjects, for example, students in the educational setting. **NO**

I want to access data about specific persons that have already been collected by others [such as test scores or demographic information]. Those data can be linked to specific persons [regardless of whether I will link data and persons in my research or reveal anyone's identities]. **NO**

Given this, your proposed project will not constitute human subjects research. Therefore, it does not fall within the purview of the CSUB IRB/HSR. Good luck with your project.

If you have any questions, or there are any changes that might bring these activities within the purview of the IRB/HSR, please notify me immediately at 654-2373. Thank you.

Steve Suter, University Research Ethics Review Coordinator