

CICERO

A STUDY OF GAMESMANSHIP IN THE LATE REPUBLIC

A Thesis

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by

Eugene H. Boyd

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Abstract

of

CICERO

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Eugene H. Boyd

Roman politics during the final decades of the Late Republic was a vicious process of gamesmanship wherein lives of people, their families and friends were at the mercy of the gamesmen. Cicero's public and political gamesmanship reflects the politics, class and ethnic biases of Roman society and how random events impacted personal insecurities.

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Cicero:
A Study of Gamesmanship in the Late Republic

INTRODUCTION

Marcus Tullius Cicero was a Roman senator, consul and proconsul, and governor of Cilicia during his professional career. Contemporaries regarded him as a philologist, linguist, and author during the frenetic last days of the Roman Republic. He was known best as the leading orator in Rome, who became Rome's top orator and lawyer when only 27 years old.¹ As an author, Cicero also produced numerous philosophical and political treatises that left such an enduring legacy that the politics and governments of most European countries and America well into the 18th century remained influenced by Cicero's writing.

Academically, Cicero's philological and linguistic skills helped to raise the level of sophistication of the Latin language from a rustic, basic language to a language akin to the already sophisticated Greek language. Cicero's ability to accurately transform Greek words into new Latin words, *neologisms*, allowed more accurate and comprehensive translations from Greek to Latin especially of Greek poems and prose into Latin that eased the interfacing of Latin and Greek. Prior to Cicero, Latin was incapable of expressing the more nuanced meanings of words so easily expressed in Greek. Thus, a heightened sense of Roman sophistication evolved so that it soon became *de rigueur* for a Roman aristocrat to be fluent in both Latin and Greek languages. By infusing the Greek language into Latin through Cicero's *neologisms*, the less refined Latin language

¹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 80.

improved to an intellectual level where, along with Greek, they became the academic *lingua Franca* of Europe and the western world up to the 19th century.

Additionally, Romans acknowledged Cicero's unmatched oratorical and rhetorical talents that placed him at the apex of Roman orators. These skills earned him the respect of his peers and separated Cicero from other prominent Roman speakers of the time. Everitt notes, "His dominance as a public speaker made him a household name that [boosted] his growing *clientele* among the commercial and mercantile class [equites]."² However, Cicero's provincial origins hindered total acceptance among the Roman aristocratic classes. Cicero's less savory side, his ability to viciously attack adversaries with his oratorical abilities, showed another side of Cicero's persona that many opponents. Anthony Everitt notes, "Cicero had no hesitation in delivering brutal and sometimes tasteless put-downs."³ Through caustic wit, unmatched sarcasm, and rhetorical skills, Cicero was a feared opponent who utilized his skills to destroy opposing ideas and individuals whether in the courts or the Senate.

Sadly, Cicero lacked the common sense and proper self-restraint to determine when to use his potent verbal weapons and when not to use them. Plutarch observes, "[Cicero had] a ready wit and jesting habit of his [that] was regarded as a good and attractive quality in a lawyer but he carried it too far, often caused offense, and so got the

² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 83.

³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 70.

reputation of being malicious.”⁴ He appeared to have a thick skin and seldom took offense from his opponent’s affronts whether in the courts or in the Senate; while, with his ready and caustic wit, he provided a retort. However, his lack of sensitivity coupled with his lack of empathy created drastic consequences and became one of the reasons why he was never fully accepted into aristocratic society—an acceptance he strove all of his life to attain. Despite his obeisance to the leaders of the aristocratic optimates, and in spite of his abilities and many accomplishments, his mercurial personality was a factor that separated him from complete acceptance in the Roman aristocratic world. Michael Parenti notes, “For all his prodigious kowtowing to the nobles, they never considered him much more than a useful upstart.”⁵ This attitude by the optimates played a key role in Cicero’s future.

Undoubtedly, the greatest deterrent to Cicero’s acceptance into the upper echelons of Roman society was the fact that he was a *novus homo*—a new man. A *novus homo* was anyone seeking acceptance into Roman aristocratic society whose family was not descended from Roman lineage.⁶ Aristocrats existed throughout Italy and beyond; however, none ever gained complete acceptance into Roman aristocracy unless they possessed Roman heredity. Cicero fell into this category. Despite being the first *novus homo* to reach the consulship in over three generations—the upper levels of Roman

⁴ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penguin Books 1968), 281.

⁵ Michael Parenti, *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome*, (New Press People's History), The New Press. Kindle Edition, 86.

⁶ Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002), 11.

aristocracy remained closed to him simply because he was not born into the family of a Roman aristocrat.

Cicero entered the world on December 6, 106 BCE, as a citizen of Arpinum, the largest town in an area formerly controlled by the Volsci, a Latin tribe distinct from the Roman tribe. Arpinum was the largest town in Volscian territory some 70 miles south-east of Rome.⁷ Over 200 years earlier, the Volsci, one of many Italian tribes, had fought against the Romans. The tribes fought each other during the 6th and 5th centuries until the Volsci were succumbed by the Romans in 304 BCE.⁸ The Volsci gained Roman status and citizenship through an alliance treaty between the two tribes of Romans. Cicero's ancestors came from the Volscian tribe who opposed the Roman tribe prior to "accepting defeat, assimilation, and ultimately, full civic rights as citizens of Rome."⁹

Like the Samnites of the Apennines, the Volsci spoke a non-Roman dialect of Latin.¹⁰ When Rome assimilated the Volsci, the tribe characteristics rapidly disappeared except for a telltale Volsci accent. A caveat of the agreement was that all Volsci convert their Volscian Latin to the Romanized Latin. The fact that Cicero retained a small Volscian accent identified him as a non-Roman thus separating him from the Roman optimates. Nevertheless, Cicero forged a place in the upper echelons, albeit not the

⁷ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 22.

⁸ T. J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC)*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, 15.

⁹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 21.

¹⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 18.

ultimate optimate level, in Roman politics and rose to the pinnacle of Roman politics when elected consul in 63 BCE.

In addition to the fact that Cicero was a *novus homo*, he possessed an Achilles heel— one that greatly hampered his success—of an ever-present personal insecurity. Everitt notes, “His personality was insecure and nervous that created two important consequences. First, he needed continuity and stability to thrive; and, it was his misfortune to live in an age of change. He was also a temperamental conservative caught in the nets of a revolution. Second, he never stopped boasting of his successes.”¹¹ Cicero felt the constant need to promote himself at all times to the public using outlandish braggadocio to generate praise and keep his name in the public’s view. Manifestations of Cicero’s insecurities emerged in both Cicero’s personal letters and in commentaries from modern historians noting who noted the insecurities as antiquarian historians after over two thousand years of history. Elizabeth Rawson describes Cicero’s temperance best when she observes:

“Though he was certainly self-centered, the charge of vanity commonly made against him is not exactly correct; for he was sometimes able to laugh at himself, and in moods of depression his self-criticism was as excessive as was his self-satisfaction in periods of exaltation, while his judgement of others was often very generous. He did, during and after his consulship, boast unconscionable of his achievement, even if with occasional apologies, and he had, even by Roman standards with the high value for glory, an insatiable thirst to hear others praise him—the result,

¹¹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 322.

perhaps, of an underlying insecurity rooted in both his origin and temperament.”¹²

What caused these insecurities to arise remains unknown: a distant, unloving relationship with his mother, his father, or otherwise unknown trauma(s) from his childhood. --all are possible causes for creating a lack of self-worth and a need for acceptance within Cicero. These insecurities were ever-present in Cicero’s career making him more susceptible to manipulation by others in the hope for acceptance and acknowledgement. This paper examines two key incidents in Rome’s history that demonstrate how Cicero, even with all his skills, became a pawn used by others to achieve the political gains of others. because of his need for acceptance. The assertion of this paper is that Cicero’s insecurities exposed him to manipulation by others to acquire their political goals. The incidents are the Catalina Conspiracy, from July, 63 BCE to January, 62 BCE¹³; and the Bona Dea incident from December 3, 62 BCE to July, 61 BCE.¹⁴ The first incident exemplifies his need of acceptance; the second event, the Bona Dea incident, demonstrates how, without obtaining acceptance, Cicero declined into depression that led to a mental breakdown as noted by both antiquarian and modern historians.¹⁵

¹² Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 90-91.

¹³ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), xlvi.

¹⁴ W. Jeffrey Tatum, "Cicero and the Bona Dea Scandal," *Classical Philology* 85, no. 3 (1990): 202-08. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/270143>.

¹⁵ Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press (Accessed November 8, 2018. “The value you give to your life and achievements. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org>

THE CATALINA CONSPIRACY

No other time in Roman history is as well-known as Rome in 1st century BCE. The history of 1st Century BCE Rome saw multiple dictatorships, monarchies, civil wars, assassinations, military conquests, and multiple boom and bust economic cycles. The period also produced, amidst the unsettled social, economic and political climates, Rome's highest level of cultural sophistication, known colloquially, as the "Golden Age of Latin Literature."

The Golden Age, the period from 70 BCE to 18 CE, consisted of two parts: The Ciceronian Era from 70 BCE to 43 BCE: a period dominated by Cicero through his speeches, books and linguistic achievement; and the Augustan Era, from 43 BCE to 18 CE--that began with Cicero's death and ended with the death of Augustus. The Augustan Era shone the spotlight on such noted authors as Virgil, Tacitus and Livy. The Ciceronian era began in 70 BCE when Cicero was the best orator/ lawyer in Rome.¹⁶ His successful prosecution of Gaius Verres in *Pro Verres* saw Gaius Verres convicted for corruption during his governorship of Gaul.¹⁷ Verres lawyer was Quintus Hortensius Hortalus (Hortensius), the most prominent lawyer in Rome at that time. Cicero dominated the trial by his oratory that when it became time for Hortensius to speak, he declined to respond. Verres went into exile after his conviction of corruption. Hortensius retired from active practice and Cicero, although only a newly elected aedile, now, under Roman law, held the rights and privileges in the Senate previously held by Verres, a praetor, that were now

¹⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 45.

¹⁷ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 44.

held by Cicero.¹⁸ From that time until 43 BCE, Cicero dominated the legal and political spotlight.

During his lifetime, Cicero produced six books on rhetoric, eight books on philosophy; eighty-eight recorded speeches of which fifty-two are extant; and, some nine hundred extant letters contained in thirty-seven books with an additional thirty-five books that are lost. Cicero's treatises and speeches played a key role in creating an age of intellectualism previously unknown in Roman culture. During the Ciceronian Era, only two other prose writers garnered specific praise: Sallust and Caesar. However, it is Cicero's extant personal letters that vault him to the apex of Roman literature not only as an author but as a historic observer of Roman politics and key figures of the Late Republic. Thanks to Cicero, no other period in Roman history is as well-known as the last century of the Republic and no other Roman personalities are as well-known as those described by Cicero during these times. As noted in the Encyclopedia Britannica, "His influence on the Latin language was so immense that the subsequent history of prose, not only in Latin however in European languages up to the 19th century, was said to be either a reaction against or a return to his style."¹⁹

Cicero always worked to keep his name before the public and his reputation untarnished. To that end, most of Cicero's speeches are not exact replicas. The reader must assume the extant speeches are the edited and revised publications. Whether in the

¹⁸ Roman law allowed a successful prosecutor the right to assume the politically elected station of the defendant if convicted. Cicero was now able to claim praetor status in terms of speaking in the Senate—an elevation in *auctoritas* that kept Cicero's speaking more prominent in the 600 plus Senate.

¹⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica. *Ciceronian Period*. Ancient Roman Literature. (Accessed August 9 2018). www.britannica.com/art/ciceronian-period.

Senate or as transcribed in one of his many trial appearances, Cicero's incessant self-promotion reinforced his insecurity and need for constant praise. During his lifetime, Cicero's lifelong friend Titus Pomponius, "Atticus", acted as Cicero's publisher and later Cicero's freedman, Tiro, published Cicero's works.²⁰ Cicero was one of the first orators to record his speeches by employing several scribes to copy them down during delivery using the Tironian method of shorthand—a method reputedly developed by Tiro, Cicero's freedman, who retained most of Cicero's works and published them posthumously after the deaths of Cicero and Atticus. Cicero, like other orators of the time, wrote the speeches, memorized them and presented them to the audience. Usually, after delivering the speech, Cicero edited his speech to improve the flow and provide a more positive emphasis on himself. On some occasions, Cicero published a speech that he never presented. The most preeminent example is Cicero's closing defense speech for the *Pro Milone* trial considered by many as his *magnum opus* of speeches.²¹ Interestingly, the speech was never delivered. Not surprisingly, the written speech failed to portray the actuality of the situation; instead, it bolstered Cicero's image—just as many he used other speeches enhancement his actions for posterity—a method he used often to seek praise and enhance his self-image.

Pro Milone was the consequential trial of Titus Annius Milo, who was charged with the murder of Publius Clodius Pulcher after the two groups and their escorts met on the Via Appia. The incident occurred on January 20, 52 BCE and "gave Cicero such

²⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 43.

²¹ Asconius, *Commentaries on Five Speeches of Cicero*, (Translated by Simon Squires); (Mudelein, Il: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers Inc.), 65-67.

pleasure that in future years he regularly celebrated the anniversary of what he called the 'Battle of Bovillae'."²² Clodius, with 3 friends and 30 armed slaves, approached Milo's entourage that was heading in the opposite direction as Clodius. Milo, travelling to his hometown to officiate in the town's ceremonies, was riding in a carriage with his wife. His caravan was much larger since it included cooks, house servants and a few trained gladiators while Clodius' group were all armed and mounted on horseback. Both groups passed each other until at the very end of the caravans, men started insulting each other's leader. In the ensuing struggle, the rear guards from both parties first began parrying words, then later parrying swords, knives and spears. Almost immediately, Clodius receive a wound from a spear thrown by one of Milo's gladiators, Birria; men from both groups turned back and engaged in the struggle. Soon after, most of Clodius' men were either dead or wounded. Milo's men had suffered two casualties. Upon learning Clodius was wounded, Milo turned back and went to the inn in the small town of Bovillae where Clodius' men had taken him for shelter. Milo, deciding that a wounded Clodius was more dangerous than a dead Clodius ordered Clodius killed. Milo's men then dragged his body outside and laid it at the side of the road. By this time, Clodius' slaves were fleeing or were hiding. Milo continued on to his hometown to attend to his officiating responsibilities. A passing senator, returning to Rome, spotted the body. He ordered his litter to carry Clodius back to Rome while the senator prudently returned to his estate to avoid the upcoming fireworks. Clodius' followers carried his body to his new home where his wife, Fulvia, showed everyone his wounds. The next day, two tribunes picked

²² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 172.

up Clodius' corpse and carried him to the Senate's chambers. They built a funeral pyre and placed Clodius on the pyre. Almost immediately, the fire went out of control and burned the Senate building to the ground. Everitt notes, "After an orgy of destruction (that burned the Senate building to ashes) Clodius' supporters and street gangs could think of nothing better to do than ask Pompey, whom Clodius had bullied and undermined on and off for years, for justice."²³

In the trial, the court charged Milo with murdering Publius Clodius during the encounter between the two men and their followers while traveling on the Via Appia. Milo claimed self-defense in rebuttal. In most cases, several lawyers represented each client, however this time, Cicero, unusually, acted as the only advocate for his friend Milo thus presenting one of the mysteries of the trial. No record exists of either Cicero or Milo waiving the representation of other lawyers or any record of the court only allowing Cicero as the only lawyer. Did Pompey intervene? Did Caesar or Crassus? The triumvirs utilized Clodius in the past; perhaps this was a method of paying the Clodii back? In any event, this part of the trial remains unknown although the action places Milo at a weakened position. With Pompey and his troops surrounding the Forum to maintain order and hundreds of Clodius' supporters clamoring for justice, the trial began. In concert, they completely intimidated Cicero who, "did not completely break down, however his performance fell a long way short of his usual standards... He spoke briefly

²³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 173.

and soon withdrew... It was the most embarrassing moment in his professional life.”²⁴ The rewritten speech, however, fails to note any type of humiliation. Later, as Everitt relates, Cicero sent Milo a copy of the speech that Cicero had intended to deliver. Milo responded by saying that he was lucky the speech had not been given; otherwise, he would not have been able to enjoy the red mullets of Marseilles.²⁵ Ironically, Cicero’s undelivered closing speech for Milo became the speech regarded by Asconius as his *magnum opus*.²⁶

In 60 BCE, students, who studied rhetoric, oratory or law, requested copies of speeches of prominent speakers, like Cicero, from which to study. For Cicero, who needed some type of self-promotion to bolster his lagging public support, he readily agreed to the student request for copies of his speeches which Cicero provided although they were edited and revised speeches. Cicero reviewed, edited and then re-published the speeches.²⁷ This sequence of events happened in 60 BCE. Cicero thought it beneficial to promote a positive image of his time as consul given the fact that his reputation suffered from actions taken during his 63 BCE consulship. Thus, three years after Cicero’s controversial consulship, some students requested some speeches and notes on his consulship for study. Using the request, Cicero published the history of his consulship. As Batson notes, several of Cicero’s speeches also contained details of

²⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 175.

²⁵ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 175.

²⁶ Asconius, *Commentaries on Five Speeches of Cicero*, (Translated by Simon Squires); (Mudelin, IL USA. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc.), 67.

²⁷ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), xxi.

Cicero's year as consul that many times discussed Catilina's Conspiracy; however up to this time, Cicero, never wrote a history of his year in office or of the Catilina Conspiracy. He, however, wrote a prose response of his consulship year in Latin. He also wrote a poem of it in Greek. As a result of the edited and revised speeches and of his writings about the conspiracy, Cicero promoted the impression of a white knight who rode in on his white horse to save the day. This was more than an impression given by Cicero's writing, it was propaganda and Cicero's attempt to present himself in the best light-- once again method, albeit only moderately successful, to restore his reputation and temporarily satiate his constant need for praise.

Catilina's Conspiracy holds a special notoriety in the history of the Roman Republic. The conspiracy centered on two protagonists—Lucius Sergius Catalina and Marcus Tullius Cicero--major players in the conspiratorial drama along with prominent aristocrats including Cato, Catulus, Caesar and Crassus. Among antiquarian historians, Gaius Sallustius Crispus, Sallust, was a contemporary of the times although he was not in Rome during the Catilinian Conspiracy. Due to his proximity to the event and his knowledge of the main participants, his work provides a key source for the event. Plutarch is another of the authoritative figures recording the conspiracy while, later, Cassius Dio enters into the ranking as the third of authoritative figures based upon proximity to the event. Sallust wrote his history 30 years after the actual event's occurrence while Plutarch and Dio each take further and further steps in time away from the event. The conspiracy is unique in the annals of Roman history because of the involvement of all social classes—from patrician to slave—and how Catilina they came

together to oppose the status quo: in essence, the Senate controlled by a conservative group of politicians known as the optimates. The optimates opposed any type of change opting instead to favor a status quo government. Catilina's Conspiracy, interestingly, created contradicting political alliances not previously seen. Of particular interest, Crassus and Caesar seemed to play a surreptitious but, as yet not fully defined, role in supporting Catilina. His greatest political supporter was Catulus, an ardent enemy of both Crassus and, most particularly, of Caesar. Catulus and Catilina formed a friendship during the Sullan proscriptions implemented in either 82 or 81 BCE to avenge the Marian massacres. Reportedly, a relationship between Catulus and Catilina stemmed from the proscription and revenge killing of Gratidianus by Catilina. Gratidianus was a Marian supporter who executed Catulus' father during the Marian massacres. Catilina brutally executed Gratidianus, a relative of Cicero's, and then carried the head through the streets to Sulla for evidence of proscription.²⁸ During this same period, Pompey finished the Third Mithridatic war (73-63 BCE)²⁹ in the east and began preparations to return to Rome. The war had lasted for 10 years and caused an economic crisis through the Italian peninsula and Rome in particular. The war had a double impact on Roman economy. It closed off trade with the east as well as stopping the collection of tax revenues for Rome in addition to financially supporting the expenses of the war. Adding to the crisis, Italian agriculture was still recovering from the civil war and the Sullan proscriptions. Combined

²⁸ Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*, (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, First Anchor Books Edition, 2003), New York: Kindle Edition. Loc. 3076.

²⁹ Robin Seager. *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*. (Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002).61

the Italian economy and agriculture had plunged both the Italian people and government of Rome into an economic crisis so much the case that as a result, lenders were reluctant to extend loans or grant new ones because of the scarce amount of money they held. Thus, with a scarcity of funds, lenders tightened lending and increased interest rates soared and foreclosures.

After removing the scourge of pirates in the Mediterranean (67 BCE) and with the death and defeat of Mithridates, the Mithridatic Wars (73-63 BCE) ended thus re-opening the eastern trade.³⁰ Lenders rushed to lend money overseas to recoup losses caused by the war and pirates. Almost overnight, lenders stopped lending at home and invested in the east where there were greater earnings. The situation became so serious that the Senate banned the Jewish settlement from sending gold and silver to their families in Israel.³¹ Returning from a proprietorship posting as governor of Africa in mid-66 BCE, Catilina is described as “one of a line of able and rebellious young aristocrats during the declining years of the Republic.”³² Sallust noted, “[Catilina] was a man of great strength, both mental and physical, however his nature was wicked and perverse. From early adulthood on, he took pleasure in civil wars, murders, plunder, and political discord, and this was where he exercised his youth.”³³ Almost immediately on his return to Rome, accusation and alleged charges of extortion carried out during his proprietorship

³⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 122.

³¹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 60.

³² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 88.

³³ Sallust. *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*. (Translated by William W. Batson). (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010).12

in Africa prevented Catilina from standing for office.³⁴ The prosecutor was Publius Clodius Pulcher, who had just returned to Rome as well. He, too, like Catilina, was looking to make a name for himself as soon as possible. In Rome, the consuls elected for 65 BCE were disqualified for bribery. Catilina hoped to take advantage of their disqualification by standing for one of the two vacated consulships; however, his pending trial for extortion barred him from consideration and deemed him ineligible. In response, Catilina, the two disgraced consul-elects, P. Autronius and P. Sulla, and a bankrupt noble, Cnaeus Piso³⁵, planned to assassinate the replacement consuls when they assumed office. The conspirators then planned to kill as many Senators as they could while Catilina assumed one of the vacant consulships.³⁶ Subsequently, Piso, an obnoxious and unpleasant man in the eyes of the Senate as well as of his co-conspirators, was sent to Spain to command the troops where shortly after his arrival he was killed by Spanish horsemen from his own Spanish cavalry troops—an act that had never before occurred. The horsemen were veteran troops of Pompey who disliked Piso as their commander.³⁷

In the 64 BCE campaign for the 63 BCE consulship, Cicero drew upon the advice given by his brother Quintus in a manual about campaign tactics.³⁸ According to Quintus,

³⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 89

³⁵ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 19.

³⁶ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 90

³⁷ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 19.

³⁸ Quintus Tullius Cicero, *How To Win An Election: An ancient guide for Modern Politicians*, (Translated by Phillip Freeman.), Princeton and Oxford. Princeton University Press, 2012.

Cicero was to avoid specific issues, and generally to present himself not as an unflinching upholder of the Senate's authority, devoted to orderly rule and the reactionary Sullan constitution but as a protector of the people. At the same time, he was to heap slander upon his opponents. From then on, conspiracy and subversion remained Cicero's political methodology in electoral campaigns, his consulship, and for much of his life.³⁹ In a campaign speech, Cicero referred to the conspiracy" headed by Catilina—identified as the First Catilinarian Conspiracy. Due to the inconsistencies about the event labeled the "First Catilinarian Conspiracy", even the occurrence of the event is dubious and appears more as "black election propaganda"⁴⁰ than actuality.

Modern historians have since debunked Catilina's lack of involvement in this incident of 66-65 BCE Catilina was fully exposed, independently, as a fiction by two modern historians: R. J. Seager *Historia*, 13, (1964) 348-47, and R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley etc.1964) 80-102.⁴¹

Cicero, as early as 66 BCE (see above) identified Catilina as a potential threat even before beginning the 64 BCE campaign. Cicero's campaign strategy was wholly designed to place himself in the best light possible while denigrating the character of any opponent in any manner. Everitt notes that two other figures allegedly played key "behind the scene" roles in this event: Marcus Crassus and Julius Caesar. Although both names surfaced, Caesar's involvement appeared less likely than Crassus'. The possibility

³⁹ Michael Parenti, *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome*, (New Press People's History), The New Press. Kindle Edition, 86.

⁴⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 91

⁴¹ Cicero. *Cicero Political Speeches*. (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery). (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006). 136

of Crassus supporting Catalina is more plausible at this stage of Catalina's career since Crassus supported, generously, any person or activity that undermined his arch-rival Pompey.⁴² The two disqualified consuls were both Pompey's men as were the replacement consuls, Crassus' involvement seems plausible whether or not the incident actually occurred.⁴³ What actually occurred remains a mystery of the past; however, from this point forward, Cicero identified Catalina as a conspirator supported by Crassus.⁴⁴ As Catalina gathered his supporters for his consul campaign in 63 BCE, his platform consisted of "clean slates, proscription of the wealthy, priesthoods, plunder and everything else that war and the caprice of victors can offer."⁴⁵ According to Sallust, Crassus and Caesar had pulled away from any involvement with Catalina after Catalina laid out the position planks for his candidacy.⁴⁶ Thus, by the time of the election in July, 64 BCE, Catalina had lost his key financial support while Caesar withdrew his support to the level of observer.

The Second Catalina Conspiracy began in 63 BCE as a consequence of the events surrounding the campaign in 64 BCE and the election in 63 BCE. After Catalina was acquitted from the extortion charges (through massive bribery as was more and more frequent in the courts during this period), in 64 BCE, Catalina ran for the consulship of 63

⁴² Sallust. *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*. (Translated by William W. Batson). (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010). 18

⁴³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 90

⁴⁴ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 91.

⁴⁵ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 21.

⁴⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 71.

BCE opposing Cicero, Antonius and four other candidates. For a multimillionaire like Crassus, who gained a great deal of money and influence through lending and real estate, Crassus' support of a candidate who advocated abolishment of debts was illogical. Caesar, rapidly rising as a political star, separated himself from a man who was too radical and impulsive. For Catalina, the conspiracy, as described by Sallust and Cicero, originated from Catalina's debauched mind and his desire to obtain wealth and personal aggrandizement. Catalina, it seems sought a redress of grievances to restore what his perception of a personal loss of *dignitas*, and *auctoritas*; and, as a leader of like-minded individuals, he was looking for some consideration from the ruling elite. Catalina had designated himself as his family descendant to champion a return to the patrician prominence and wealth they had once held. Catalina, according to Sallust, wanted the consulship "without being elected and general without earning or being given a command."⁴⁷ The unique aspects of the conspiracy centered on Catalina's followers that comprised all orders of Roman society at the time and the fundamental difference in Catalina's aims: "Catalina wanted domination for the sake of destroying the state, not for the purpose of being powerful within the state."⁴⁸ All fed into Catalina's and Cicero's subsequent drama.

Catalina descended from the aristocratic patrician family *gens Sergia*. Sergustus, the original family patriarch, was allegedly a legendary companion of Aeneas in the mythical Roman past. The family thus held the highest social class in Roman aristocratic

⁴⁷ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), xxii.

⁴⁸ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), xxii.

lineage albeit not a dominant one. Like many patrician families, the family had not held any type of political prominence since 380 BCE, the year of their last consulship. Romans, however, still respected the patrician status regardless of the family's current economic position. He had support in the Senate from Quintus Lutatius Catulus Capitolinus Senate, the leader of the conservatives.⁴⁹ According to Tom Holland, "Their friendship had been literally sealed with blood. Back in the dark days of the proscriptions, Catalina had helped Catulus to punish his father's murderer."⁵⁰ Quintus Lutatius Catulus Capitolinus was one of the *consuls* in 78 BCE, a strong supporter of Sullan conservative values and a fierce enemy of Gaius Julius Caesar.⁵¹ Catalina first ran for one of the two empty consul offices of 65 BCE; however, disqualified him. Violaceus Tullus, the consul of 66 BCE, presumably due to a legal action charged Catalina with extortion while governor in Africa in 67-66 BCE.⁵² At his trial, Publius Claudius Pulcher defended Catalina and who, according to Quintus, Cicero's brother, won an acquittal only after heavy bribery.⁵³

⁴⁹ Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*, (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, First Anchor Books Edition ,2003) New York: Kindle Edition. Loc. 2169.

⁵⁰ Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*, (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, First Anchor Books Edition ,2003) New York: Kindle Edition. Loc. 2169.

⁵¹ Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*, (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, First Anchor Books Edition ,2003) New York: Kindle Edition. Loc. 1379.

⁵² Anthony Everitt. *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*. (New York: Random House, 2003). 90

⁵³ Oxford Classical Dictionary, Fourth. Oxford, United Kingdom, 2012.

In the 64 BCE campaign and subsequent election, only three of the seven candidates vying for the two consul positions stood a chance of winning election: Cicero and two aristocrats: Caius Antonius Hybridis and Lucius Sergius Catalina. Catilina and Antonius were friends and had an agreement regarding how they would share the two consul positions after being elected.⁵⁴ Antonius was a weak individual, “corrupt, often insolvent and with little native ability or pluck...He had been disgraced in 70 and expelled from the Senate however [he] managed...to be re-elected to the Praetorship.”⁵⁵ The optimates accepted and supported Antonius, considered harmless and unimpressive, in spite of the fact that he and Catalina were friends.⁵⁶ Working to separate Antonius from Catilina, Cicero drew Antonius’ support to his side by giving Antonius his potentially lucrative proconsul assignment thereby bifurcating the Catilina/ Antonius ticket, destroying the combination of Catilina and Antonius, and calming the concerns of the Senate.⁵⁷ The plan was successful. Cicero and Antonius won the consulships.

Cicero had dutifully spent his adult life adhering to the requirements of Sulla’s imposed *cursus honorum* rising through the required political levels of government. Beginning with his election to quaestor in 79 BCE, Cicero’s administration of the western Sicily grain allotments gained Cicero his first contingency of clients.⁵⁸ After his term as quaestor, he became a life-time member in the Senate and continued his climb winning

⁵⁴ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 70.

⁵⁵ Anthony Everitt. *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*. New York. Random House 2003. 88

⁵⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 70.

⁵⁷ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 70.

⁵⁸ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 34-35.

election in the first year of eligibility at each level of the *cursus honorum*, an achievement every candidate vied⁵⁹. After the expiration of his year at the praetor level in 66 BCE, he resigned his allotted propraetor posting to spend the next two years preparing and campaigning for his election to the consulship.⁶⁰ The climb through the *cursus honorum* culminated with his election as consul in 63 BCE, at age 42 (also the youngest allowable age for election).⁶¹ At each level of the political climb, his campaigns followed the pattern of platforms designed to please both the plebians, denigrate his opponents and minimize his exposure to the optimates.⁶² Romans consider Cicero's ancestry as a *novus homo* and aristocrat, inferior to a Roman ancestry that placed him socially lower than the patrician levels of either Antonius or Catilina.

At the beginning of 64 BCE, Antonius and Catilina were the aristocratic choices for consuls in 63 BCE. However, their bribery was so excessive that, instead, the Senate considered new legislation (not surprisingly, introduced by Cicero and his followers at the urging of the Senate) to impose more severe penalties regarding bribery.⁶³ Cicero during this time managed the passage of an anti-bribery law that increased the penalty to 10 years exile. The ruling optimates distrusted Catalina and soon became worried that he

⁵⁹ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), xv-xvi.

⁶⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 87.

⁶¹ Donald L. Wasson, *Ancient History Encyclopedia*, June 23, www.ancienthistory.eu (Accessed November 14, 2018).

⁶² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 84.

⁶³ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 137.

would gain the consulship.⁶⁴ To help deter the possibility of Catalina gaining election, the optimates, “put Cicero forward for the consulship [and] the people accepted him gladly.”⁶⁵ Cicero, in a scathing attack on both optimate candidates, attacked them in his speech, *In Toga Candida*.⁶⁶ D. Berry cites this speech as being the, “origin of the myth of the first Catilinarian conspiracy and the allegation that Catilina was responsible for the murder of Catalus’s relative, Gratidianus.”⁶⁷ Catalina was, according to Plutarch, “guilty of many serious crimes and had once been accused of taking the virginity of his own daughter and of killing his own brother.”⁶⁸ Other ancient writers have described Catalina as a man with “high abilities and specious virtues to balance his fearful vices.”⁶⁹ Rawson objectively describes Catalina: “he was remarkable for boldness and above all for extraordinary powers of endurance, and that he had as much force of mind as body.”⁷⁰ Rawson places a caveat when describing Catalina that, “most of the information on his early or private life comes directly or indirectly from invectives by Cicero and others and is as highly colored and unreliable as possible.”⁷¹ As biased as the descriptions of Catalina appeared, they demonstrate the dislike of many optimate’s toward him.

⁶⁴ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 286.

⁶⁵ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 285.

⁶⁶ Asconius. *Commentaries on Five Speeches of Cicero*. Translated by Simon Squires; Mudelein, II. USA. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc.129

⁶⁷ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 137.

⁶⁸ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 285.

⁶⁹ Elizabeth Rawson. *Cicero: a portrait*. (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975). 63

⁷⁰ Elizabeth Rawson. *Cicero: a portrait*. (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975). 63

⁷¹ Elizabeth Rawson. *Cicero: a portrait*. (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975). 63

Catalina bribed young spendthrift aristocrats to gain their following; while, to gain plebian support, both he and Antonius campaigned for debt relief and agrarian reform—two issues becoming more and more salient due to the continuing economic decline and agricultural dilemmas Rome was experiencing. Brunt describes the widespread agricultural dilemma in the rural areas. He notes the number of agricultural uprisings, “in Etruria (which had suffered most from Sulla’s settlement) and in almost every region of Italy—Cisalpine Gaul, Picenum, Umbria, the Abruzzi, Campania, Apulia and Bruttium. [Catilina’s Conspiracy] indicated the extent and intensity of *agrarian* discontent.”⁷² Additionally, several senators and prominent equites were heavily in debt forgiveness was appealing. Another group of Catilina’s supporters were young aristocrats “who had the resources to live at ease...however preferred uncertainty to certainty, war to peace.”⁷³ As he gathered his supporters together for his consul campaign in 64 BCE, his platform consisted of “clean slates, proscription of the wealthy, priesthoods, plunder and everything else that war and the caprice of victors can offer.”⁷⁴ The families rejected many young aristocrats of this nature or they rejected their families thus leaving many of these young men with no means of support and heavily in debt. These were the young

⁷² P.A. Brunt, *Social Conflicts In The Roman Republic*, (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. New York.1971), 131.

⁷³ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 19.

⁷⁴ Sallust. *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*. (Translated by William W. Batson). (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010). 21

aristocrats that followed Catalina as did many senators and aristocrats who, although silent in their support, held excessive debt as a result of their extravagant lifestyles.⁷⁵

Catalina also had a military following that extended to the Etrurian countryside where Sullan veterans had lost the land given them and had returned to a military way of life. The disgruntled Sullan veterans had lost or squandered all of their land allocations and looked again to plunder and loot to regain their lost wealth. Sallust notes, “Debt was rampant throughout the whole world, and most of Sulla’s soldiers, having squandered their own property, were thinking about plunder and their former victories and hoping for civil war.”⁷⁶ Since the veterans were the only “army” on the peninsula at the time, their support was crucial. Meanwhile another group of Catalina’s follower’s, the urban proletariat and slaves grew larger and more restless as they simmered in Rome and the larger cities of Italy where they faced continued or only occasional unemployment.⁷⁷

In addition to debt reform, the second plank of Catalina’s political platform was agrarian reform. Catalina planned to gain support from disenfranchised provincial farmers who lost their land and the Marians who suffered under the proscriptions and confiscations of Sulla. Both groups had emigrated to Rome and the larger Italian cities.⁷⁸ Although not publicly known, Catilina also planned proscriptions as well.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 60-61.

⁷⁶ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 18.

⁷⁷ P.A. Brunt. *Social Conflicts In The Roman Republic*. (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. New York.1971). 128

⁷⁸ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 138

After failing to win the consulship in 63 BCE, Catilina again ran for the consulship position of 62 BCE. His opposition was Decimus Junius Silanus, Lucius Licinius Murena and Servius Sulpicius Rufus. With Sulpicius and Catilina, both patricians, running for election allowed only one patrician as consul in one year.⁸⁰ Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a close friend of Cicero's, threw his hat into the election for the consulship of 62 BCE which was apparently a strategy by the optimates and Cicero to keep Catilina from winning the consulship that year.⁸¹ Once again, Catilina lost in his bid for the consulship. This time, however, he believed that Cicero had intentionally targeted the legislation for him which, in fact, may have been the case. "Despairing of gaining power by conventional means, Catilina now started his conspiracy."⁸²As part of the conspiracy, Catilina decided it necessary to kill Cicero and others during the elections held later in the year. Historian Michael Parenti, however, questions Catilina's intentions. Parenti, citing the ineptitude of Catilina and his gang of assassins, believes this was nothing more than a Ciceronian invective. He comments doubtfully, "Given Catilina's bloodthirsty designs, why were no murders committed? Assassination was hardly an

⁷⁹ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 20.

⁸⁰ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 139.

⁸¹ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

⁸² Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

unknown accomplishment in Roman politics, yet Catilina and his bumbling gang seemed never to get the hang of it.”⁸³

Twice defeated for election to the consulship and shamed before the Senate and people by Cicero with the Catilinarian Orations, Catalina ignored the bounds of propriety and accelerated the plot to overthrow the government even as he campaigned for the 62 BCE consulship elections.⁸⁴ Catilina’s second loss removed his desire to gain the consulship through legitimate channels.⁸⁵ However, Cicero was equal to the task. Cicero had for many years, developed a plethora of spies. Apparently, he had some of them watching Catilina since 65 BCE. He learned, from one of his key spies, Fulvia, via her lover Quintus Caelius, of the plans for the Second Catalinarian Conspiracy and immediately informed Cicero.

Cicero’s many spies reported that Catilina was still planning to assassinate Cicero and several other senators who did not support Catilina.⁸⁶ As part of the planning, two assassins were to go to Cicero’s house to call on Cicero later that night as if to make a ceremonial visit.⁸⁷ They would then enter Cicero’s house and kill him. When the

⁸³ Michael Parenti, *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome*, (New Press People's History) (91), The New Press. Kindle Edition, 108.

⁸⁴ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 139.

⁸⁵ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

⁸⁶ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 22.

⁸⁷ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

assassins arrived at Cicero's house, however, they found it closed and highly defended.⁸⁸ Curiously, these would-be assassins then simply turned around and went home. Cicero immediately postponed the elections until September in the hopes of dispelling any further attempts. Cicero claimed the action avoided further assassinations; but more likely, postponement of the election forced many of Catilina's followers, especially the ex-Sullan military, to return home to their harvest crops. These former soldiers were the only military force in Italy at the time and it seems that Cicero felt it prudent to move the soldiers out of Rome.

At the 62 elections held in September of that year, Catilina arrived with a gang of armed men. After Cicero had learned of Catalina's gang of armed men, he kept an armed group of supporters around him at all times. Cicero, himself, wore an armored breastplate under his toga which he "inadvertently" advertised.⁸⁹ On the night of October 18 or 19, Crassus came to Cicero's house and handed him a collection of letters addressed to several prominent individuals. The letters warned them to leave Rome quickly and that Catilina planned to attack the city.⁹⁰ Once Catilina decided to use force to gain his consulship, Rawson notes that Crassus and Caesar ceased support of Catilina.⁹¹ Sallust notes, "...there were those who believed that M. Licinius Crassus was not unaware of Catalina's plans; that, because his enemy Pompey was in charge of a great army, he was

⁸⁸ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

⁸⁹ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

⁹⁰ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

⁹¹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 71.

willing to let anyone's resources increase in opposition to Pompey's power; and that he would easily become the leader when the conspiracy succeeded."⁹² As Plutarch notes, Crassus brought the letters to Cicero, "wishing to do something to clear himself from the suspicion he lay under because of his friendship with Catalina."⁹³

On November 6, the conspirators met at Laeca's house to discuss upcoming plans. Catilina would travel to Manlius' camp while others would travel to various local areas to take charge of the uprisings. Meanwhile, those men who remained in Rome would partition the city to organize assassinations and to set fire to the city. Cicero immediately called the Senate to meet the next day.⁹⁴ At the Senate session, Cicero handed out the addressed letters—Cicero read only Crassus' letters—and asked the other addressees to read their letters."⁹⁵ Meanwhile, Catilina remained in Rome since there remained no hard evidence since all of the letters were anonymous. The alleged incident provided the Senate, for the first-time, with concrete evidence supporting Cicero's prior claims. Up to this time, the Senate had not seen anything to support Cicero's assertions. They believed that Cicero was grandstanding in an effort to make a name for him by creating a crisis situation that did not exist. Almost immediately, Quintus Arias reported to the Senate on October 20, news arrived from Faesulae. Gaius Manlius, a former Sullan army centurion,

⁹² Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 18.

⁹³ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 285.

⁹⁴ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 140.

⁹⁵ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 18.

was preparing an armed resistance against Rome.⁹⁶ Once again, Cicero called a meeting of the Senate and on November 7 gave the First Catilinarian speech in which he directly accused Catilina of planning an insurrection against Rome. Catilina asked Cicero and the Senate ordered him into exile.⁹⁷ The Senate did not reply. According to Sallust's version, Catilina protested his innocence and replied that he was a patrician not just a mere squatter from Arpinum—a line of defense not well received. Berry reports that Catilina reportedly fled the Senate chambers claiming he was going into exile. (Later, in 46 BCE, Cicero refuted Sallust and claimed that Catilina said nothing and just abruptly left.)⁹⁸ Catilina left Rome that night with 300 armed supporters to meet up with Manlius in contrast to Catilina's claim that he was traveling to Marseilles and going into exile. One week later, reports reached Rome that Catilina had arrived in Manlius' camp. The Senate responded and passed the *senatus consultum ultimum*, SCU.⁹⁹

Having learned of the passage of the SCU that classified Catilina and himself as enemies of the state, Manlius began his open rebellion and started marching on Rome. Later that same month, news arrived from Faesulae that the rebellion had begun. The Senate received reports of slave revolts in Capua, Apulia and Picenum. The Senate also offered rewards for any information about the conspiracy; however, interestingly, no one

⁹⁶ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 24.

⁹⁷ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 75.

⁹⁸ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 143.

⁹⁹ Oxford Classical Dictionary, Fourth. Oxford, United Kingdom, 2012, 1354.

came forward. Up to this point, the urban plebs had supported Catilina; however later, when Cicero disclosed Catilina's plan to set fire to sections of the city during Cicero's Third Catilinarian oration they turned in adamant support of Cicero.

Before leaving Rome, and hoping to increase the number of supporters, Lentulus and other senior members of the conspiracy decided to meet with the Allobroge ambassadors in the hope of securing their cooperation to overthrow the Roman Senate.

¹⁰⁰ The Allobroges were a Gaelic tribe who, as Cicero learned in late November, had traveled to Rome to appeal the oppressive Roman taxes and request relief. The Senate denied the appeal. Before leaving Rome, Lentulus asked the Allobroges to join the conspiracy and once the conspiracy was victorious, the Allobroges could gain relief.¹⁰¹ Cicero asked Fabius, the liaison for the Allobroges, if his clients did not know of the conspiracy; he should contact them to determine the seriousness and inclinations of his clients. He immediately informed Cicero that the Allobroges favored the side of Cicero and the Senate. Cicero asked the Allobroges leaders to negotiate with the conspirators and to obtain documentary proof of the conspiracy by persuading the conspirators to write and sign letters to the tribe's Senate.¹⁰² Once Cicero received the letters signed by the conspirators, the Senate and the people would see them. The senior leaders of Catalina also sent a messenger who carried an unsigned letter allegedly from Catalina

¹⁰⁰ Cicero's Four Catalinarian speeches delivered: first, before the senate, the second and third before the people, and the final before the senate wherein Cicero demanded Catalina and his followers leave Rome immediately.

¹⁰¹ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 30.

¹⁰² Anthony Everitt. *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*. (New York: Random House, 2003).106

inviting the delegation to visit him on their way home. Now, Romans allying themselves with the Gauls, their traditional enemy, was anathema to most Romans.¹⁰³ The Gauls as a nation were Rome's most mortal enemy both before the Punic Wars and after the wars. They had invaded Italy, beaten northern Italian tribes such as Etruria, invaded Rome and sacked it in 390 BCE--an act of sacrilege that still burned in the hearts of Romans and Italians. Forces arranged by Cicero sprang a trap at the Milvian Bridge during the night of December 2-3, when the Allobroges ambassadors were leaving Rome. At the bridge, the Allobroges surrendered the letters in question. When Cicero received the signed and sealed letters, he immediately called a meeting of the Senate for the next day. The conspirators Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius were brought to Cicero. Cicero placed the four conspirators under house arrest and assigned each of them to the households of various members of the Senate. Four additional conspirators escaped the trap in addition to Caeparius who sensed a trap and escaped. Soldiers captured Caeparius and returned him to Rome. (Rome did not have any jails).¹⁰⁴ The authors of the three letters read them aloud to the Senate after acknowledging their seals on the letters. The evidence incriminated them sufficiently. The Senate for his efforts in preventing this uprising thanked Cicero. Catulus and Cato hailed Cicero as "Pater Patria" (father of his

¹⁰³ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 144.

¹⁰⁴ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 178. Rome had no jails. As such, the prisoners were assigned to Senate members and placed under house arrest. The only type of secured detention facility in Rome was known as the *Tullianum*. Batstone notes, "It had two chambers: the lower one, the Tullianum, was subterranean, although not originally (middle of the third century) built underground; the ground level had risen over the years. This was the death chamber. A second chamber was built at the end of the second century to serve as a detention room for those waiting their sentences.

country).¹⁰⁵ The Senate ordered a Thanksgiving feast to acknowledge Cicero to the gods.¹⁰⁶ When the meeting ended, Cicero walked outside into the Forum and gave the people a full explanation of the events that had just finished. This speech, known as the Third Catilinarian, caused a complete turnaround in the public's opinion of Cicero and the Senate after the people learned of the conspirators plans to set the city ablaze.¹⁰⁷

The Senate met again on December 5 to discuss the fate of the five conspirators in custody. Cicero first called upon consul-elect Silanus. Silanus and 14 ex-consuls recommended the “extreme penalty.” Murena, the other consul-elect stated his agreement with Silanus. Caesar, however, opposed the “extreme penalty” and suggested the sentence of life imprisonment for the conspirators under house arrest placed at various houses throughout Italy—a totally illogical proposal however one that demonstrated to the proletariats that he was looking out for their interests. Finally, after Cicero summarized the two positions, he launched into his Fourth Catilinarian speech where he recommends the death penalty. Cicero, though, avoided stating his opinion one way or another. At this point in the drama, Cicero's excessive egotism came to the fore. After intervening in the debate over Caesar's proposal or Cato's proposal, Cicero “begged the senators not to worry about his own position if they declared for death; he had always been in danger in his consulship. Nevertheless, Cicero's egotism had a strong hold on him in this supreme moment. He was ready for, he would even prefer, he said, a decision

¹⁰⁵ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 146.

¹⁰⁶ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 146.

¹⁰⁷ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 147.

for death, relying on the unity of all classes that had been achieved and the support he was sure the Senate would give to one who had deserved a place above the great heroes of old, above even Marius and Pompey.”¹⁰⁸ After the speech, Silanus weakened and changed his position to life imprisonment. As Berry notes, only Catulus remained adamant in voting for the death penalty. Cato then spoke. He chastised the senators for their turn-tail positions and urged the death penalty. Once again, the majority opinion of the Senate shifted back to favor the death penalty. After he finished, Cato received a standing ovation.¹⁰⁹ After much debate, life sentences, as recommended by Caesar, were rejected and the death penalty once again approved by the Senate. Cicero, supported by Cato and the majority of the Senate, urged immediate execution due to the discovered attempt by slaves and freedmen of Lentulus and Cethegus to free the prisoners as well as deter the Catilinarian army from marching toward Rome.¹¹⁰ On December 5, Cicero and other nobles marched the conspirators to the Tullianum, the Roman concept of a prison. The Tullianum, according to Sallust, was a, “depression [in the ground with] a dome made with stone arches [overhead], however the squalor, murk, and stench make it hideous and terrible to behold.”¹¹¹ The condemned conspirators—Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius and Caeparius—were lowered one by one into the Tullianum (the only way in or out of the pit). All five went down into the underground cave were garroted.

¹⁰⁸ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 83.

¹⁰⁹. Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 149.

¹¹⁰ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 146.

¹¹¹ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 43.

Cicero acted decisively and immediately to remove the danger to the Republic. He then announced to the gathered crowd that all five were dead, the silence was broken with thunderous cheers. Catulus hailed Cicero as the “father of his country”¹¹² while Poplicola put forth a motion that Cicero should be awarded the Civic Crown—the highest military award—even though he was a civilian ¹¹³ The question remains, however, as to why the Senate did not remand the conspirators to the Roman courts and tried them for treason? Plutarch notes Cicero’s dilemma in contemplating the fate of the conspirators:

“[Cicero believed that] The extreme penalty was the proper one for such crimes, but he shrank from inflicting it, his reluctance being due partly to the kindness of his nature and partly also to the fact that he did not want to appear to be abusing his power too high-handedly in ruthlessly stamping out men who belonged to the greatest families and who had powerful friends in Rome. Yet he feared danger from them in the future if he treated them less severely. He believed that if they suffered any penalty milder than death they would, so far from accepting the situation, break out again and stick at nothing; they would remain as wicked as ever and would merely have fresh reasons for being infuriated. He himself, too, would be thought weak and unmanly, particularly as his reputation for courage among the people of Rome was not in any case a very high one.”¹¹⁴

Further, Terentia had rushed to Cicero to inform him that the “goddess was sending him a great light to promise him both safety and glory.”¹¹⁵ Thus with the approval of the good goddess and upon Cato’s and Cicero’s lead, the Senate ignoring its mandate as an

¹¹² Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 146-7.

¹¹³ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 146-7.

¹¹⁴ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 292-3.

¹¹⁵ Plutarch. *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*. (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968). 293

assembly of advice only, acted in a magisterial capacity, and determined that the conspirators should be executed. The Senate made the ultimate decision and, led by Cicero, 5 Roman citizens went to their death without trial. After Cicero announced to the gathered crowd that, “Vixere--They [the conspirators] had lived,”¹¹⁶ which was the Roman way to “avoid a direct and unlucky mention of death.”¹¹⁷ Friends and prominent members of the Senate led Cicero to the house of one of his friends while crowds lined the route holding torches lighting the way for the entourage. Cicero could not return home since his wife, Terentia, was hosting the exclusive female ritual: the Bona Dea ceremony.¹¹⁸

Ultimately, Cicero broke the law as had the entire Senate in an effort, they believed, to save the city. It was a highly prized right of every Roman citizen to receive a trial and be heard before an adjudication of death was handed down. With the Senate’s most powerful tool, the *senatus consultum ultimum*,¹¹⁹ the Senate requested that Cicero to take what steps he deemed necessary to protect Rome, an ultimate decree, known as the *senatus consultum ultimum*, against Catalina, his co-conspirators and the imminent military attack. The SCU, however, was not a law—it was a decree by the Senate that

¹¹⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 85. This phrase was used by the very superstitious Romans to prevent an unfortunate calling of death at meetings.

¹¹⁷ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 111.

¹¹⁸ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 292.

¹¹⁹ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 29.

was not legally binding except by custom.¹²⁰ Roman law Instead, the SCU authorized the consuls to a magistrate, “the power to raise an army, wage war, coerce allies and citizens in any way necessary, to exercise complete authority and jurisdiction at home and in the military. Otherwise, without an order of the people, the consul had no right to any of these actions.”¹²¹The SCU was the strongest of senatorial recommendations equivalent to a modern day declaration of a state of emergency. Cicero, as consul, magistrates and the courts held the responsibility for upholding Roman law. While the Senate could debate whether the conspirators should receive the death penalty, they could recommend that the consul take whatever steps were necessary to save Rome through enforcement of the SCU. Conversely, by utilizing the SCU, Cicero, as consul, held dictatorial powers to take any action deemed necessary. Thus, the SCU raised legal questions that went unanswered. A key question raised was the limitation of the people’s power after declaration of the SCU. For example, could Tribunes veto a SCU? If the answer was affirmative, Cicero’s actions—any actions—were legal and did not require approval of the people (Tribunate approval). Conversely, if the SCU decree did not preclude a Tribunate veto, the question then raised was, “What precluded any of the Tribunes from vetoing the Senatorial decree?” It appears that the Senate placed the onus of executing aristocrats in Cicero’s hands and it was only an afterthought that the Tribunes thought of exercising the Tribunate veto.

¹²⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 97-98.

¹²¹ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 24.

Cicero would later claim that he had merely obeyed the Senate's orders: this falsifies the constitutional position. He was empowered to take what actions he deemed necessary by the SCU decree. Cicero was not empowered by the Senate to put Roman citizens to death even though the Senate debated the issue and determined that execution was the best decision. He also tried to convince people that the conspirators lost the constitutional right of trial and appeal because they lost their citizenship rights by their own actions—a spurious attempt to justify his actions.¹²² This reasoning is closer to the truth since Cicero, as per the SCU's authority, had the legal authority to declare the conspirators as non-citizens. Further, if Caesar, as an opponent of executing the conspirators, understood the law, then Cicero had the authority to take whatever action was necessary to protect the state including execution of citizens. The issue would then shift to the question of whether or not the state was in dire need of protection. As Everitt notes, "However, it is interesting that in his intervention [during the Senate debate], Caesar did not raise the question of the legality of summary executions [as he had during the Rabirius trial]."¹²³ With the public disclosures of the conspiratorial plans and with the Senatorial SCU, Cicero had both public and Senate backing since the people realized that Cicero saved the city from a mass conflagration and, because he followed the Senate bidding to avoid a bloody conflict; however, history holds he had broken the law, and that the responsibility was his alone. Cicero accepted the responsibility and executed the

¹²² Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 154.

¹²³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 111.

conspirators as a result. Subsequently, Cicero's support of the people and the Senatorial support melted away.

Learning of the execution of the five conspirators, Catalina and Manlius' legions, comprised of disgruntled veterans and farmers, began to march on Rome.¹²⁴ However, the Catilinarian force of 10,000 soldiers had quickly dissolved to around three thousand soldiers. Troops mustered from around Rome and marched to meet Catalina and his forces; meanwhile, other Roman troops marched from Gaul down the Italian peninsula thus trapping Catalina's remaining legions. Realizing his troops were in the middle of a pincher movement and without hope of escape, Catalina bravely led the remaining troops into a battle where only one in five of Catalina's troops had weapons, the rest marched into battle with pitchforks and hoes.¹²⁵ "Catalina's army fought long and hard but in the end they were annihilated."¹²⁶ To show proof of his defeat, the commanding general Antonius sent Catalina's head to Rome to prove he was no more.¹²⁷ After the battle, Roman troops crushed other uprisings around Italy while other Romans placed on trial suspected followers of Catalina where the courts convicted them quickly and they went into exile. By mid-year 62 BCE, most of the conspirators were in exile.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010),43.

¹²⁵ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), 43.

¹²⁶ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 151.

¹²⁷ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 151.

¹²⁸ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 152.

On December 10, 63 BCE, 5 days after the execution of the five conspirators, the newly-elected tribunes for 62 BCE took office. One of the tribunes, brother-in-law of Pompey, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos (who housed Catilina while the Senate debated) immediately spoke out against Cicero and his actions regarding the fate of the five conspirators. On December 29, Nepos, under the direction of Pompey, vetoed Cicero's right to swear the traditional oath after successfully completing his term as consul.¹²⁹ Another tribune, Lucius Calpurnius Bestia, also refused to allow Cicero to give any speech other than the traditional affirmation oath that he had obeyed the laws during his tenure in office. When Cicero appealed to Metellus Nepos, Nepos replied, "...he could not go back on his public statement...that someone 'who had punished others without a hearing should not be given the right to speak himself.'"¹³⁰ The tribunes allowed Cicero to affirm only the traditional oath; however, when delivering the oath, he modified it. Rawson states, "Cicero was heard to swear not the ordinary formula, but that he saved his country and maintained her supremacy."¹³¹ The people's cheering ratified Cicero's oath. Cicero's oath was, in fact, a true statement and one that saved him from perjuring his statement under oath. From that point on, Nepos and other tribunes attacked Cicero at every opportunity: they attacked him during trials, in public and in the Senate. To prevent further Tribunate actions, the Senate passed a decree exempting anyone associated with the deaths of the conspirators mainly to protect Cicero.

¹²⁹ Pompey wanted to enhance his position and not have another person reflect as much favor as himself upon his return to Rome. c.f. Everitt 2003 p. 114

¹³⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 114.

¹³¹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 86.

Cicero had written a long, detailed letter to Pompey about his consulship to which Pompey responded coldly. Rawson notes, “As for Cicero, Pompey could not persuade himself to enthusiasm.”¹³² Later, in a letter to his friends, Cicero noted with his characteristic lack of humility trying to understand Pompey’s cold response and the public animosity, he wrote, “That the only citizen the Republic could not do without was myself.”¹³³ For Cicero, whose conceit veiled gnawing insecurities, the cold dismissal by his hero [Pompey] was deeply hurtful.¹³⁴ Cicero’s second letter to Pompey stated his hopes that he and Pompey “would be close cooperators on Pompey’s return.”¹³⁵ After the Senate exempted all participants, the frustrated Nepos left Rome to join Pompey in the east. The tribune’s action, however, acted as a harbinger of things to come for Cicero. Although Nepos had left Rome, other tribunes continued harassing Cicero for the duration of the year and into 61 BCE. Cicero knew the Senate’s support was waning but it seems he still did not know why. The plebeians followed the tribunes who abandoned Cicero after learning of Cicero’s optimate leanings during the agricultural bill debate in early 62 BCE; while the equites support weakened after Cicero backed two optimate based positions on the land law and the tax law.¹³⁶ Again, Cicero failed to comprehend

¹³² Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 93.

¹³³ Michael Parenti, *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome*, (New Press People's History), The New Press. Kindle Edition, 106.

¹³⁴ Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. First Anchor Books Edition 2003 New York, NY. Kindle Edition. Loc. 3269

¹³⁵ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 92.

¹³⁶ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 112.

the political climate in Rome: especially the strength of conviction held by the plebian tribunes and the growing discontent of the populace who followed them.

In a hubristic approach, Cicero believed he still basked in the support of the Senate led by Cato and, in particular, the optimate support he held during the Catilinarian hearings.¹³⁷ Everitt believes that Cicero knew of the possibility of a backlash to his actions by his insistence of consulting with and gaining approval of the Senate before acting against the five Catilinarian conspirators.¹³⁸ To this end, Cicero's intuition served him well. It seems that Cicero felt that by continual promotion and boasting of his actions during the conspiracy, the Senate, or the optimates at least, would continue their support. Cicero still had Senate optimate support but the support was wearing thin because of Cicero's incessant bragging in his need for recognition. Even so, the optimates still supported the actions taken by Cicero during his consulship despite their impatience with his braggadocio. As Plutarch notes, "One could attend neither the Senate nor a public meeting nor a session of the law courts without having to listen to endless repetitions of the story of Catiline and Lentulus."¹³⁹ While his opponents continually raised the issue that Cicero's actions as consul were illegal, Cicero also tried to maintain the position that legal precedent existed for taking the extraordinary steps of execution and that he was justified by the Senate's recommendation to take the necessary steps. Gruen continues, "[this] specious argument held that the men killed were enemies of the state and hence no

¹³⁷ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 109.

¹³⁸ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 108.

¹³⁹ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 296.

longer citizens.”¹⁴⁰ In fact, the SCU did permit Cicero to declare the conspirators enemies of the state and then execute them as opposing combatants to Rome. The SCU was an all-encompassing decree which, in fact, did grant extraordinary powers including the right for Cicero to declare the conspirators as enemies of the state; however, Cicero either did not foresee the many facets of this powerful law or was unwilling to take such necessary steps.

Cicero spent his entire adult career striving to achieve the consulship. His Achilles heel was the ever-present need for recognition and acceptance, an affliction impacting any struggle where acceptance was conditional. With election as consul, he and his family entered the ranks of nobility—a social class ranking second only to Patrician nobility—the struggle for acceptance ended.¹⁴¹ He could rise no further in society without the pedigree of the patricians. However, after years of effort, the glory surrounding the consulship lasted only five days before detractors such as Nepos began tearing down his mountain of lifetime achievement. Holland notes, “The fact that the gloss of his consulship was rapidly vanishing may have been upsetting to Cicero; however, it was a source of quiet satisfaction to most of his colleagues.”¹⁴² Every speech presented by Cicero, whether in court or before the Senate, for the rest of his life, never failed to remind his audience of the enormity of his efforts to preserve the country for

¹⁴⁰ Erich S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press Ltd. 1974), 244.

¹⁴¹ Defined as “a direct descendant of a consul through the male line.” Cicero: *Political Speeches* 2011) xvi.

¹⁴² Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic* (Kindle Locations 3329-3330). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

which Cato and Catulus proclaimed him “Pater Patrias” (Father of the Country)¹⁴³ for saving Rome.

The reality of 63 BCE, however, saw the plebeians and the populous follow the tribunes in opposition to Cicero’s actions while members of the Senate gradually removed their support leaving only the Senate optimates to support his actions. The Senate and optimates supported the *novus homo* Cicero as their candidate to prevent Catilina from gaining the power of a consulship from which they were successful. The optimates took what actions they deemed necessary to preserve the status quo. The fact that Cicero remained a *novus homo* without any standing within the privileged circle of the optimates was also one element involved in maintaining the status quo. For Cicero, lack of optimate acceptance was a bitter pill to swallow and increased his insecurities even more. In the following years, the actions taken by the optimates polarized Cicero’s view of all politicians based on their actions at the time of the Catilinarian conspiracy and their attitude toward Cicero after the conspiracy.¹⁴⁴

In the end, Cicero’s personal insecurities finalized the abandonment of the optimates with his excessive and continuous self-aggrandizement and constant need for acceptance. Plutarch notes: “...he made himself obnoxious to a number of people, not because of anything which he did wrong; however, because people grew tired of hearing him continually praising himself and magnifying his achievements.” Plutarch adds, “He went on to fill his books and writings with these praises of himself and made his style of

¹⁴³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 112.

¹⁴⁴ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 155.

speaking, which was so very pleasant and so exceedingly charming, boring and tedious to listen to, since this unpleasing habit clung to him like fate.”¹⁴⁵ Cicero’s obnoxious self-promoting with the attendant negative results questions the Cicero’s ability to comprehend the impact of his insecurities on both his political and understanding of social innuendo. Granted, Cicero was influential, momentarily, to gain total support of the people and government of Rome; but, the support lasted only for a short time. Cicero met the needs of his supporters—a complimentary blending of various political interests unified to attain an agreed result. The Catilinian Conspiracy gave testimony to Cicero’s abilities--his strengths and weaknesses--and to the struggle necessary to overcome his self-aggrandizement and convince others he had in fact confronted the challenges brought about by the Catilina Conspiracy. Afterward, with the rejection of the Senate optimates and the equites, his need for recognition and acceptance grow geometrically in an attempt to offset the rapidly dwindling support. Rawson notes, “He did, during and after his consulship, boast unconscionably of his achievement [Catilina Conspiracy], even if with occasional apologies, and he had, even by Roman standards with their high value for glory, an insatiable thirst to hear others praise him—the result, perhaps, of an underlying insecurity rooted in both his origin and temperament.”¹⁴⁶

Cicero soon recognized that he should propagandize his position (as others had in the past) before he lost all support. He began looking for the ideal vehicle that allowed him a platform where he could promote his achievements. The ideal opportunity arose

¹⁴⁵ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 296-7.

¹⁴⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 91.

when students asked Cicero for copies of his speeches and notes from his consulship. He gladly provided Latin and Greek prose, and Greek poetry about this consulship--¹⁴⁷ The *Catilinian Orations*,¹⁴⁸ which most likely received their final revised editorial touches in 60 BCE that incorporate frequent references to the theme of a hero saving the day, as Cicero embellished his actions during his consulship with a heightened grandeur and significance.¹⁴⁹ In addition to preparing a volume of his consular speeches, he composed in 60 BCE an account in Greek of his suppression of the conspiracy, as, too, did Atticus, who played a minor albeit noteworthy role in the events of December 5, 63 BCE.¹⁵⁰ Cicero also composed a Latin poem on his consulship (*Consultum suis*), a work completed by March 60 BCE.¹⁵¹ Statements in the poem presented an ambitious challenge to the accepted hierarchy of values in ancient Rome; nevertheless, his writings served their intended purpose by succeeded in portraying Cicero as a man of non-violence—a smart move given the prevailing accusation of *crudelitas*.¹⁵² Cicero's rush to compose such works himself smacked both of his overzealous desperation and conceit, (others had refused to prepare embellished prose relating to Cicero's actions during the

¹⁴⁷ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol. I*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). *Att.* XXII.22.1.20. 123

¹⁴⁸ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol. I*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 171 (*Att.* 2.1.3).145

¹⁴⁹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), cf.N.4. 217.

¹⁵⁰ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol. I*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). *Att.* 1.19.10, 2.1.2, and 2.1.7

¹⁵¹ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol. I*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 145

¹⁵² Oxford University Press. *Oxford Latin*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.48 def. "cruelty, barbarity"

conspiracy) and it was not hard to find his enemies who ridiculed his efforts.¹⁵³ In the four *Catilinarians*, the four speeches delivered by Cicero during the conspiracy, Cicero made it clear in a letter to Atticus (a) that he has just committed these speeches to paper (60 BCE)¹⁵⁴ and (b) that Atticus has not seen them before thus providing historical evidence that they were a first publication and not a reissue of prior writings.¹⁵⁵ The question arises then whether the four “original” *Catilinarian* speeches are a true record of what Cicero said on the several occasions in 63 BCE¹⁵⁶; or, whether they were the edited revisions, as were the other edited speeches, designed to enhance Cicero’s reputation rather than to provide an accurate rendering of the original speeches. Some passages seem to indicate a high possibility that they respond to the historical situation of the years after Cicero stepped down from his consulship.¹⁵⁷ The existing evidence is inconclusive; however, a pervasive apologia runs through the speeches which would serve Cicero in 60 BCE and seems surprising in any other context in which the executions of 5 December occurred. Almost 30 years later, Sallust would use these same notes to reconstruct the events of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Although no evidence is available to either deny or confirm the veracity of the conspiratorial events of 63 BCE or

¹⁵³ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 153. (cf. *Pis.* 72-5; *Phil.* 2.20, *Off.* 1.77; *Quint. Inst.* 11.1.23; *Sall. [Cic.] Inv.* 5)

¹⁵⁴ Mary Beard, “SPQR: A History of Rome.” New York. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015. 44

¹⁵⁵ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 62.

¹⁵⁶ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 153.

¹⁵⁷ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 154. (e.g. *Cat.* 1.4, 3.14, 3.15, 3.26-29a, 4.1-3, 4.9-14).

their replication in 60 BCE, it appears that Cicero modified the original story of the conspiracy to put his actions in a more favorable light.

The Sallust history of the Catalinarian Conspiracy is the most contemporary recording of the event; however, some caveats remain about Sallust's authorship that prevents a total acceptance. First, Sallust was not in Rome at the time of the Conspiracy or the subsequent events.¹⁵⁸ Further, even as a relative contemporary of Cicero's, Rawson notes that over thirty years elapsed between the time of the Conspiracy and Sallust's rendition of it.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, Sallust was an ardent supporter of Caesar who promoted Caesar positively at every opportunity. William Batstone describes Sallust as a ne'er-do-well in a career characterized by one failure after another.¹⁶⁰ The Senate expelled him, he was an unsuccessful military leader and a corrupt magistrate convicted of corruption. During the trial of Titus Milo, he and two others publicly denounced Cicero and Milo. Ultimately, Sallust apologized to Cicero although a strained relationship remained between the two romans. Finally, Sallust actually requested Cicero's 60 BCE consulship notes, speeches etc. that included the four conspiracy speeches. Later, Plutarch utilized Sallust's writings as a source for his biography on Cicero as did Cassius Dio--thus the similarities of each.

Cicero never passed up any opportunity of reminding people in his speeches of how as consul he had saved Rome because his actions were never universally accepted

¹⁵⁸ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 151.

¹⁵⁹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 62.

¹⁶⁰ Sallust, *Catiline Conspiracies, Jugurthine Wars, Histories*, (Translated by William W. Batson); (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010), xviii.

and with his insecurities needing constant reinforcement of his actions to protect public opinion from turning against him.¹⁶¹ Although the *Catilinarians* did not save Cicero's waning popularity, by the time of Virgil, a century later, the speeches were literary classics.¹⁶² Cicero reached the highest elected post of Roman government and achieved the ultimate goal of the *cursus honorum* thereby overcoming class and ethnic bias. Through his achievement of election to the consulship, Cicero and his family became *Nobiles*.¹⁶³ Sadly, the prominence was short-lived. In a matter of days, Cicero began slipping from the apex of Roman politics. First to desert him were the Tribunes, then the people, next came a weakening in his core support, the equites; finally, the optimates.

Anthony Trollop summarized Cicero's political rise and fall , "Then came the one twelve-month, the apex of his fortunes; and after that, for the twenty years that followed, there fell upon him one misery after another--one trouble on the head of another trouble--so cruelly that the reader, knowing the manner of the Romans, almost wonders that he condescended to live."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 154.

¹⁶² Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), 155.

¹⁶³ Oxford Classical Dictionary, Fourth, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2012. By the 3rd Century BCE, the term defines a new, plebian oligarchical class. The new class were called *nobiles* or "known" people. By the 1st century, the term had narrowed to "imagines" i.e. "wax portrait-masks that were prominently displayed in the houses and in funeral processions of Romans who had held higher magistracies. Families 'known' to the public through these processions formed the 'nobilitas'." By the 3rd century BCE, the term had acquired a political definition of 'descended from a consul'.

¹⁶⁴ Anthony Trollop. *Life of Cicero*. on-line literature.com/Anthony-trollope/life-of-cicero. (Accessed October 20, 2018).

BONA DEA—THE GOOD GODDESS

During the ensuing months of 62 BCE, Cicero went from a hubristic high note so much so that he talked to anyone and everyone and “became so obnoxious...because people grew tired of hearing him continually praising himself and magnifying his achievements.¹⁶⁵ Since Cicero, as a *novus homo*, had no Roman lineage, the only claim to fame Cicero felt he possessed was his year as consul. Cicero, at first, did not take as seriously as he probably should the detractors who criticized his handling of the Catilina Conspiracy; particularly relating to the execution of 5 Roman citizens without a trial. Since that time, the newly elected tribunes, the retired tribunes and their constituent plebeians had kept an ever-increasing harassment of Cicero—something Cicero failed to understand. His detractors harassed him whenever he ventured outside of home in spite of the optimate controlled Senate who had passed a law exempting from prosecution all participants involved in the execution of the five romans. While that helped abate some of the legal pressure, Cicero’s public opinion continued to decline.

However, Cicero believed public exposure as much as possible. As such, Cicero made every effort to remain a prominent stance in the public eye which included constantly reiterating his saving the country to anyone that listened: the people, the courts and the Senate. Neal Wood notes that Cicero, “always considered [the suppression of the Catilina Conspiracy] to be the high point of his political career, a fearless feat of statesmanship of which he was still unabashedly proud twenty years later.”

¹⁶⁵ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 296.

Cicero not so humbly stated: “For never was the republic in more serious peril, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsel and my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the most desperate traitors—dropped to the ground of their own accord! What achievement in war, then, was ever so great? What triumph can be compared with that?”¹⁶⁶

Wood tempers Cicero’s boastfulness when he states, “Although the exact nature of the conspiracy is still in doubt among scholars, it seems that Rome was not on the verge of social revolution, governmental overthrow, or civil war.”¹⁶⁷ Perhaps the Senate and the optimates were correct in the regard of Cicero as exaggerating the conspiracy claims. When the tribunes announced their displeasure with Cicero’s actions surrounding the oath, plebeians had followed the tribunes and turned a deaf ear to these utterances by Cicero thus leaving him with little plebeian support. Cicero noticed the departure; however, he dismissed it as the fickleness of the “plebs sordida,” the “great unwashed.”¹⁶⁸ The plebeian agitation began against him before his term expired because of his action while consul. Brunt notes that he never again would enjoy the popularity he once claimed, blaming the ‘wicked’ citizens who found it popular to attack him.¹⁶⁹ He was more concerned with the fact that his *equites* support had receded. Yet, Cicero still held some influence in 62 BCE as first speaker in the Senate: a privilege that lasted until the

¹⁶⁶ Neal Wood. *Cicero’s Social and Political Thought*. (Berkeley and Oxford. University of California Press.1988). 51

¹⁶⁷ Neal Wood. *Cicero’s Social and Political Thought*. (Berkeley and Oxford. University of California Press.1988). 51

¹⁶⁸ Tom Holland. *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*. (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. First Anchor Books Edition 2003) New York, NY. Kindle Edition. Loc. 243

¹⁶⁹ P.A. Brunt, *Social Conflicts In The Roman Republic*, (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. New York.1971), 133.

end of 62 BCE. Although unknown by Cicero at the time, influential individuals outside the locales of Rome postured to gain more influence in future Roman politics. These detractors maneuvered to diminish Cicero at every opportunity.

Pompey followed events in Rome from his military headquarters in Greece even while campaigning against Mithridates through his agents that he dispatched to handle his affairs. He, initially, asked his brother-in-law Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos to get a law passed to recall Pompey to Rome to fight against Catilina; however, during Cicero's consulship, that threat passed. Next, Pompey instructed Nepos to besmirch Cicero and Cicero's consulship hoping to lessen Cicero's influence. Rawson notes, "As for Cicero, Pompey could not persuade himself to enthusiasm."¹⁷⁰ Metellus Nepos, as one of the tribunes for Pompey, knew precisely what to do. Metellus Nepos began a negative propaganda campaign against Cicero that began on December 10th—the day the tribunes-elect assumed their offices and Metellus Nepos as an outgoing tribune, twenty days before Cicero's last day of his consulship. On the last day of Cicero's consulship, tradition held that the outgoing consuls would attest that they had faithfully obeyed the laws and carried out the wishes of the State. Normally, in addition to the swearing of the oath, the outgoing consuls summarized their accomplishments during their term in office.¹⁷¹ Nepos, as tribune in charge of the proceedings and Pompey's agent, saw an opening. When it came time for Cicero to speak, Nepos "vetoed" Cicero's speech and

¹⁷⁰ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 93.

¹⁷¹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 86.

stated he would only allow Cicero to swear his oath.¹⁷² Cicero was quite aware of the implications caused by these actions: Nepos and his boss, Pompey, had aligned with the *populares* movement and Caesar, and Cicero was one of their targets. As Rawson notes, “to the chagrin of the tribune the people greeted [Cicero’s] words with enthusiasm.”¹⁷³

Whether Cicero was aware of the growing antagonism by the *populares* against him or not is unclear. Cicero, while still inebriated from his increase in *dignitas* from the Catalina incident, decided that, as savior of the country, he needed a new house...not just any house; but a house befitting his [hubristically imagined] popularity—the former house of Crassus on the Palentine Hill that was adjacent to Publius Clodius Pulcher and his family.¹⁷⁴ Cicero borrowed heavily to obtain the necessary 3.5 million sesterces needed to purchase this house. The house was close to the Forum, close to where all the activity of any given day occurred and, most importantly, displayed the prominence necessary to satisfy the demands of Cicero’s insecurities.¹⁷⁵

Meanwhile, Pompey lands at Brundisium after the close of the Mithridatic Wars. Cicero notes his bitterness in letters to Atticus about his frustration with Pompey and his disingenuousness. Cicero noted,

As you said, he [Pompey] began to praise me when he found he did not dare to criticize...he pretends regard, intimacy and affection for me, and praises me in words, but underneath it is easy

¹⁷² Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 296.

¹⁷³ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 86.

¹⁷⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 115-116.

¹⁷⁵ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 116.

to see that he is jealous. There is nothing courteous, nothing straightforward, nothing politically superior, nothing honorable, nothing courageous, nothing generous there.”¹⁷⁶

After his support of Pompey in the Senate, Cicero’s detractors seemed to reduce their animosity toward Cicero. His complaints about Pompey soon ended with the events surrounding the Bona Dea Incident.

In December of 62 BCE, Cicero’s new neighbor, Publius Clodius Pulcher, decided to stir things up at the annual Bona Dea festival—a festival held exclusively for women. Annually, Romans celebrated the first half of the Bona Dea festival in early December. The December festival was held at the home of a senior magistrate’s wife—usually the consul’s house as was the case in 63 BCE when Cicero’s wife, Terentia, hosted the festival. The consuls for 62 BCE were Decimus Silanus and Licinius Murena. For some reason, Caesar’s mother, Aurelia, at the house of the Pontifex Maximus, Julius Caesar, hosted the 62 BCE celebrations. As usual, the Vestal Virgins assisted Aurelia as well as Caesar’s wife Pompeia.¹⁷⁷ The second half of the annual ritual occurred in May of each year at the Bona Dea temple located at the base of the Aventine hill.

The Bona Dea religion was the most enigmatic religion in Rome; somewhat based upon the Greek goddess of agriculture Demeter whose Roman equivalent was Ceres. The exclusivity of the ritual only allowed women to attend the festival and prohibited males from participating in the religion or even knowing what the actual rituals were. Secrecy was so strict that women were not allowed to disclose the name of the deity thus, even the

¹⁷⁶ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1975), 93.

¹⁷⁷ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 117.

goddess' name was unknown hence the title (but not the name) "The Good Goddess", or Bona Dea¹⁷⁸ was used for lack of a more definitive name. Women performed the ritual in secret to benefit Rome and the state.¹⁷⁹ What is known is that during the December ritual, women were allowed to drink undiluted wine and dance—both taboo in Roman tradition at any other time. Reports also show the sacrifice of a sow as the main offering of the December ritual. Further, in the house where the celebration occurred, women removed or covered anything male prior to the performance of the rituals and they covered the male busts and statues. History notes little else about the religion or the religions' rituals.

When the Bona Dea goddess came to Rome from Greece after the end of the Second Punic War, it rapidly spread throughout the peninsula and quickly became one of the larger annual religious ceremonies. The Vestal Virgins maintained the Bona Dea religious ritual requirements in Rome and religious matrons throughout the provinces attended the shrines and ceremonies outside of Rome. Men knew only two things about the religion: it excluded them from the ceremonies; and, as the strongest prohibition against men: if a man defiled the ritual, the sanctity of the ritual tainted the ceremony placing the welfare of the state in jeopardy. For that sacrilege, the penalty was death.

In 62 BCE, Clodius, the thirty-year old, quaestor-elect threw caution to the wind and challenged both Roman law and religious dogma when he attempted to affect a liaison with his lover in the residence where the Bona Dea ceremony was taking place.

¹⁷⁸ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 117.

¹⁷⁹ Oxford Classical Dictionary, Fourth, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1340.

He and his lover, Caesar's wife, Pompeia, reasoned that the distraction of the ceremony worked to their benefit and offered them a window of opportunity. In all likelihood, the entire affair was nothing more than a lark perpetrated by a young man flaunting the conventions of society;¹⁸⁰ however, what was a lark to Publius Clodius Pulcher, "Clodius," was a violation that tainted the religious ritual thus placing the welfare of the State in danger.

At dark, after the festivities began, Clodius donned the clothes of a woman and entered the home disguised as one of the female musicians. His plan was to enter the residence and make his way to his lover's room where, alone, they would have the entire night to themselves. Once inside the house of the Pontifex Maximus, Julius Caesar, he became lost and, while wandering around a maid to the mistress of the house asked him if he needed assistance. He tried unsuccessfully to disguise the deepness of his voice and the disguise was discovered almost immediately as the maid ran screaming to inform her mistress. Aurelia immediately ordered the house sealed and searched. It was not long after that Clodius was discovered a short time later hiding under a bed in a maid's room.¹⁸¹

Pontiffs met shortly following the incident and the pontifical college decided to place Clodius on trial for breaking the religious traditions of Rome. When Caesar learned of the incident, the pontifex maximus immediately divorced his wife, Pompeia. When

¹⁸⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 118.

¹⁸¹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 117.

asked why Caesar divorced her, he said, “Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion.”¹⁸² Caesar later declined to give testimony against Clodius claiming ignorance of the affair which is highly doubtful since the incident occurred in his house, he was the pontifex maximus who chaired the meeting discussing the incident, his mother Aurelia had informed him of the incident and, his wife, Pompeia, who was Clodius’ intended lover, probably confessed her infidelity to Caesar. More likely, Caesar did not wish to give testimony against Clodius and create any animosity between him and the Clodii—one of Rome’s very influential and powerful family’s enmity. Clodius came from a powerful family, the patrician Claudii, and Clodius had just begun to make his mark on the Roman political scene after being elected as a quaestor. The Claudii “had produced consuls in every generation since the foundation of the Republic—a house, too, with a remarkable traditions of arrogant and individualistic behavior as well as vast patronage in the Greek East.”¹⁸³ Caesar’s decision was politically motivated. Caesar realized the power and wealth of the Clodii and by keeping silent, Clodius would owe Caesar a favor: a type of political gamesmanship often employed by Caesar. Unfortunately, Cicero, when given the opportunity, failed to show the same level of political insight.

The trial for religious sacrilege began in July, 61 BCE. Immediately, a jury biased in favor of Clodius was formed. “Crassus, Clodius’ shadowy financier, happy as ever to make trouble for the Senate, came forward with funds to bribe the jurors.”¹⁸⁴ The jurors

¹⁸² Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*. Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2006).147

¹⁸³ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 94.

¹⁸⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 122-3.

asked for a guard to protect them—a request implying steps taken to make the trial a fair one. However, almost immediately after the incident, Clodius’ men began their intimidation and bribery using Crassus’ money to sway the jury in favor of Clodius’ acquittal. Clodius maintained he had been 90 miles away in the Etruscan town of Interamna when the incident occurred and that he was being confused with someone else. Caesar didn’t testify although his mother, Aurelia, and daughter, Julia, testified they had seen Clodius in the house on the night in question. When Cicero testified, he stated that he saw Clodius in Rome on the day in question, thus refuting Clodius’ statement that he was in Interamna—a town controlled by Clodius and his gangs—far from Rome when the incident occurred. Everitt notes, “It looked like an open and shut case however then Crassus’ money began to do its work.”¹⁸⁵ In the end, the jury acquitted Clodius by a jury vote of 31-25. Caesar escaped the whole event without doing any damage to his public image. Cicero’s actions were not as adept as Caesar’s. By testifying against Clodius, Cicero had tarnished the *dignitas* of Clodius, an affront that every aristocratic Roman took most seriously. Plutarch observes, “Cicero’s propensity to attack anyone for the sake of raising a laugh caused a good deal of ill-feeling against him.”¹⁸⁶ By the end of July, Cicero recognized Clodius as a vicious enemy. However, the damage was done. Cicero continued to harm his cause over the next two years as he continued to spar verbally with Clodius in the Senate throughout the year. In a letter to Atticus he relates his one incident between Clodius and him before the Senate: “You would think he was saying I’d bought

¹⁸⁵ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 121.

¹⁸⁶ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, (Translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore: Penquin Books 1968), 300.

a jury. The jurors gave no credit to your sworn testimony, said Clodius. No, I said, twenty-five of them did give me credit—but thirty-one gave you none, for they got their money in advance. Overwhelmed by roars of applause he collapsed into silence.”¹⁸⁷

Rawson notes that “[Cicero] He could never control his tongue; and he lacked, many may have felt, the *gravitas* proper to a leader of the state.”¹⁸⁸

In February, 61 BCE, Pompey returned from the east. Upon landing in Brundisium, he immediately discharged his troops and went home much to the surprise and relief of the optimates. About the time of the Bona Dea trial in July, Cicero had written Pompey a long-winded letter of self-congratulation about his Consulship. Pompey’s reply was, at best, curt. The reply to Cicero, notes Holland, was a cold dismissal by his hero [that] had been deeply hurtful.¹⁸⁹ Rawson notes that Pompey’s reply was cold and disappointing for Cicero, “Pompey was perhaps still keeping his options open, and may not have liked the way that Cicero tried to commit him.”¹⁹⁰ Everitt notes, “Pompey disliked Cicero’s boastfulness and more to the point, the fact that Cicero had no political power base.”¹⁹¹ Pompey, however, did want two things: a land distribution, however, for his troops and ratification of his eastern settlement plan. When Pompey addressed the Senate later, although not a polished speaker, he acknowledged the Bona Dea incident; and then, he addressed the Senate as to the needs of his troops and the

¹⁸⁷ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 97.

¹⁸⁸ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 91.

¹⁸⁹ Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. First Anchor Books Edition 2003 New York, NY. Kindle Edition. Loc.3269

¹⁹⁰ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 92.

¹⁹¹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 124.

eastern organization agreement. Pompey's speech was a total failure impressing nobody. Up to this point, Pompey identified with the *populares* supporters; however, in an attempt to entice the get the Senate optimates help in passing his two demands, he began courting Senate optimates to bring him into their fold after abandoning the populares. Pompey, however, was not a polished speaker and the speech flopped.¹⁹² After recognizing the Senate's cool reception to his speech, he decided to postpone further requests until next year and began cultivating a more favorable position with the Senate and, particularly, with the optimates.

In 60 BCE, one of Pompey's tribunes, Lucius Flavius, proposed a land distribution bill that was "carefully and unprovocatively framed and, after proposing some amendments, Cicero supported it."¹⁹³ By supporting the bill, Cicero's former *populares* detractors hailed his vote and the attacks against him subsided for a while. In addition, it was summer, the time when most aristocrats left Rome to travel to cooler climates in the mountains or, more likely, to the coast. The optimates opposed the land bill proposal from the onset for no other reason than because it disturbed the status quo. Pompey was disgruntled and depressed that he could not acquire ratification of his eastern settlements or passage of his land bill after two years back in Rome.

The bill was a balanced approach attempting to find an equitable solution to a recurring problem. He reconsidered his reconciliation with the Senate and started to assess other

¹⁹² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 124.

¹⁹³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 128.

options. Everitt points to the lack of caliber in the Senate and notes the composition of the optimate controlled Senate at this time:

“Had there been more conservative politicians of real ability, the history of these years might have been quite different. The bloodlettings earlier in the century under Marius and Sulla had depopulated the ruling class and, with the deaths of senior figures (including, recently, that of that elderly pillar of the political establishment Catulus), the talent on the Senate’s benches was much reduced.”¹⁹⁴

Cicero, now a back bencher, considered an elder statesman of the Senate. He had fewer clients and followers; however, he remained the best orator of the time with an ability to motivate and influence people whenever he spoke; but, the optimate support no longer protected him. Now, at the end of 61 BCE and the beginning of 60 BCE, Catalus died. He was the leading optimate of the Senate optimates and a friend to Cicero. Cicero noted, “Since Catulus died I have been holding to this optimate road without supporters or companions.”¹⁹⁵

Caesar returned in June 60 BCE and the Senate, in an attempt to stifle Caesar’s plans offered him a choice of either waiting with his troops outside the *pomerium* for the Senate to accept his Triumph celebration or to reject the triumph, cross the sacred boundary of the *pomerium* and present himself as candidate for consul in 59 BCE. Caesar crossed the *pomerium* to run for election much to the surprise and chagrin of the

¹⁹⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 129.

¹⁹⁵ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol.1.20.20*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 121.

Senate.¹⁹⁶ Once in Rome, Caesar immediately recognized that only four men of any consequence had the influence of any concern in Rome: himself, Crassus, Pompey and Cicero. He began thinking of channeling the abilities, wealth and energies of these men; that, if properly harnessed and working in concert, could acquire what they wanted: Crassus and his tax collectors, Pompey and his two land and eastern settlement proposals, and Cicero with *dignitas* or prominence. The optimates, led by Cato, believed Caesar would never cross the *pomerium* and turn down a triumph. However, Caesar did. Caesar formed a partnership with Pompey and Crassus. Caesar, next, ordered his daughter, Julia, to break off her long engagement to Brutus and marry Pompey. As a dutiful Roman aristocrat's daughter, she obeyed her father. Cicero, however, declined Caesar's request and explained that involvement in such an arrangement jeopardized his political independence.¹⁹⁷ He was probably correct with that assessment but lost Caesar's protection against Clodius and the increasing attacks by the *populares* and the *equites*.

Caesar was elected consul in 59 BCE. His co-consul was M. Calpurnius Bibulus, son-in-law of Cato. Cato lobbied the Senate debate to block the vote on Caesar's triumph that allowed him to run for election as consul—a frustration that Cato unwisely believed would stymie Caesar's plans. With Pompey now fully committed by marriage to Caesar, he acted as liaison between the Senate and Pompey and Pompey and Crassus. Pompey desperately needed passage of his laws to preserve his *auctoritas* with his troops. At this same time, Crassus realized he could help both himself and his tax farmers. Caesar,

¹⁹⁶ Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2006), 155-9.

¹⁹⁷ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 134.

Crassus and Pompeii agreed to work together even though Pompey and Crassus could not stand each other. Thus, the First Triumvirate was born. By 58 BCE, as Ronald Syme points out, “the domination of Pompeius Magnus was openly revealed. It rested on his own *auctoritas*, the wealth and influence of Crassus, the consular power of Caesar and the services of a number of tribunes.”¹⁹⁸

In March, 59 BCE, Cicero was defending his co-consul Marcus Antonius Hybridis against the charges of corruption.¹⁹⁹ Hybridis, once again, had showed his ineptness and greed as governor in Macedonia, the province that Cicero relinquished to him to gain his allegiance against Catilina. Cicero, without thinking, used his speech to launch an attack on the First Triumvirate.²⁰⁰ This was another political mistake by Cicero, who, once again, brought about problems created by his need for recognition and coupled with a lack of political awareness. Although no names were involved, the audience realized who the three individuals were that Cicero mentioned. When Caesar learned of the speech, he made no public comments; instead, he summoned Clodius. Caesar attempted to silence Cicero earlier by offering blandishments or covertly threatening Cicero. Cicero responded to none of these ploys. Instead, Cicero retreated and withdrew to his villas away from public life.²⁰¹ During this period, he began writing his “Secret History”, his *De consules Suis*, “a candid memoir of his life and times, in which

¹⁹⁸ Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002). 35

¹⁹⁹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 138.

²⁰⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 138.

²⁰¹ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 138.

he denounced his enemies and attacked what historians would later call “the First Triumvirate.” The book was well-known during that time but has since been lost.²⁰²

Since the Bona Dea trial, when massive bribes to the jury bought Clodius an acquittal, Clodius had sworn vengeance against Cicero. Working on revenge, Clodius petitioned the Pontifex Maximus, Julius Caesar, to approve his request to relinquish his patrician status and become a plebeian. As Pontifex Maximus, Caesar had the authority to change Clodius’ designation from patrician status to plebeian. On the same afternoon as Cicero’s speech, Caesar, after learning of Cicero’s speech, let Clodius loose. Caesar declared Clodius an adopted plebeian of his 20-year old “father.” Clodius now had the ability to run for election as tribune. Shortly, thereafter, Cicero learned that Clodius announced he was running for election as tribune in 58 BCE. Clodius also announced that his goal was to make Cicero pay for the execution of the 5 Catilinarian conspirators. With Clodius’ money, influence and desire to avenge the 5 conspirators, the people elected Clodius as tribune in 58 BCE. Immediately he pushed a series of bills to benefit the people and bolster his support. He passed a law for free grain that gained him the support of the urban plebs; then passed a law that repealed the ban on assembly of social groups; and, repealed the ban on joining clubs: a move that won him the tradespeople. These laws opened a massive recruiting ground for Clodius’ gang members. In the past, tradesmen

²⁰² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 138. Everitt notes, “This *Secret History (De consules suis)* was a well-known book in antiquity is now lost. It was unpublishable in Cicero’s lifetime and he gave it to young Marcus with the instruction not to issue it until after his death.” Although unverified, this book may have been one of the many books that Augustus confiscated which, along with the others, contained defamatory statements about Julius Caesar.

met in the cross-streets of their trade areas.²⁰³ The activity banned club association and membership as illegal for fear that groups of plebs would do nothing but cause trouble. Although this statement wasn't necessarily true, it was possible. More importantly, the passage of these laws helped insure Clodius' power and influence after his Tribuneship.²⁰⁴ Clodius had formed a recruiting base for his gang looking past his year in office as tribune where his army of street gangs would control the city; hence, the state. Since Clodius always needed more and more "soldiers" for his urban army, it stood to reason that repealing these laws benefited his activities. To maintain the allegiance of the new consuls, Gabinius and Piso, Clodius secured favorable 5-year postings for both men after their year as consuls. Of the two consuls, Gabinius was the most aggressively hostile to Cicero. Seager notes, "Gabinius was violently hostile, lending open support to Clodius and exerting his consular authority against all who demonstrated their sympathy for Cicero."²⁰⁵ He continues, "[Gabinius'] whole career reveals his concern for the victims of Rome's equestrian tax-gatherers, and the chance to hurt Cicero, so often the mouthpiece of the *publicani*."²⁰⁶ Seager posits that Gabinius' actions, served as an indication of Cicero's self-deception and Pompey's deviousness. Later in the year, when Gabinius openly shifted his support of Pompey to that of Clodius, it was a harbinger that Pompey,

²⁰³ Mary Beard, "*SPQR: A History of Rome*," (New York. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015), 281.

²⁰⁴ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, Second. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002, 101.

²⁰⁵ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, Second. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002, 101.

²⁰⁶ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, Second. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002, 101-02.

“had decided to sacrifice Cicero.”²⁰⁷ If Pompey allowed Clodius to have his way, Clodius in reciprocation would not bother Pompey. Then, after Clodius was out of office and no longer a tribune, Pompey would then gain Cicero’s return from exile. The most telling law passed by Clodius, however, was the last law that Clodius put past a naïve and trusting Cicero and his Tribune based upon a promise by Clodius to Cicero.

Cicero had retained tribunes to protect him should Clodius present any tribunal law that threatened Cicero. If Clodius presented any acts that affected Cicero, his tribunes were in a position to veto the law thus stymying Clodius’ efforts. Clodius, however, promised Cicero no enmity remained if he allowed Clodius to pass this one law without interference. Clodius made this oath. Cicero accepted the oath. Almost immediately, Clodius broke the oath by immediately passing a law exiling any person minimum distance of 400 miles that condemned a Roman citizen to death without a trial.

Cicero, as per custom when an aristocrat sought clemency, let his beard and hair grow long, he dressed in torn and soiled clothes and walked through the Forum in that manner. Senate sympathizers took up his plea for mercy and began wearing the same clothing; however, Caesar told them to cease such support. The senators complied although they did not want to incur the wrath of Caesar and his tribune bully, Clodius. At this same time, Caesar and Pompey portrayed themselves as Cicero’s friends.

Cicero tried to meet with Pompey, his supposed friend, to remind Pompey about his vow he made to protect Cicero from Clodius. Instead, Pompey told Cicero that he could not betray Caesar. Later, a second envoy visited L. Piso—one of the consuls. Piso

²⁰⁷ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, Second. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002, 102.

said he was not as brave as Cicero and that he should save the state again by going into exile to avoid a terrible bloodbath. He and Gabinius could not betray his tribune (Clodius) or Pompey's son-in-law, Caesar.²⁰⁸ A second delegation of Senators, headed by M. Lucullus went to Pompey's Alban Hills estate to plead Cicero's case; Pompey informed them that he was powerless to help without a Senate decree giving him authority to act.²⁰⁹ At another meeting at Cicero's house, Hortensius, a friend of Cicero's, explained that they could not muster sufficient support to prevent Clodius from assailing Cicero. They advised Cicero to leave Rome: advice which Cicero regarded as the deepest and darkest of treacheries.²¹⁰ With all avenues of appeal exhausted and insufficient optimate or equites support, Cicero and a group of friends who were helping him, left Rome on foot in the middle of the night as Cicero went into exile. The closest Cicero could live as per the exile regulations that Clodius had passed was in Salonika in the Macedonian region of Greece. Clodius' law prohibited anyone from giving "fire and water" (i.e. aid and sustenance) to Cicero for 400 miles; however, in Italy became aware of the situation and aware of Cicero's previous kindnesses ignored the law and offered him shelter wherever he traveled. As Cicero told Atticus, "The bill for my destruction has come into my hands, and the correction about which I had heard was to the effect that I

²⁰⁸ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 115-6.

²⁰⁹ Robin Seager. *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*. Second. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002. 102.

²¹⁰ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 116.

am allowed to live at a distance of not less than 400 miles, but am not allowed to get there.”²¹¹

Upon learning that Cicero had escaped Rome without the public humiliation that Clodius anticipated, Clodius immediately passed another law that allowed the Senate to confiscate an exile’s home and personal belongings. Upon passage, Clodius leveled Cicero’s home, threw his family into the street, confiscated his art work and also destroyed two of his villas one of which was the most prized Tusculum villa. To prevent Cicero or his friends from re-building on Cicero’s land in Rome, Clodius next dedicated the site as a religious offering to Liberty. Clodius now had a large beautiful garden to gaze upon rather than Cicero’s house. The First Triumvirate supported Clodius since his actions kept the Senate intimidated and prevented any type of vigorous opposition to any bills or decrees, they presented²¹² Clodius, however, never a close friend of Pompey, felt threatened by Pompey’s rise to power. To demonstrate the power of the triumvirs and Clodius, as Syme notes in his agreement with Seager, “As a demonstration and as a warning [of Clodius’ power], Cicero was sacrificed to Clodius.”²¹³

Cicero had always been prone to excessive mood swings, as Rawson notes. During Cicero’s exile, Everitt believes that Cicero experienced “something like a mental

²¹¹ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol.1.20.20*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 223.

²¹² Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 143.

²¹³ Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002), 36.

breakdown...or at least considered suicide.”²¹⁴ Wood concurs noting that, “He [Cicero] may have suffered a suicidal breakdown.”²¹⁵ Traveling down the boot of Italy to Brundisium where he departed for Thessalonica Cicero bemoans, “This I do say flatly that no one ever suffered so crushing a blow or had greater cause to pray for death...From the time that remains I do not look any longer for a remedy; however, only for an end to my misery.”²¹⁶ Rawson also agrees that during this time, Cicero was close to a mental breakdown that he was: very near a real nervous breakdown.²¹⁷ Exiled in Thessalonica, Cicero expressed his animosity to Atticus and his enmity toward his enemies, “you see how the perfidy of others has stripped me of all that I have enjoyed in such ample measure, all that I most valued and delighted in, how I have been betrayed and thrown to the wolves by my own advisors [Hortensius, Pompey in particular]...”²¹⁸

Feeling lost, contemplating suicide, homesick for his family and friends, his letters to Atticus show that Cicero seemed to treat his depression by writing at a higher than normal oratory level and musing about his fate while in a deep state of self-pity. Through the exile, Cicero vacillated between these states of high oratory and dark depression—both moods in his swings of emotion calling out for attention. Rawson also agrees with Cicero and his “mercurial personality and mood swing.” Once out of Italy,

²¹⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 145.

²¹⁵ Neal Wood, *Cicero's Social and Political Thought*, (Berkeley and Oxford. University of California Press.1988), 52.

²¹⁶ *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol.1.III.4.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 229

²¹⁷ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 116.

²¹⁸ D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Letters to Atticus vol.1.20.20*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999),

landing in Dyrrachium on his way to Salonika, Cicero, between mood swings, started reaching out to people in Rome who he thought might help him. The letters and the behind the scene efforts of his friends began and continued throughout 58 BCE; however, they only started making headway when on January 1, 57 BCE, the last day of Clodius' term as tribune, a bill was introduced by Consul Lentulus to recall Cicero. The bill passed with a strong majority. Clodius, to avoid the people voting on the bill, deployed his troops. Violence ensued during which several Tribunes were injured (Tribunes were sacrosanct). Cicero's brother, Quintus was injured and left for dead. Of note is the method used to circumvent the language of Clodius' earlier law.

The bill from Lentulus contained language that convicted anyone, who did not support the bill, as a public enemy.²¹⁹ For weeks, the street fighting continued between, mainly, Publius Sestius and Titus Milo's gladiators and Clodius' fighters. Later, in Cicero's defense of Sestius, he described the weeks of street fighting and its effects, "The Tiber was full of citizens' corpses, the public sewers were choked with them and the blood that streamed from the Forum had to be mopped up with sponges."²²⁰ Finally, the Senate vote came. All voted in favor of recalling Cicero from exile except one—Clodius. Clodius was stopped for the time being; however, he was not defeated.

Pompey, finally, stated his open support for Cicero's recall after he came out of his self-imposed hibernation after constant assaults by Gabinius' gangs who were associated with Clodius. and began lobbying for Cicero's return up and down the

²¹⁹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 121.

²²⁰ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 149.

peninsula gathering support in as many Italian cities as possible—an effort where Clodius' contacts outside of Rome were not as extensive as Pompey's. Clodius' shifted his attacks to Pompey. Interestingly, Cicero makes no mention of either Caesar or Crassus during this time. Granted, Caesar had left Rome for Gaul; however, distance had not stopped him from being involved in Roman politics in the past. Given the assumption that Clodius had worked in concert with the Triumvirs, the question then is. “Why did Caesar allow Clodius to harass Pompey? Was this a method to keep Pompey under Caesar's control? Alternatively, did Clodius break away from the triumvirs and strike out on his own? This alternative seems most likely since Clodius had developed his army. Pompey had married Caesar's daughter, Julia. In addition, where was Crassus? The history of this event at this point in time identifies nothing but the absence of Crassus who was distracted, presumably, by his eastern campaign. His resentment of Pompey and his past influence of Clodius suggest that it was Crassus that encouraged Clodius to harass Pompey. Caesar, however, was not suspected. However, Crassus' influence on Clodius waned as his career as Tribune came to an end and his personal forces increased. By January, 57 BCE, Clodius broke from the influence of Crassus and Caesar to expand and organize his street forces to support his climb up the *cursus honorum*.

Caesar was the last of the Triumvirs to consent to Cicero's recall; but, he had conditions. Cicero had started, arguably, the wheels turning that led to his downfall after publicly denouncing the Triumvirs. Caesar, in order for Cicero to return, wanted guarantees from Cicero and his brother to prohibit any public invectives against the Triumvirate. Quintus was compelled to give private guarantees of Cicero's good

behavior, and public demonstrations of loyal acquiescence.²²¹ The moment Cicero learned of the recall movement, who was supporting it, and how broad the support was, he left Dyrrachium and sailed to Brundisium on August 4, 57 BCE. Coincidentally, the day was the City's founding celebration; and, more importantly, his daughter Tullia's birthday. Cicero waited in Brundisium for mail from Quintus that announced the passage of the bill. Cicero then travelled up the Italian peninsula greeted by throngs of well-wishers and celebratory officials and their decrees while delegates met him all along the way.²²² Cicero arrived in Rome on September 5th, well-timed to coincide with Rome's *ludi Romani* celebration. He told Atticus that when he finally arrived at the edge of Rome on September 4, everybody on his list of important people welcomed him. Everitt notes that Cicero's return to Rome was, "as close to a Triumph as a nonmilitary man could aspire to."²²³ From Brundisium to Rome, demonstrations greeted the entire way, noted Cicero noted so much so that, "Italy had taken him on its shoulders and carried him back to Rome."²²⁴ His enemies stayed away.²²⁵ Once there, Cicero quickly regained his old form and began attacking some of those supporters who held secret resentment and open jealousy.²²⁶

²²¹ Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002), 37.

²²² Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 122.

²²³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 141.

²²⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 141.

²²⁵ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 151.

²²⁶ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 152.

Cicero, at once, began his appearances in the courts and in the Senate. Cicero had been out of work for almost 18 months, he had no home and debts to pay. His appearances in public reaffirmed that Cicero had lost little, if any, of his rhetorical skills during his exile. During 56 BCE, he successfully defended Sestius, who had continuously lobbied for Cicero's return; and, when Clodius tried to blame Cicero for the food shortage, Cicero adeptly authored a decree giving Pompey complete charge of the grain supply for the next five years. Pompey reciprocated immediately by appointing Cicero as one of the legatees for Pompey's grain commission naming Cicero as his second self.²²⁷ Cicero, once again active in the courts, was defending his client, Caelius for poisoning his lover, Clodia—Clodius' sister. Caelius was a one-time friend of Cicero's, who was, at one-time, Clodia's lover, the sister of Clodius. To get back at Clodius, Cicero attacked his sister, Clodia, in the courts. He eviscerated Clodia to such an extent that she disappeared from history²²⁸. Cicero had not lost his sense of overcompensated revenge.

He next took issue with the College of Pontiffs regarding the land where his home had once stood however where Clodius had leveled it, confiscated everything then burned it to ashes and dedicated the plot to "Liberty" to prevent Cicero from reclaiming it. Cicero was dealing with a personal and passionate subject now. He convinced the College of Pontiffs to invalidate the religious distinction of his property; and next, he argued before the Senate for funds to rebuild his home and two of his other properties that Clodius destroyed. The Senate approved the allocation of funds but the amount

²²⁷ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, (Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002),108.

²²⁸ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), xx.

approved was just a little over half the value of what the original house. The same ratio applied to funds allocated for the rebuilding of the destroyed villas. Cicero still had the ability to speak publicly. Cicero regarded this action by the Senate as resentment toward him from disgruntled optimates.²²⁹

Clodius was not done dealing harm to Cicero. Clodius was running for the constitutional office of Aedile in 56 BCE wherein, if elected, he would hold, a senatorial position able to advance his interests whether they were against Cicero or anyone else. The elections, normally scheduled in July, were for some unknown reason postponed until November. Clodius warned the Senate to hold the elections or his gangs would stage riots. He kept his promise and in November, riots began in the city. Workmen at Cicero's house were run off the property by Clodius' gangs, Quintus' house close to Cicero was set on fire and later, Cicero, himself was attacked while walking toward the Forum.²³⁰ The next day Clodius boldly led his gang in an attack on Milo's house attempting to defeat Milo's forces and burn down Milo's house. Milo was a strong ally of Cicero and Pompey who was running for consul and was a stated enemy of Clodius. Many leading Clodians died during this melee thus forcing Clodius to temporarily step back.²³¹ Cicero realized the necessity of remaining on good terms with the Triumvirs. He had attempted to drive a wedge between Caesar and Pompeii which backfired resulting in the

²²⁹ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 125.

²³⁰ Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: a portrait*, (London: Bristol Classical Press. 1975), 125.

²³¹ Anthony Everitt. *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*. (New York: Random House, 2003). 173

reaffirmation of the Triumvirate in 56 BCE.²³² To compensate for this error in judgement, the Triumvirs asked Cicero to defend Vatinius and then Gabinius both of whom were stated enemies of Cicero. Although his skills had not diminished, he was a “back-bencher” in the Senate—now and rarely called upon. Everitt notes that Cicero’s “frame of mind shifted uneasily from one mood to another; but, at heart, he was depressed. He could not help despising himself for doing Caesar’s bidding.”²³³ With his speech censored both publicly and privately, Cicero spent fewer hours in the Senate and more time in the privacy of his home with his books. He began writing in earnest in 55 BCE. He retired to his villas and began writing his political theories, his philosophical theories and his religious theories while avoiding travelling to Rome as much as possible. As Berry notes, “In 53 BCE or 52 BCE, Cicero was gratified to receive, on Hortensius’ nomination, an important political honor: he was elected to a place in the College of Augurs...”²³⁴ This nomination appeared to be an act acknowledging Cicero’s value to Rome but also Cicero’s value as a friend to Hortensius.

While Cicero was governor in Cilicia 51-50 BCE, the political atmosphere grew more dysfunctional. By this time, life in Rome bordered on anarchy as street violence between gangs kept escalating both in size and severity and corruption ran rampant.²³⁵ From 53 BCE on into 52 BCE; the violence continued with such frequency which

²³² Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), xx.

²³³ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 162.

²³⁴ Cicero, *Cicero Political Speeches*, (2009) (Translated by D. H. Beery), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), xxi.

²³⁵ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome’s greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 162.

prevented consular elections. Instead, much to their chagrin, the optimates called on Pompey, as proconsul, to assist with the holding of elections.²³⁶ Consuls Messalla and Calvinus were elected eventually after more than half of their term had expired. Word then came from the East that Crassus and his legions were dead. With the death of Crassus and the earlier death of Pompey's wife and Caesar's daughter, Julia, the Triumvirate evaporated almost immediately. Caesar still hoped that Pompey would stay connected; however, Pompey turned this option away. He remarried in 52 BCE after appointment as sole consul. His new wife, Cornelia, was the daughter of the noblest man in Rome, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica. The marriage moved Pompey away from Caesar and the populares and toward the Senate and conservative optimates.²³⁷ Pompey had successfully positioned himself between Caesar and the optimates. The stage was set for the consular elections of 52 BCE.

Titus Annius Milo was a candidate for consul of 51 BCE and an enemy of Clodius. On January 18, 52 BCE, Clodius and his followers met Milo and his followers met by chance on the Appian Way. Milo and his wife were in a carriage returning from his official duties as dictator for one of his towns. His entourage included household slaves, workers and some gladiators as bodyguards for the entourage. Clodius and 30 of his gang members rode out from Clodius' country villa with weapons unsheathed. Each group traveled in the direction opposite from the other. When the last of the men met in passing the fighting began. Soon, men from both parties had doubled back to support

²³⁶ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, (Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002), 131.

²³⁷ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, (Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002), 131.

their side. Almost immediately, a spear wounded Clodius and his men took Clodius into the nearby Bovillae Inn. Milo and his men followed after Clodius. They found Clodius and on the orders of Milo, killed Clodius. Milo's men carried Clodius outside the inn and placed him by the side of the road. His slaves ran away or hid out in the woods. Milo and his group continued on to their destination. A passing senator, on his way back to Rome, found the body and ordered his litter to take Clodius back to Rome.²³⁸ Supporters of Clodius carried his body to the Senate chambers where they built a funeral pyre using furniture and Senate records. The pyre ignited and quickly grew out of control so rapidly that the entire Senate chambers burned to the ground. The Senate had to act to control the situation. They turned to Pompey. Seager notes that the people's support shifted to Milo with the burning of the Senate house. When learning of the event, Caelius and Cicero came to Milo's aid.²³⁹

Pompey wanted to be sole consul rather than meet the constitutional limitations of Interrex. He later appointed a co-consul to serve with him. Both the Senate's appointment of Pompey as consul and Pompey's appointment of a co-consul were illegal; however, the Senate was desperate to retain control. They passed a *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU), apparently, feeling that Pompey was the only answer to the problem. Clodius' followers charged Milo of murder. Cicero represented him although the odds were completely against Milo because of the number of Clodius' followers and Pompey. Pompey and leaders of the Clodians looked to rid themselves of such a powerful

²³⁸ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, (Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002), 133.

²³⁹ Robin Seager, *Pompey the Great: A Political Biography*, (Second. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002), 134.

opponent especially given the fact that the support had grown for Milo. At the trial, Cicero, never highly courageous and averse to violence, began his speech when Clodius' backers started shouting and chanting. Pompey's forces stepped up and surrounded the area posing an impending threat of force if deemed necessary. Cicero froze. He mumbled meekly and could not complete his speech. The court convicted Milo who went into exile in Marseilles. Afterward, Cicero wrote the closing speech that he intended to deliver at Milo's trial. This speech, paradoxically, *Pro Milone*, has become the magnum opus, according to Asconius, of Cicero's many speeches even though it was never delivered. Cicero had lost all braggadocio and everywhere he looked at Milo's trial, he found nobody that accepted him.

After 52 BCE, Cicero, as a former consul, the Senate forced Cicero to take a proconsul governorship in Cilicia due to a shortage of experienced consuls. To Cicero, the governorship seemed like a second exile. Nevertheless, he administered the province well and honestly. The provincial leaders admired his administration of the province as a fair and just one that resisted increased tax levies. He also led his troops although he did not tactically command in his province. His military leadership was such that his troops recommended to the Senate a triumph for his efforts. Returning from his governorship in Cilicia as soon as possible, Cicero found the Rome atmosphere was heavy with pre-war tensions. Once in Rome, Cicero had to choose sides between Caesar and Pompey. He chose Pompey, not because he thought Pompey the better of the two; but, because he could not support anyone who rebelled against the Republic and the constitution and who had invaded his country. Cicero travelled to Greece to meet up with Pompey and his

troops. He soon learned how inept Pompey was and the Senate optimates that accompanied him to Greece who Pompey allowed heavy strategic input in his actions. He then returned to Italy where he landed in Brundisium in October, 48 BCE. Caesar, now in control of the whole of Italy did not permit him to travel to Rome until Caesar pardoned him in September, 47 BCE.

Cicero returned to the Senate but spoke only occasionally after the war. When he did, it was to implore Caesar to spare Pompeians sentenced to death. He did not have the same energy, the same enthusiasm, the same willingness to challenge verbally a person or an issue. Caesar's dictatorship had effectively stifled free speech which was Cicero's stock in trade. More sadly, Cicero's daughter, Tullia, died from complications of childbirth in 45 BCE. He was never the same after Tullia's death. For a time, he was inconsolable, depressed and crying frequently—all natural emotions but emotions that Roman men were not expected to show. After Caesar's assassination which he thoroughly supported, with the "republican" forces driven to ground in Africa, Republicans asked Cicero to take up the mantle as the leading man of the Republic. Although he assailed Marcus Antonius in his Philippic speeches in an attempt to retrieve the Republic, it was a lost cause. When he learned that Antonius, Lepidus and Octavian had formed a Second Triumvirate, Cicero knew that his days were numbered. Once again, Cicero fled for his life after speaking against the Second Triumvirate who needed to generate funds to replenish the state treasury by using proscription. Anthony signed the agreement only after Lepidus and Octavius agreed that named Cicero as the first person proscribed. Soon after, the Forum wall saw Cicero's head and hands nailed to it.

Conclusion

Historians, especially ancient Roman historians, acknowledge the fact that without Marcus Tullius Cicero--an orator, a linguist, a politician and a philosopher--an unredeemable gap of knowledge is lost. The absence of this man's influence cannot be recreated or re-established. Sir Ronald Syme hails Cicero as "a humane and cultivated man, an enduring influence upon the course of all European civilization."²⁴⁰ Other admirers trumpet him as a "constitutionalist" of "honorable and unselfish ideals," a leader devoted to "standards of duty, kindness and public spirit," "singularly genuine, refined and lovable," "one of Rome's leading sons" and "most precious gems," who refused "to live under a tyranny." As Michael Parenti observes, "Almost everyone shares that opinion of Cicero. "Contemporary American and British ancient historians are divided between Ciceronian's (95 percent)²⁴¹ and Caesarians (a mere handful), and the division reflects their current political attitudes," observes Arthur Kahn, one of the handful.²⁴² Another of the handful is Friedrich Engels, who called Cicero "the most contemptible scoundrel in history."²⁴³ So how can a person be defined as "singularly genuine, refined and lovable and also the most contemptible scoundrel in history"? The answer seems to rest in Cicero's actions and the motivation behind those actions and individual appreciation of those actions. In the examples, Cicero, until his exile, shows a dynamic

²⁴⁰ Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002), 4.

²⁴¹ Michael Parenti, *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome*, (New Press People's History), The New Press. Kindle Edition, 85.

²⁴² Michael Parenti. *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome* (New Press People's History) The New Press. Kindle Edition. 86

²⁴³ Michael Parenti, *The Assassination Of Julius Caesar: A People's History Of Ancient Rome*, (New Press People's History), The New Press. Kindle Edition, 86.

personality taking decisive action to mitigate a conspiracy; or, a person with a quick and caustic wit put to use to overcome his opponents. This person needed to boast constantly of his achievements whereas, after exile, Cicero seems struggle with the effects of a mercurial personality: depression, low self-worth, or high elation. From the 50's BCE on, Cicero displays less of a mercurial range in his day-to-day life.

The Catilinarian Conspiracy, regarded as one of the major events of the Late Republic, was Cicero's crowning achievement in his political career. Looking at the historical facts of the conspiracy, Catilina is a patrician of impeccable pedigree; but, not a person of high moral values. As scion, he struggled to acquire the wealth and prestige he believed due to him. He was charismatic, a born leader who possessed both superior mental and physical abilities. Although he campaigned on a platform of debt relief and land distribution—two topics that were anathema to the controlling and conservative aristocratic optimates, he did so not because of his beliefs but as a tool to gain elected office. His supporters came from all social levels: from indebted patrician aristocrats, to plebeians, to urban plebs and provincial farmers a phenomenon that sets the conspiracy apart.

His antagonist was Marcus Tullius Cicero—brilliant orator, lawyer known for his courtroom abilities and his speeches who, as *novus homo*, rose through Sulla's *cursus honorum*, to the level of candidate for Rome's highest elective office: consul. For each of his electoral campaigns, Cicero used the tactics of character assassination coupled with a balanced platform designed to garner votes from the plebeians and the *equites* with the swing votes resting in the electoral laps of the *optimates*, the aristocratic Senate. These

men held sway over large numbers of individuals as clients of these patrons who possessed the ability and means to attract votes. Cicero constantly strived to please the optimates and gain acceptance into the rarified air of the senatorial class. If he helped them, he was confident they would bring him into their social circle. Once elected consul, although the optimates supported Cicero's election, Cicero fretted about the optimate ingratitude: they "have never made me the slightest return or recompense, material or even verbal."²⁴⁴ He could not understand why their acceptance was temporary and not permanent. It was not until his exile apart from the day-to-day politics of Rome that he began understanding the political overtones and actions. For many years, Cicero believed that Hortensius was jealous of him and, as such, attempted to hold Cicero back. In reality, Hortensius was cognizant of political currents and events. When Clodius was no longer a tribune, Hortensius and other, optimates rallied to Cicero offering their support and through them launched a successful recall. Pompey realizing the duplicity of Clodius waited for the politically ripe moment to recall Cicero—a concept involving timing, planning and patience—all aspects not found in Cicero's actions.

Cicero's need for acceptance is seen best in his outlandish egotism that, even for Romans, was overly excessive. As was noted by antiquarians and modern historians, his boasting reached proportions that even offended Romans. After the Catalinarian conspiracy, Cicero made himself more unwelcome than the tedious boar he was by his constant speaking about how he saved Rome. In every speech for the next 20 years, the audience hears of his act of saving the Republic. However, little evidence survives of his

²⁴⁴ Anthony Everitt, *Cicero: the life and times of Rome's greatest politician*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 153.

continued levels of egotism and caustic wit. Exile and public restriction calmed his impulses to hurt maliciously individuals as noted by Plutarch. Cicero's bantering with Clodius taught him that gamesmanship was deadly and destructive as he found out as victim of Clodius. Pompey taught him duplicity while Caesar taught him the prudent application of money and power to control people.

Cicero's return to Rome from Sicily in his early career—when people did not realize that he had been gone—taught him that he should never leave Rome and never let the people forget who you were. He only left Italy three times: as quaestor in Sicily, as an exile and as proconsul governor of Cilicia. He believed that his future rested in Rome. Cicero basked for only a few minutes in the glory of achieving his life-long goal and optimum acceptance as the “Father of the Country” (*Pater Patria*) before the struggle began anew with Clodius.

Cicero was still riding an egomaniacal high after the Catilinarian Conspiracy. He felt that he had finally arrived. When supporters at all levels disappeared, Cicero believed the cause was that these they were unaware of his many and great achievements. He failed to perceive the situation within himself and his insecurities and in empathy with his *clients* and supporters. His supporters did not follow him blindly but because he had assured them of his service for them. When Cicero's actions betrayed the people's trust, his boastfulness could not convince them that he made the right decisions for them. Cicero did not accept the fact that he had insufficient support to overcome his enemies like Clodius until he succeeded in exiling Cicero. For the entire 16 plus months of his exile until his return to Italy, Cicero's personality swung from utter despair and suicidal

thoughts to unreasonably optimistic thoughts of hope and salvation. Exile changed Cicero. He learned that his need for acceptance and recognition had put him in dire straits to such a point stifling his ability able to express himself freely in either the courts or the Senate.

Luckily, for the world, Cicero rechanneled his energies into literary pursuits for the last years of his life and, in so doing, gave the Roman and western European worlds the foundations of law and governments. He perfected the use of Latin that it was widely used as the *lingua Franca* until the 18th century. He was an elitist who distrusted democracy and regarded the plebs as the *plebs sordida*, the unwashed. He was, unabashedly, the biggest egotist in the history of Rome; however, conversely, he left a literary legacy that lives on. Cicero failed to recognize his insecurities however still struggled to overcome the challenges presented him. Instead, he masked his insecurities behind caustic humor and his need for acceptance and approval. His abilities and insecurities created and destroyed his career and success. Only a few people felt any of his empathy while he felt the betrayal of others. In the end, Cicero never forgot or forgave those senators and optimates who supported him or opposed him during his exile.

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